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Abstract
Vehicle management may be considered to consist of traflic managcml.!nt,
usage control, maintenance, and security.

Various regulatory authorities

undertake the first aspect, fleet managers will be concerned with all aspects,

and

owner~drivcrs

will· be

intere~ted

mainly in maintenance and security. Car

theft poses a universal security problem.

Personalisation,

including

navigational assistance, might be achieved as a by-product of an improved
management system. Authorities and fleet managers may find smartcards to
be key components of an improved system, but owners may feel that the need

for improved security does not justify its cost. This thesis seeks to determine
whether smartcards may be used to personalise vehicles in order to improve
vehicle management within a forseeable time and suggest when it might
happen. In the process four broad questions are addressed.
•

First, what improvements in technology are needed to make any improved
scheme using smartcards practicable, and what can be expected in the near
future?

•

Second, what problems and difficulties may impede the development of
improved management?

•

Third, what non-vehicle applications might create an environment in which
a viable scheme could emerge?

•

Finally, is there a perceived need for improved vehicle management?

The method involved a literature search, the issue of questionnaires to ownerdrivers and fleet managers, discussions with fleet managers, the preparation of
data-flow and state diagrams, and the construction of a simulation of a

IV

possible security approach.

The study concludes that although vehicle

pcrsonalisation is possible- and desirable it is unlikely to occur within the next
decade bt:causc the environment needed to make it practicable will not emerge

until ;.i number of commercial nnd standardisation problems that obstruct all
smartcard applications have bCcn solved.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Inspiration for the topic • smart cards in cellular

telephones

1.1.1 Personal communications and personal mobility.

Within the last century there have been dramatic improvements in personal
communications. One hundred years ago only the rich had telephones and usage

was limited tb local calls: long distance messages were sent by telegraph. Today,
with a cellular telephone, it is possible to communicate with another person almost

anywhere in the world; however, minor nuisances such as unwanted interruption and
disturbance for others nearby have accompanied this improved convenience.

In

contrast, there have been lesser improvements in personal mobility. The vehicle, the
principal personal mobility device, is less convenient and has become more of a
nuisance. Can we enhance its convenience and overcome the nuisance factors of
security risk, wasteful usage, pollution and crowding? Perhaps, in the distant future,
in potentially hazardous traffic situations such as major intersections, an automatic
system might assume control of all vehicles within a specified zone and regulate
their speeds and distances to improve efficiency and safety by the temporary
suspension of the human factor. As an ultimate example, might we, one day, match
the convenience of the cellular telephone and have our car at our fingertips,
summoning it like a magic carpet from elsewhere, by pressing buttons, and
dismissing it in the same way?
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1.1.2 Electronic control and smart cards

Th~

magtc carpet concept is lent a tinge or credibility hy the world·~o'lidc trl·nd

towards electronic control ami delivery in commerce.

This trend is appan..:nt in

lln;mcial, telephone, transportation, utility, entertainment, health, and welfare,
systems. An example is the application of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards
in Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) cellular telephones that has
shown how useful a smart card may be in personalising a device for the individual.

It is possible that, just as a person inserting his/her SIM card into any compatible

cell phone makes that phone his/her own, a smart card might contribute to
personalising a motor vehicle for its owners or drivers. In this thesis the term "smart
card" is reserved for cards that conform to Parts l to 6 of the International Standards
Organisation (ISO) standard 7816 and may serve as both a source and a repository
of data, and/or as a highly portable processor. Standard ISO 7816 is discussed in
more detail in section 4.3.2. The smart memory card, whose processor merely
controls its memory with "hard wired" logic, is excluded.

1.1.3 Communications and mobility contrasted

Although the need for vehicle personalisation may be similar to that accepted at
present

for

cellular

telephones,

there

are

differences

between

personal

communication systems and personal mobility ones. Telephone channels are owned
privately, or by a government agency, and the owner has almost absolute control
over them, but Australian roads are genera(ly publicly owned and control is mostly a
matter of prohibitions. The reasons for the differences are practical, rather than

logi~.:;.\1,

and it is possible that one day a national gowrniHl'nt might privatise more

roads, and th~.: new owners impose a toll or traversal fee, as is th~.: practice in
Singapon.: and in some places in the US and FrancL'. today.

Another possibility

might be that thl! lntcrnl!l absorbs till! global tcll!communication network, with most
intelligence and

~.:ontrnl

becoming resident in the terminals mthcr than the network

nodes. So. we may sec a convergence between the communication and mobility
systems. In the author's opinion. pcrsonalisation will probably remain

a<;

a major

attraction for users. and smart cards appear to be the best tool for its implementation.
Whatever happens, smart carJs might play an increasing role and the following
discussion examines this possibility.

1.1.4 Vehicle ownership in WA

Before defining vehicle management, its scope should be estimated. At the 1998
census, Western Australia (WA) had about half a million cellular telephones and
about 1.1 million passenger and light commercial vehicles, of which the vehicles
constituted a vastly greater asset (Yearbook Australia, 2000, p. 602). Included in the
1.1 million are both fleet and owner-driven vehicles.

For fleet vehicles,

accountability for their efficient employment usually rests with someone other than
the driver. Of cars and light commercial vehicles, a majority are personal transport
and owned by the driver or driver's family; whereas, the remainder, about ten
percent (see Appendix!), might be regarded as fleet vehicles, where the driver(s) arc
not necessarily the owner(s). This fleet versus private distinction is not clcm·-cut, as
many cars arc family transport and driven by more than one member of the family.
Since the drivers of fleet vehicles may have no direct stake in efficiency, a more
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formal and controlled management style is required for such vchidcs than for those
driven by their owners. However, it seems likely that any management system that
gains widcspn:ad acceptance will have appeal to the private, as well as the tlcct,

owner.

1.2

Components of Vehicle Management

Vehicle management may be considered to consist of traffic management, usage
control, maintenance, convenience and security. These components nave associated

problems that are described next, and that might be ameliorated by a smart card
supported system.

1.2.1 Traffic Management

Traffic management presents probiems in behaviour, congestion and pollution, and
in the provision of parking spaces. These problems are now examined in the light of

trends in vehicle management and usage:

furthermore, potential business

opportunities are highlighted.

Behaviour control includes determination of regulations, registration of vehicles,
licensing of drivers, monitoring and enforcement.

Even with the increasing

employment of multi-novas (speed cameras that are operated by police auxiliaries)
for speed control, the surveillance that results is inte.rmittent and currently, in
Australia, monitoring of roadworthincss is not

compn~hensivc.

Recently, a

subsidiary problem, the identification of those who exceed speed limits, has captured

media atll:ntion ("Priv.:tcy IC:tr", 199tJ). A system that automatt.:d monitoring and
ensured idcntifil:ation might improve behaviour.

Snmc congestion, with accompanying pollution. is incviwhlc, as the utilisation of
cars in W A is neither static nor declining: for example. there was a steady rise in the
number of registcrd vehicles throughout 1995-1997 (Yearbook Australia, 1998, p.
600).

Naturally, this rise adds to the congestion and pollution problems, as thr;

Australian Federal and State Governments cannot provide, in the short term, for the
increasing number of vehicles by constructing extra roads due to private land
ownership limiting the availability of appropriate space. The Federal and/or WA
State Government response may exploit the general trend in fiscal policy to make
the user (especially, the motorist) pay. The trend has been given prominence with
the High Court ruling concerning •he right of Australian States to impose a tax on
petrol (Sources of State Revenue, 1999). The issue of road pricing, as an effective
means of both managing road traffic demand and raising additional revenue for road
construction, is on the political agenda of many European governments (Blythe,
Burdon, Clark, Givens & Rourke, 1994, p. 42). For example, in some cities, such as
3ingapore, a charge is made on every motorist who enters the central business
district. Australian governments have not ignored the trend.

National and State

projects are described in section 7.5.2. Congestion might also be reduced if smart
cards were used to encourage car-pooling and facilitate cost sharing between vehicle
occupants.

Motorists expect to pay for parking in congested areas, and there is a perception that
user payment is the fairest way to allocate a scarce resource: this perception is

r~infon:cd

by the

ne~ds

of local hodies.

Parking ft.:es and fines resulting from

parking offences me an important source of revenue for civic authorities,
particularly as th~ir imposition may also advance the socially desirable objectives of
reducing pollution and congestion.

Australia wide, in 1995, parking was an SO

million-dollar industry (Guimmarra, G. & Luk, J, 1995). Currently, coin-operated
kerb-side devices or ticket dispensing machines collect the fees and, in either case,
wardens must monitor the system. Mechanical meters arc vulnerable to vandalism
and theft. have unreliable moving parts, and provide no information about the cash
collected (Luk, J.Y.K., 1995, p. 1).

For both behaviour control and parking, the present method of collecting traffic
management charges is labour intensive, expensive and, therefore, wasteful: hence, a
system that could collect the charges automatically and accurately would be
desirable. The introduction of any automatic system would depend on the existence
of a "critical mass" of motorists prepared to pay for the necessary roadway and "invehicle" devices; however, until there is a mass market for the devices, their prices
would continue to remain high and the "critical mass" might not eventuate.

An

example of this possibility is the "City Link" project in Melbourne which is reported
to be functioning satisfactorily (City Link Project, 1999). Prices might fall and the
transition to widespread automatic collection systems be facilitated if fuel
companies, road authorities, and financial institutions, cooperated to standardise the
collection method.

In this regard, smart cards might provide the facilitating

mechanism for such a standard automated "user pays" system. Standardisation is
considered in more detail in chapter four.
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ThL·n: may he problems in developing an automatic syswm, hut there an.: also
business opportunities. The number of fuelling and other transactions in vchich.:
usage is second (lnly to point-of-sale
p. 646).

trans:.~c\i(JJls

in the f<md industry (Arazi, 1991,

Arazi is probably referring to the US, and Australia docs not collect a

comparable statistic, but this admitlcdly dated reference is not inconsistent with
statistics from the Household Expenditure Survey, Australia, Catalog No 6535.0.
Since vehicles operate day and night, the gradual adoption of automatic vending

would seem to be inevitable.

Other opportunities include insurance sales and

support, navigational information and, on a futuristic scale. a city hire car system
along the lines of the Praxitcle pilot scheme now under trial in Saint-Quentin en
Yvelines, France (Arensonas, 1996).

1.2.2 Usage

In contrast to traffic management, usage is of more concern to owners, especially
fleet owners, than to authorities.

Owners are concerned about cost, and the

operation of 1.1 million registered light vehicles is a significant cost. The Royal
Automobile Club ofWA (RAC) web site gives estimates of the cost per kilometre to
run a vehicle as varying from about 80 cents for a Long Wheel Base (LWB) offreader to 38 cents for a small city runabout ("Car running costs", 2001). An average
figure might be about 50 cents and an average annual kilometres per vehicle might
be about 15,200 (Yearbook Australia, 1998, p. 602). Therefore, the estimated cost

of vehicle usage in W A might be about A$8.4 billion. The ten percent of vehicles
that are in fleets, in practice are newer than those owned by individuals and are more

X

heavily used: consequently, the cost of their operation is likely to be more than ten
percent of the totaL

Although owner-drivers might welcome some assistance in controlling usc of their
vehicles. the desire for assistance is unlikely to amount to a compelling motivation

to

purcha~e

even a cheap device because the owner is entitled to "waste" resources

in his/!ter vehicle if convenience so dictates.

For tleet owners the situation is different, since profit considerations require that the
fleet provide the maximum benefit foo: the minimum cost.

A one percent

improvement in the management of a "A$1 bn plus" annual expenditure of resources

is a substantial sum that, although insignificant when compared to W A's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of A$50b, might justify pressure to improve control
(Australian Economic Indicators. p. 92). Control requires accurate records of what
journeys a vehicle has made and why. Without some form of automation this is a
tedious chore and the results are often not accurate, but automatic onboard loggers,
whilst available, are expensive. At present fleet managers usually issue fuel cards to
drivers knowing that the chosen fuel company records the details of cards that are
tendered and, from a central database controlled by that company, wili provide
reports to the managers. Drivers may be required to keep additional details, such as
the reason for the journey, in logbooks. The potential for automatic recording of
these additional details in the convenient portable data stores provided by smart
cards is obvious, and is considered in chapter three.

')

1.2.3 Maintenance

Control of m:..tintcn:.mcc, unlike traffic management and usage, offers little scope for
exploiting pcrsonalising smart cards because maintenance relates to the vehicle

rather than the user. The maker predetermines most of the maintenance activities.
Nevertheless. a smart card system could provide reminders about periodic checks, or
reports of incipient failure. Moreover, repairs under warranty and (to a lesser extent)

maintenance depend on accurate recording of previously performed work and the
reporting of defects. When vehicles are moved from one location to another a smart
card system might help to ensure that records are available in the new locations. In

the USA, the Environmental Protection Agency has regulations establishing
requirements for on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems on light vehicles manufactured

after 1993 ("Frequently asked questions", May 1997). These systems notify the
driver of faults by means of a dashboard light. A non-owner driver might be tempted
to ignore the light, but if the diagnoses were recorded on smart cards that were
returned to the owner's office at prescribed intervals, it would be possible for the
owner to arrange remedial action.

1.2.4 Security

Vehicle security, the final component of vehicle management, must be examined in
the context of the crime environment as a whole. Crime statistics may be interpreted
in different ways so the environment has been discussed in more detail in Appendix
2. Suffice to say here, that motorists should not be tolerant of vehicle-related theft
merely because· their insurance covers them against loss.

I
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Before considering possihlc security measures it is scnsihlc to examine the nature of
the crime and seck answers to the following questions.
•

Who steals cars and why?
As a generalisation, car thieves probably fall into two fairly equal categories:
young impulsive thieves and older cunning professional thieves {Biles &
Willing, 1987, p. 42).

•

What kind of car is most frequently targeted?
The only clear trend is that older cars appear to be more frequently targeted
(Devery, 1993; Motor vehicle theft in SA, 1995).

•

How many are taken and where from?
In WA, about 19,000 vehicles at a cost of A$80m to A$ 100m are stolen each

year; therefore, the security aspect alone is worth study. Cars seem to be stolen
impartially from all places lo which the public has access (W A Police Annual
Crime Statistics Report, 1995/96).

•

How are they taken?
Methods vary but human carelessness is a frequent contributory factor (Geason
& Wilson, 1990; Devery, 1993).

More detailed responses to the above questions have been provided in Appendix 3.

A fairly simple and cheap method of security would probably foil impulsive thieves,
but a more sophisticated defence would be needed to prevent a professional theft.
Therefore, a basic system should be modular and extendible so that owners can get
the level of security which they require.

Ideally, retrofitting a system to older

vehicles should be possible and the chosen system should compensate, as far as
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possible, for human carelessness. How smart canis might he part of sud1 a system
and also facilitate the tracking of stolen vehicles, is discussed in chapter thrcc.

1.3

Perception of the need for better management

Whether a better system of vehicle management emerges may depend upon the
public's perception of the need for improvement: but perceptions depend upon
viewpoints.

Although there may be a need for better management to promote

individual control of mobility and remove, or at least reduce, currently experienced

nuisance factors, the recognition of that need is not universal. For example, many
people advocate a greater use of public transport; arguably the equivalent of a return

from the telephone to the telegraph office.

It will be argued that this lack of

recognition is the major reason for the lethargic manner in which the problems
obstructing progress, including problems of standardisation, have been addressed.

Generally, if vehicle ownership and usage continues to increase at the present rate,
management will become both more difficult and more important whatever the
awareness of the need. The management of traffic is fragmented amongst various
authorities; usage control and maintenance seems to be an imp01tant issue only for
fleet owners; and, security is probably the main concern of owner-drivers.
Moreover, employed drivers are likely to be unenthusiastic about any proposal that
adds to either their chores or their responsibilities. This fragmentation of viewpoints,
contributing to the Jack of any perceived need for improvement, is possibly the
greatest obstacle to the development of a better system. Inharmonious motivations
merely exacerbate the difficulties.

Adopting a positive perspective, this thesis
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argues that intelligent people should ovcrl'omc obstadcs rather than surrcmkr to
them: but, it accepts the reality that, whilst any technology that promises improved
cfncicncy will probably be investigated, identified technical enhancements may not
be implemented. ll would help if "in-vehicle" devices were modular in design so
that motorists could get just those aspects for which they fell the grcatc:-;t need.
Another positive factor might be that, as a by-product of automatic systems, more
infom1ation might become available to authorities, vendors and owners (e.g., times
and places of payment). The recipients might welcome feedback, but drivers might
regard it as an invasion of privacy. Since it is argued that perceptions are crucial in
assessing the likelihood of developing a more personal mobility system, their
assessment will be left to chapter seven.

1.4 Thesis approach

This thesis seeks to detennine whether smart cards will be used to personalise
vehicles, thus improving vehicle management within a foreseeable time frame. To
improve the focus of the study, and explain what at first may appear to be omissions
in the investigation, a number of assumptions are made and factors that impede
smart card research generally arc mentioned briefly.

1.4.1 Assumption - political will

A political will to attack road and traffic management more vigorously will be
needed, but it is emerging only slowly. Attention has already been drawn to the fact
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that the highway used by a vehicle differs from the "highway" used by a cell phone

in that:
•

a non-commercial organisation usually owns a road,

•

users do not usually need the approval of the road owner,

•

vehicles are approved for road usc by an organisation other than the road owner,
and

•

road management is less thoroughly covered by international agreement.

Amongst the consequences of these difft!rences is that, unlike a cell phone SJM card

system, a personal mobility system using smart cards probably cannot stand alone.
First, Federal, State and local body road owners and regulatory authorities must
cooperate to create a suitable road network. Second, the mobility system needs
more technical support than a communication system, it would cost more, and
individual motorists might not be prepared to meet this cost. Third, to provide more
value to justify the cost, smart cards used in vehicles would need to be useable in
card readers other than those in the vehicles. After considering these consequences
the assumption has been made that, despite the technical possibility of managing
roads in a manner similar to the management of telecommunication links, the
environment to facilitate such management is developing only .slowly. Progress may
depend, in part, upon political decisions, but politicians are wary and wait for
pressure from the electorate.

1.4.2 Assumption · "killer application"

The nature of the environment, within which a smart card supported vehicle
management system might emerge, depends on commercial factors as well as the
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political ones already mentioned.

With this dependence in mind, a second

ussumption has been made: namely, that the usc of smart cards might explode if a
"killer application'' emerged to form the core of a multi-application card, who'iC
acceptance might then achieve critical mass. Just as the word-processor and the

spreadsheet were the commercial applications that brought the personal computer
(PC) onto muny

desk~.

so some equivalent application may be needed to put a smart

card in every wallet.

1.4.3 Assumption • multi-application smart cards

A smart card system would be unlikely to be used solely for vehicle management,
therefore there would need to be space on the card for other applications and any

associated problems in creating a multi-application smart card would have to be
solved.

Continuing the analogy with the PC, people may have bought a PC

primarily for use as a word-processor but they became aware of its other uses, which
they quickly began to exploit. For general acceptance a smart card, likewise, is
assumed to need an extension potential.

1.4.4 Factors impeding smart card research

When experiment or direct observation cannot obtain answers to questions posed,
for example queries involving the future behaviour of people, a review of literature
is often the only possibility of enlightenment.

When dealing with smart card

research, even with this method there are difficulties due , ' commercial
confidentiality. Two examples follow.
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•

Information obtained from the records of cornmen.:ial organis<ltions, or by
market surveys, is valuable hut costly and is sddom is n!leased universally until

it is severely dated.
•

Technically

comprehensive

reports,

based

upon

commercially collected statistics, arc expensive.

market

research

usmg

Examples arc "Smartcurd

Technology" by SJB Services and "Smart Card'i in Transport" by Dean, Arnold

& Harrop.
obtained

In 1997 these texts each cost over AS 1000 and still cannot be
from

booksellers

or

borrowed

from

libraries.

However,

CardTechnology, an online magazine published by FaulknerGray, now releases
some tigurcs when they are no longer commercially valuable.

The World Wide Web has proved to be the most useful source of up-to-date
information. Unfortunately, much of the information on the \Veb is anonymous and,
as a source, is contaminated by hype and inaccuracies. Moreover, when informative
and apparently authoritative Web pages are found, frequently they are posted only
temporarily.

Journal articles, both those published on the Web and those located by Internet
searches, tend to be either non-technical or non-specific in their treatment of
commercial possibilities.

In addition to the literature sources described above, inquiries were made of the
Police Department, the Crime Research Bureau of UWA, Wcstrail. the Insurance
Council, the RAC, Main Roads WA, the Perth City Council, five major fleet owners
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and a numhcr of vehicle immohiliscr vending nu.:rcilants.

These organisations

formally responded with caution to unwarranted requests for specific information.

1.5

Research questions

Four broad questions arc addressed and, in the following subsections, these arc each
stated brietly and elaborated.

1.5.1 Necessary technological advances

Whm advances in technology are needed to make any improved scheme using smart
cards practicable, and which of them may be expected within the time frame?

This main question can be divided into the following four subordinate questions.
•

What general improvements might be needed in smart card chips to make them

practicable and acceptable for a wide range of applications?
Potentially improvable features are memory (especially RAM, EEPROM or
other rewritable, non-volatile memory) power consumption and processing
power.
•

What do different levels of vehicle management (authorities, fleet operators.
owner-drivers and users) demand in increased card memory capacity?

•

What improvements might be needed in biometrics identification systems?
Four potentially improvable aspects might be:

• reductions in False Acceptance Rate (FAR), in False Rejection Rate (FRR),
in invasiveness, in scanner size and in cost,
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•

increases in

rcli;~bility

and llcxihility (ranging from high security through to

adequate deterrent).
•

easier cnrolmt::nt of persons to be idcntifil:J, and

•

improved and swndardiscd testing.

•

What vehicle modifications might be needed'!

•

What infra:Hructurc (external to both card and vehicle) developments might be
required?

In this thesis, in chapter 6, in pursuit of answers, a possible vehicle management

system is modelled and data flow diagrams with supporting repository are prepared
to enable an assessment of both the onwchip data storage required and, specifically
for vehicle applications. the necessary rewritable non-volatile memory. In addition
to these assessments, in section

6.~.

a further estimate is made of the extra memory

needed for other associated applications. To clarify the vehicle security requirement
a state diagram is prepared identifying the different security states (locked and
immobiiised, unlocked but immobilised, ready and valet mode) and the transitions
between them.

A simulation of partial security aspect:-; of a vehicle smart card

system seeks to demonstrate the technical feasibility of such a system and the
enhanced security it might provide, and hints at the prerequisite modifications and
possibilities for smart c..:._d vehicle management.

A search of the Internet and

journals is carried out to assess the commercial and public expectations of biometric
identification methods.

An attempt is also made to estimate within what time frame these technical advances
(changes or improvements) might be expected.

IH

1.5.2 Problems impeding development

What problems and difficulties might impede the development of personal mobility
comparable to existing personal communications?

The envisaged problems and difficulties seem to be mainly non-technical and

include excessive costs, inadequate card performance, flawed system security,
unacceptable biometric rejection rates, failure to achieve standardisation, and
political attitudes and fears. The political factors have almost total influence upon
regulatory changes that might affect the environmental options, such as whether
road pricing might conceivably be introduced and whether surveillance of motorists
and enforcement of regulations should be intensified (possibly, to the extent
currently the case with aircraft pilots). Inevitably, therefore, uncertainty exists as to
what measures, if any. are likely to be taken to improve driving behaviour, to reduce
traffic congestion, and to minimise pollution.

The problems of vehicle management are described in more detail in chapter 3. The
general thrust of several discussion papers issued by the W A Department of
Transport and a Web page issued by the NZ Government are outlined in section 3.2.

1.5.3 Potential

What potentially c!-Ianging public attitudes and commercial developments might
create an environment in which a viable scheme could emerge?

The thesis argues that changes, not diredly related to vchidc management, might
impar.:t on the environment. Candidate developments im:Judc innov<~tions in:
•

finance (e.g .. the electronic purse),

•

transporl<.ltion (e.g., public transport ticketing),

•

telecommunication(c.g., for pay phones and c-commcrcc),

•

authentication (e.g., for welfare benefits),

•

storage of information (e.g., for health records), and

•

other minor areas.

The possibility that any of these developments, or a combination of them, might
result in smart cards becoming ubiquitous is evaluated and an opinion is fonnulated.

1.5.4 Perceptions

What is the public (political. commercial and individual) perception of the need for
an improved personal mobility, in:luding better vehicle management?

The investigation seeks to determine if there is a perceived need for improvement in
vehicle management by regulatory authorities, fleet owners, individual vehicle
owners, and/ur drivers; and, if so, whether the perception in any way contemplates a
system using smart cards. What owners (tleet or individual) might be prepared to
pay for beuer vehicle management is accepted as an indication of perception. The
extent that authorities might be prepared to impose a higher standard of behaviour
on owners and drivers, and (in their turn) fleet owners upon drivers, is assessed, as

20

;llsn are vd1i1.:le owner

p~.:n.:cptions

of what

1s

a cost-c!Tcctivc level of vehicle

security.

It was decided that the best method for obtaining an indication of perceptions would

be by questionnaires reinforced by direct interviews where possible, with opinions
being suught from regulatory authorities, vehicle fleet owners, and owner-drivers.
However, public officials cannot be expected to complete questionnaires which have
not been approved by their superiors; so, necessarily, the determination of the views
of regulatory authorities was confined to the informal discussions that were held

\. . ith officials in the WA Department of Transport, Main Roads W A, and Perth City
Council. The position of commercial managers is different and five Perth major
fleet owners were contacted by telephone, sent a questionnaire, and asked for their
opinions. All responded to the questions, but only verbally. For owner-drivers the
situation is different again. To survey the opinions of visitors using the student car

park at Edith Cowan University (ECU), Mount Lawley (MTL) campus, a
questionnaire was distributed to almost 300 vehicle drivers. The form was placed
under windscreen wiper blades and returned ailonymously by various means. The
questions specifically ask about desirable levels of security, and endeavour to obtain
the views of individuals as to the cost-effectiveness of different levels, but a
subsequent reinforcing interview would not have been feasible. What is known, is

that ECU students include more part-time and mature students than other Penh
Universities (Student's (Preliminary) Selected Higher Education Statistics, 2000, p.
27); therefore, the responses arc likely to be fairly representative of the opinions of
citizens in general.

A search of trade magazines seeks to reinforce the views

obtained by the questionnaires.
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1.6 Thesis structure

It is now possible to describe the structure of the thesis. Chapter two examines the
current state of the technologies that might promote better vehicle management and
chapter three considers how these technologies might be applied.

Chapter four

examines problems and difficulties of a general nature, such as the obstacles to
standardisation, costs, security and political and individual concerns; and, chapter
five analyses commercial factors that might influence the adoption of any system.

Chapter six describes investigations undertaken to answer questions that are not
addressed in the literature: including an analysis of a possible system to estimate the
card memory needed, a study of the opinions of fleet managers and owner-drivers
and a simulation to demonstrate an approach to enhancing security.

In chapter

seven, conclusions are drawn, not only from the preceding discuss;on of positive and
negative influences, but also from the opinions of authorities who are abo trying to
predict the future of smart cards. Finally, the seven chapters are supported by a
number of appendices incorporating relevant technical and statistical detail.
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2

CURRENT RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES

2.1

introduction

This chapter examines the current situation in smart card technology and the
associated area of biometric identification; it briefly considers the alternatives for
access control, such as transponders and passwords or PINs; and, il explores the
possibility of developments that might lead to more widespread, perhaps even
ubiquitous, use of the cards.

2.2 Smart Card Capabilities

A discussion of smart card technology should begin with a consideration of what the
devices do, therefore potential general application categories are summarised before
describing smart card, associated, and alternative, technologies. A report (Butler,
1996, p. 2) prepared by the New Zealand Futures Trust states:

"There are three kinds of applications of smart cards:
Authentication.

This allows cardholders to gain access to buildings, facilities, databases etc.
In general, these applications are convenient, secure and efficient and pose
few problems for eii:her users or providers. A number of such applications
are already operating ...

I
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Stored-value transactions.
Here a smart card can be used as an clct:tronic purse, which may also he
n::loadablc. Before there is wide acceptance and usc of stored-value cards for
financial transactions,

... the public... will need !() be convinced of: ... (a

number of features) ...

Store of information.
The third main usc of smart cards is as portable records, to store information
which needs to be independent of fixed locations, e.g. as a patient's health
card, or for vehicle or equipment maintenance.

As with stored-value

transactions, questions of standardisation, privacy and security must be
resolved before there is general acceptance".

Other authors, for example, Myers and Baker, broadly confirm this statement and

although, seven years ago, Baker gave greater emphasis to security as the most
important characteristic of smart cards, Baker's altitude is probably not inconsistent
with the general application categories described above (Myers. 1996; Baker, T .,
1992). Amongst electronic payment systems supported by smart cards, distinctions
should be drawn between open and closed systems, and between electronic purses
and stored-value cards (SVCs). A closed payment system is one in which the issuer
of value in digital form is also the sole redeemer of that value: for example, a
prepaid telephone card system.

By contrast, in an open system a range of

organisations and individuals may accept the digital value and provide goods or
services in return without the prior knowledge of the issuer. At o:1e time the terms
SVC and electronic purse were regarded as synonymous, but, increasingly, a
distinction is being made between SVCs that cannot be reloaded, and arc commonly
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used in closed systems, and reloadablc purses that arc more suitable for usc in open
systems. This distinction makes .'icnsc, because, in ordinary parlance, a purse is a

device into which we can put money for subsequent spending where we choose.
Vehicle management, as described in the introductory chapter, has candidate
applications in:
•

authentication (e.g., security),

•

stored-value transactions (e.g., vehicle related payments), and

•

stores of information (e.g., record keeping).

The possible applications are explored in more detail in chapter three, whilst this
chapter considers present day technology, both supportive and alternative, and the
potential for improvements and refinements.

2.3

Present Smart Card Technology

2.3.1 Definition
There is some confusion about the definition of a smart card, but any card that

incorporates a microcontroller is clearly a chip card. Chip cards can be divided into

memory cards and smart cards.
•

Memory cards have more memory than magnetic-stripe cards, and "hard-wired"
programs to control that memory, but no processing capability.

•

True smart cards have a facility that enables the chip to be partially

reprogrammed after manufacture, and they have both read only memory (ROM)
and other non-volatile memory; the latter usually stores the "smartness" of the
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card in programs to calculate, encrypt, manipulate, and record, data. Also, the
progr;.uns and data arc stored in a typl! of non-volatile memory that can be read
yr:ars Iiller, andean be over-written many thousands of times. Jn turn,

trw.~

smart

c;.mls can be divided into contact and contactlcss types: hoth arc defined, in some
aspects a liHic laxly, by international standards which arc introduced in the next
section. Contactless cards can be "close-couplcd"/proximity/vicinity type which
are readable at lmm/!Ocm/lmetre, respectively.
The terms hybrid, dual-chip and combi/dual interface are now u';ed by authors, but

not always consistently. A hybrid card has a magnetic stripe as well as smart card
features; a dual-chip card, obviously, has two chips, one of which is accessed
through a contact plate and the other using remote communication features; and, the
combi/dual interface card has a single chip that can be accessed by contact or
remotely.

2.3.2 Standards

Standard ISO 7810 prescribes the size of smart cards, and standards ISO 7816/l 0536

the nature of communications wilh contactl"close-coupled" contactless cards.

A

draft standard ISO 14443 for "remote-coupled" contactless cards has yet to be
finalised and there is a proposal for standard ISO 15693 for vicinity cards. Initially,
smart cards were designed for closed systems, such as prepaid telephone card
systems, and their electrical properties were relevant only in so far as cards had to he
compatible with their associated readers.

Today, multi-application cards arc

considered to be desirahle, and these types of card, eventually, will have to be
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capable of forming a matching pair (on a "one to one" hasis) with many diJTcrcnt

terminals and

l'l~aders.

Th!! need lOr wide compatibility became apparent with the

growth of the GSM mobik telephone network. The electrical properties defined in
the European Telecommunication standardisation Institute (ETSI) GSM 11.11

standard for the SIM card have become a model for semiconductor manufacturers
and, in effect, have extended the conditions defined in standard ISO

7816~3

(Rank!

& Effing, 1997). A list of ISO and other standards and specifications relevant to

smart cards has been prepared by the Smart Card Forum and can be found at
http://www.edtn.com/embapps/fancher~97-tl.htm.

These and other standards are

discussed in the chapter dealing with problems and difficulties (see chapter 4 section
3).

:- .3.3 Contact cards

The integrated circuit chip on a contact smart card requires some input from the
outside world and, generally, this inp.Jt is an electrical voltage to power the chip and
a clock frequency to synchronise chip

activiti~s.

Another requirement is an

input/output path for the transmission of data which, for the contact card, is created
by direct connections established between card and reader. The integrated circuit on
the chip is connected to a contact plate on the surface of the card and when the smart
card is placed into a reader device, the card's contact plate is mated with connections
in the reader to complete an electrical circuit. Clearly the contact plate must be in
position as defined by standard ISO 7816-2.
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2.3.4 Con tactless cards

The contactlcss smart card dispense!-> with the contact plate on the surface of a smart
card and instead uses some form of electronic coupling. Generally, contactlcss smart
cards will be placed in close proximity to a reader and an inductive (tram;formcr) or
capacitive coupling is used to transtCr energy and power the card. The clock may b.:;·
intemally derived and data transferred by modulating the power supply. Standard
ISO 10536, mentioned earlier, is a fairly loose standard since different n:tanufacturers

use different methods, including either capacitive or inductive coupling, that arc
incompatible with one another ("Smartcard technology", 1994). It is still too early to

assess the effect of standard ISO 14443, the planned standard for "remote-coupled"
contactless cards.

2.3.5 Card population

In 1996, about lOO million smart cards were estimated to be in use. (Note: The
comparable figure for chip cards was well over 500 million, but most, for example
phone cards, were merely memory cards and did not meet the definition of true smart
cards given above). By 1998, the number issued could have been over a billion.
Bauer of Siemens claims that Europe currently holds the lion's share of the world
smart card market (50%); but, according to estimates by its Semiconductor Group.
the US may account for 25 %of the market by 1999. By the year 2000 Southeast
Asia and Japan are expected to reach a 25 % market share (Bauer & Hamman,
1996). A table of forecasts is presented later, as Table 9, in chapter seven.
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2.3.6 Card manufacture and system development

s~vcral manufacturing

industries h.:tvc an interest in the smart card market Firstly,

chipmakers face challenges in making suitable chips; secondly, cardmakcrs have
problems in integrating the chip and the card into a marketable product; and thirdly,

a number of minor players arc working to develop supporting devices, such as
readers. However, card issuers arc probably the stakeholders that are most important
in detem1ining the general acceptance of smart cards.

Banks and other financial

institutions must decide whether or not to exploit smart card technology; but, even m;
active participants, they may have difficulty in persuading users to accept their

preferred products. Finance is a likely, but not the only possible, application field.
For example, some authorities claim that by the end of the decade, about 50% of all
smart cards will probably be used for transportation, either in contactless toll
collection systems for expressways, or as combined entry and billing systems for
public transit users, or as automobile entry systems, (Bauer & Hamman, 1996;
Higgs, 1996). Discussion of the attitude of financial institutions and other potential
issuers is deferred to the section dealing with commercial factors.

2.3.7 Manufacturing process

The process of manufacturing chips for smart cards is not greatly different from that
used in manufacturing any other chip, except that special .security precautions must
be obstrved. More specifically, the design of the chip usually includes features to
frustrate rever~e engineering; all chips, both functional and faulty, must be accounted

2'!

for: and, the delivery process is similar to that used fnr bullion (Paterson, I 99 I, p.
36).

Manufacture involves using a series of masks to etch circuitry onto silicon

wafers and, usually. one of these masks includes circuitry that hardwircs part of the
opcmting system - a practice that leads to difficulties in standardisation which is

discussed later (see section 4.3.4). There is no simple way to compare one card chip
with another, as their description involves several parameters including power

consumption, clock speed, memory size and types, geometric density, physical size,
cost, robustness and security.

2.3.8 Cost and cost estimation

There are constraints on the technology that can be used in the manufacture of chips
for smart cards, which are discussed later in section seven under the potential for
improvement. New and cheaper methods of manufacture might affect the extent to
which all concerned accept the cards, but the estimated cost of a card depends upon
what economies of scale are anticipated, and what components are included in the
estimate. The card is always part of a

ht:~er

system that includes at least a reader

and supporting software (Noakes-Fry, 1994, p. 204). According to Svigals, the value
of the card itself is likely to be between US$2 and US$25 (Svigais, 1994, p. 112).
An alternative estimate, from Lam, is from A$5 to A$40 (Lam & Low-Shang, 1994,

p. 8).

Neither of these figures includes the cost of readers or other supporting

devices. The variance among these dated references shows the uncertainty at the
time and the hopes that mass production would reduce costs. More recent figures in
section 4.4.3 show that the reduction has been :, ss than expected. Most J.uthors
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claim that, like other electronic devices, the cost of smart cards will fall as a mass
market develops, but others argue that it will not fall indefinitely because the
demand for improved capabilities will outweigh the demand for lower prices
(Haykin & Warner, 1988, p. 34). More detailed ligures arc given in the chapter four
dealing with problems and difficulties.

2.3.9 Present day cards

To date almost all contact smart card applications use one of six chip families,

•

Motorola 6805,

•

Hitachi H8,

•

Siemens SLE44xx,

•

STMicroelectronics ST8 or STI6,

•

OK! 627xx or

•

Philips/Intel 8051.

Baker, in 1992, wrote of 30 types of chip but it is not clear what he regarded as a

type (Baker, 1992). In 1994, a smart card had an 8,bit microprocessor working at
5MHz, and the memory available for all applications was seldom more than 8K.
According to Zoreda, such limited capacity could be found in a PC 15 years earlier

(Zoreda & Oton, 1994). Io those 15 years, 64 bit, !66MHz microproce,.ors had
become available and user memory was expressed in megabytes, but for the smart
card chip there had been little change. Today a contact smart card used in an

application typically has:
•

a relatively slow 8-bit processor (5 to 14 MHz),

I
o

RAM 256 bytes,

o

ROM 8 to 20 Khytcs, and

o

EPROM or EEPROM 8 Kbytcs (Rank! & Effing, 1997, p. 49).

Duffy claims cards with 128 kbytcs of RAM arc made hut it is not clear whether or

not these are true smart cards (Duffy, 1994, p. 104). The chips used in contactlcss
smart cards arc, in all likelihood, proprictury extensions of chips designed for contact
cards. but, for commercial reasons, details arc seldom made public.

2.3.10

Conclusion

A reasonable conclusion from the foregoing is that whilst those smart cards now
being used in applications have only limited memories and slow processors, more

powerful cards are being developed by commercial concerns in secret and any
investigation into their use should anticipate improvement. Some possibilities are
set out in sectio.n seven of this chapter.

2.4 Biometric Identification Technology

2.4.1 Identification in general

It can be argued that good security begins with accountability which,-_in mrn.
depends on irrefutable, unfakeable identification. The argtimcnt, that unjustifiable
identification is an invasion of privacy, is discussed later (sec chapter four section
nine). A person is identified by something they:
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•

have (a token),

•

know (a password or PIN),

•

arc (a biometric feature), or

•

can do (a .signature or keystroke pattern).

(The term biometrics strictly related to the statisti<;al analysis of

biologic~!

phenomena and measurements, but has become widely accepted within the security
profession to describe technologies used for personal identification (Shennan, 1992,

p. 128)). A smart card can integrate two or three of these identifiers because it is a
token and can respond to any of a password, a biometric feature, or some action.

2.4.2 Identification and verification

An identification system may be designed to establish an individual's identity by
checking that his/her details are recorded in a database of many records, or merely

verify that a claimed idenlity is correct. Identification systems are those in which it
is necessary to prove either that the individual's details are in the database or that
they are not. Both identification and verification can be illustrated diagrammatically.
Identification is a much more demanding process than verification and either process
might be necessary in vehicle management. For example, identification might be
necessary to prove that an individual has a license (say at the time of a traffic
violation) or has no license (say before issuing one) ("Best practice", 2000).
Research to find improved methods of identification is being undertaken by
authorities worldwide in law enforcement, health, welfare and other areas and the
scope of the subject spreads beyond the focus of this thesis. As the main concern of

this discussion is the case of a person seeking access to a vehide, the complexities of
identificuti01l. have been left for others to investigate. Since

i.IOY

car is likely to have

a limited number of drivers (a few dozen at the most), the vehicle-related
upplications for identification would be the identification of a driver. or a
driver/vehicle pair. Returning to the verification process, an owner or driver seeking
the use of a vehicle, and presenting a ~mart card together with a pa<.;sword, token or
biometric feature, merely requires that the item (of, in the la.'it ca<>e, the temtllate
extracted from the feature) be verified as being identical, or acceptably similar, to

that on the card.

Extract
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store in
database or
smart card

Feature
Capture
feature at
enrolment

Template

Identification
Database
Feature

Template

Individual
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Verification smart
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~
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Figure I Validation and vcrilicution
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2.4.3 Smart card identification

Authorisation is the process

or determining that an entity may do what it seeks to do.

A smart card authorisation system can be considered to have two aspects: user
authorisation and card authentication. Both identification and verification may form
part of user authorisation and have been discussed in the previous paragraph; but
card authentication involves authenticating the smart card to the tenninal.

In the

GSM cellular telephone system a symmetric challenge/response method is used
because the reader is always on-line, but in off-line situations an asymmetric method
is necessary. In the latter cases a challenge, provided by the terminal, is encrypted

on the card using the issuer's private key and returned to the terminal, which
decrypts it using the issuer's public key. In this way, at some cost in card computing
resources, the terminal is assured that the card is a genuine issuer's card (Leach, J.,
1995).

2.4.4 Biometric performance

Well known biometric features of individuals are fingerprints, retinal patterns, voice
patterns and back-of-hand vein patterns, but there are others. Biometric techniques
promise the best standard of user authentication, since they depend on something the
owner is, rather than something he/she carries (and can lose), or something he/she
knows (and can disclo!'c). However, in the author's opinion, at least two weaknesses
must be acknowledged, "comparison
described in the next two sections.

threshold>~

and

11

tcmplate vulnerability'',
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2.4.5 Comparison threshold

The first weakness results because all the techniques involve a companson of
presented and recorded features (commonly images) and the two can never be
identical but only similar to a

~_;reater

or lesser degree. The required degree of

sirriilarity is known as the threshold. If a comparison detects a similarity better than
the threshold it is termed a "hit". Occasionally a comparison will record a hit when

it should not and fail to record a hit when it should: these results are termed false
acceptances and false rejections respectively. If a graph is drawn with the values
that could be chosen for the threshold along the abscissa and the proportion of false
results as the ordinate, then receiver operating curves (ROC) can be plotted as in
Figure 2. The need for an appropriate threshold is discussed in section 4. 7. I and the
possibility of a variable threshold in section 7 .3.6.

I

2.4.6 Template vulnerability

A second weakness in the promise of biometric techniques is that whilst "what we
are" can be neither mislaid, nor stolen, and is difficult to counterfeit, the same cannot
be said of a template (e.g., a bit string derived 'he-m an image of a human feature).

The technique requires a scanner to be used to take un image of a biometric feature
such as a fingerprint or back-of-hand vein pattern; and from this scan, it derives a
template for storage on a smart card and, possibly, in a database of authorised
templates.

If the template was captured by a rogue terminal and written by a

fraudster onto a counterfeit card, the counterfeit could then masquerade as a

legitimate item, unless asymmetric card authentication is also used.

2.4.7 Biometric features

Of human identifying features, the fingerprint is the best known, whilst the
voiceprint is the cheapest, and the retinal pattern the most expensive, to capture.
There are a number of others including the "back-of-hand" vein pattern. These four
features each represent a possibility for use in vehicle management, and are now
considered in more detail.

2.4.8 Fingerprint

Fingerprints are usually processed in one of four 'Nays: specifically,
•

capturing the image optically and then converting it to digital form;
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•

capturing the image directly into digital form using capacitive sensing ("UniBO
Finge1vrint Cap<Lcitivc Scn:-;or", 19f.J7);

•

sensing the heat differences between the ridges and valleys of a fingerprint and

then c.:onvcrting the gradients to digital form: an approach being developed hy a
French company, Thompson-CSF (May, 1998),
•

capturing the image optically and then processing it with an optical computer,
without digital conversion. Il is claimed that, with

thi~

method, the work is done

using parallel processing and is fast ("Mytec Technologies: Technology", 1996,
May 13).

Following this processing, in most systems a template is derived. As yet none of the
last three alternatives has an established track record in industry. Of the several
human features that can be used in biometric identification, there is a wealth of
experience only in fingerprint collection and use (Ruggles, 1998). Fingerprints are
almost certainly unique to each individual, their capture is non-invasive, and a
scanner could be designed to collect fingerprints without being exposed to either the
weather or casual attack. The genetic process by which fingerprints arc generated is
believed to be random, since, so far as is known, those of relations, even identical
twins, are not similar. However, because of its association with crime, the technique
may not be acceptable to the public (Millar, 1994).

2.4.9 Voiceprint

Another identifying feature is the voiceprint, which is commonly used because the
captured pattern and the recorded template are more easily compared.

However

JH

voiceprints are probably less reliable than the fingerprints, in that both the

l~tlsc

acceptance rate (FAR) and the false J·:~jcction rate (FRR) arc higher (Ruggles, /998).
Furthermore, it may be difficult to mount a microphone inside a vehicle (out of tlw
weather and vandal proof) and still be able to capture the voice pattern.

2.4.10

Eye retina

Retinal patterns are known to be unique, but the scanning and matching techniques

are expensive, thought to be regarded by the public as invasive, and may provoke
antagonism amongst people who are sensitive about their eyes (Miller, 1994).

2.4.11

Back of the hand

The back of hand vein pattern has been investigated because it does not have the

stigma of a fingerprint and because the image/template comparison may be a little
simpler.

A disadvantage is that vein patterns arc not so certainly unique as

fingerprints (Mehnert, Cross & Smith, 1994) and require either a rather large scanner
external to the vehicle, or a fist-sized hole in a panel.

2.4.12

Comparison chart

The chart in Figure 3 provides a simplified but visually convenient display of the
relative merits and .shortcomings of the features mentioned above.

Symhols for

meritorious feafures are placed towards the periphery of the chart, but this

:w
positioning is only the author's current intt:rpret<Jtion of the descriptions provided in
the references, and has no mathematical validity. Other writers may cvaluah.: the
fc~turcs

differently.
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Figure 3 Visual indication of biometric system merits

2.4.13

Scanners

An optical scanner may be used to capture the image of a biometric feature such as a
face, back-of-hand vein pattern, or in one system, a fingerprint.

At present,

commercially available optical scanners use Charge Coupled Devices (CCDs) and
occupy a volume between 250 and IOOOcc.

Scanners arc expensive now but,

according to Dan Maase, vice-president at ldentix, like other electronic devices, they
can be expected to improve in performance and fall in size and cost {Abate, 1997).
The optical types usually employ technology similar to that found in a digital camera
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and can capture images in hoth the visual and the infrared pmtions of the c/cctromagnctic spcc.:trum. The aforcmclllioncd alternative fingcrprint scanner, hascd on
capacitive sensing, although now being marketed in at least one model, is still being

investigated; but it may have advantages in both size and cost (Abate, 1997).
Generally, each of the biometric identifiers requires a different type of scanner. At

present retinal scanners arc the most expensive and "back of hand" scanners the
cheapest, whilst fingerprint scanners fall in between, ranging in price from US$100

to US$1000 (Miller, 1994 ).

2.4.14

Pattern recognition

Having captured the image, its pattern must be recognised, a process defined as the

identification of images by their shapes, forms, outlines or other attributes (Weik,
1989). In biometric identification, two or more images may he compared, or a
template extracted and compared to other stored templates, to detennine similarities
or differences. The following sequence of steps may be required.
1. Preprocessing which may include enhancement, segmentation, skeletonization
and smoothing. Briefly,
•

enhancement seeks to remove noise, especially the background to the image,

•

segmentation, or thresholding, seeks to convert a grey scale image in which
features have fuzzy edges to one in black and white (a binary image),

•

skeletonization, or thinning, is used to reduce all lines to a common width,
since the pattern of an image rarely depends on the thickness of the lines with
which it is drawn
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•

smoothing, usually directional smoothing, and/or fihcring is used to remove
anomalies, or spikes, that may he introduced during skclctonization
(Mehnert, Cross & Smith, 1994).

2. Feature extraction which identifies significant items, or features and Ignores
redundant data (Ratha, Chen and Jain, 1995).
3. Image registration, which is concerned with variations. Inevitably images arc not
captured at the same time, with a single sensor, from one viewpoint and,
consequently, there are always variations which can be any of three types:
•

misalignment due to the acquisition method,

•

variations due to intensity or perspective, and

•

variations that are of interest.

Image registration seeks to eliminate or identify the first two variations

(Gotlesfeld-Brown, 1992, p. 325).
4. The derivation and storage of a template or bit-string representation of the
significant items of the image.

In the process of biometric verification smart cards could have any of three roles.

They could:
•

merely store and make available the template derived from the feature of the
enrolled person, or

•

perform as above, but in addition, compare the stored template to the template of
the supplied image which has been derived elsewhere, or

•

derive the template from the supplied ima·gc and compare it to the stored image.
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Only the first role has been implcmcnlcd. In the author's opinion, the restriction to
the first role is proh<lbly because the work of pattern recognition and comparison is
computationally intenSive and, as yet, beyond the processing capal?ility of any smart

card used in a major application.

2.4.15

Conclusion

From both management and usage viewpoints there is a need to verify drivers'
identities and authenticate them to the vehicle they drive. Fleet managers and traffic
authorities need to know beyond dhpute who is driving a vehicle at critical
moments, whilst the average owner will wish to deny others access to what is his/her

second most valuable asset (after a house). The possible further need for authorities
to validate applicants for licenses and, perhaps, identify drivers suspected of
offences, requires more demanding processing but, even so, biometric identification
might be used in this area. Whilst biometric technology promises an eventual high
standard of identification, as yet it has weaknesses and requires unacceptably
subs-,tantial computational resources. If, eventually, these drawbacks are overcome,
fin:gerprints are likely to be the chosen feature. However, as a technology, it may
al~ays

be suspect because of the miniscule, but undeniable, uncertainty of

comparisons and, paradoxically, the more nearly infallible it becomes the more
vocife.rous will be the protests of those who believe identification to be an invasion
of privacy. Until, if ever, public opinion matures to the point where identification is
accepted and widely used, cost and unfamiliarity are likely to render biometric
methods unpopular, even in what is merely a niche application.

2.5

Transponders and access tokens

2.5.1 Description

An alternative to identifying people by personal features is to cqu1p tlicm with

transponders (small versions are called tags) as access tokens.

The difficulty of

using biometric features to identify individuals, and the present cost of scanners
could be by-passed by equipping authorised individuals with one of these devices,
which would respond to a radio frequency challenges from within the vehicle with a
unique bit-string signal in order to authorise access. The possibility of identification
in this way might be facilitated if the Bluetooth communication specification wao;;

widely adopted ("Short description", Nov 2000). (Note: A contaclless smart card
can be thought of as a sophisticated transponder, since current versions are capable
of on-card processing before responding with a signal.) Although a transponder
could be counterfeited, or the owner could lose it, or be robbed of it, modern tags are
small and could, for example, be incorporated into something, such as a watchstrap.
that rarely leaves the owner's body. Furthermore, after gaining access to the vehicle
using the tag, the driver could be required to enter a PIN at a keypad. A thief who
either stole the tag, or simply forced entry to the vehicle, would still have to
overcome the need to supply the PIN before moving off. A secondary advantage is
that transponders located in the vehicle can be used as tracking beacons as well as
for identification.

Owners of valuable animals, such as stud animals, sometimes

improve their protection against theft and the probability of recovery, hy attaching a
transponder to the creature: oflen by inserting a tag under the skin. Heavy haul.:lgc
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carriers, both rail and road types, abo usc these devices to keep trm.:k of containers
and wagnns: then:forc, as the transceivers that communicate with the transponders
become more common, it is possible that filling them to vehicles will increase the
chance of recovering those stolen.

2.5.2 Vehicle tracking application

A paper presented to a colloquium on vehicle security in Britain in 1993 proposed a
system based on this idea of tracking beacons and Geason describes a similar
system, the Massachusetts Lojack System (Geason & Wilson, 1990, p. 32). The
Lojack system appears to be a commercial success because, despite the obvious
drawback of its high cost, now (admittedly almost ten years after its first launch) it is

used in 12 US states, in Moscow and in South Africa - all high-risk areas for car
theft. A less widely known system, QuikTrak, briefly described in section 3.5.6, is
marketert in Australia, but has not achieved general popularity. However, Home!,
apparently considering car theft from a social rather than technical point of view,
quotes Clarke and Harris ( 1992) as considering tracking devices may merely change
the target, but do not significantly deter thieves (Hamel, 1994 ).

2.5.3 Disadvantages

,.

The social aspects will not be considered
here, but technical drawbacks in usinu0
'
transponders, either as tracking beacons or as access tokens. must be acknowledged.
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•

The response of a transponder can 1arely be detected through metal, a factor

which limits the possible
•

loc<.~tions

for this type of beacon in a vehicle.:.

A reasonably competent technician with the necessary equipment could easily

scan an item for any affixed transponders.
•

To be effective and justify police effort, a high proportion of vehicle owners
would have to participate, and probably neither they nor the insurance companies
would be prepared to meet the cost.

The possibility of facilitating tracking using smart cards is discussed in section 3.5.6.

2.5.4 A different system

A somewhat different access token system, named Vehicle Anti-theft System

(VATS), developed by General Motors used a small resistor pellet embedded in the
ignition key. The pellet had a specific electrical resistance, like an electrical code.
Installed elsewhere, in a hidden and inaccessible part of the vehicle, was a decoder
with a complementary resistance. When the key was turned in the ignition lock the
car would start only if the decoder's resistance and the key's resistance matched

(Biles & Willing, 1987, p. 50). Nevertheless, the system docs not seem to have been
widely used.

2.6 Passwords and PINs

Passwords, of which PINs are a sub-set, are an ancient technique for identification,
and their drawbacks arc well known (Lynch, 1998). If the same password is used by
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more than one person and is discloscJ, responsibility for its disclosure is difficull to
determine.

Another problem is that if passwords arc changed frequently,

memorising the correct password can be a chore, so, to relieve the strain on memory,
thc passwords arc too often written down. Obviously the practice of recording a

script copy seriously degrades the protection they afford: therefore, to make recall
easier, authorised persons arc sometime(; permitted to choose their own passwords.
Sadly, studies have shown that password guessing is more likely to succeed when

holders are allowed to choose (Fak, 1991).

2.7 Potential for Improved Smart cards

2.7.1 Design constraints

The engine of any smart card is its chip; therefore the potential enhancement of the
card is heavily dependent upon chip improvement, which in turn is constrained
because the card's chip requires unique features that militate against the use of some
leading edge chip technology.
•

Probably most importantly, to reach a mass market, chips must be cheap, which
requires high volume production, and this precludes some of the more exquisite
manufacturing techniques (Fancher, 1997).

•

Furthermore, in many applications, smart card chips must be reliable and, hence,
tend to exploit only proven technology (Rankl & Effing, 1997).
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•

In addition to hcing cheap and reliable, the chip must hl! small enough so that the
card may llcx norm:.lily, he thinner than the card and no higgcr (and preferably
smaller) than 5mm by 5mm (Danids, 1995).

•

The chips may not draw much power, because of the problem of disposing of the
resulting heat, and must work even when dirty (Owen, 1995).

•

Generally, financial institutions consider that the chip component should be a

single chip. or separate unconnected chips. and not a cooperating multiple,
because multiple chips would need connections that would be vulnerable to

hacking and to damage through card flexure (Paterson, 1991; Owen, 1995).
•

Since it has power only when in or near a reader, the chip data memory must be
non-volatile. be capable of being rewritten many thousands of times, and be
readable for sr.veral years.

•

Finally, a smart card chip must be extremely resistant to any attack on its
security, must be virtually impossible to counterfeit and, like a patriotic spy with
a cyanide capsule, must self-destruct rather than divulge its secrets. Although
smart card chips approach this security ideal, it is likely that, given .suflicient
resources (well into the millions of dollars) and world-level expertise, they could
be "cracked" (Anderson & Kuhn, 1996).

In short, the makers of .smart card chips are faced with a challenging requirement.

2.7.2 Leading manufacturers and products

Technical detail about the chips used in smart cards is seldom released to the puhlic.
However, in 1997 each of four

m:.~or

manufacturers gave some information about a

4K

chip incorporating a cryptographic: co-prm:cssor, and each claimed their product was
the most

s~1itablc

for smarl card installation. The incorporated crypto-controllcr

circuitry act:dcratcs public key encryption, and is a hardwired part of the ROM; a
feature that suggests financial institutions were the target market.

The available

information is set out below and summarised in Table I.

•

In March, Motorola published details of a new chip, claiming it to be the fastest
of its kind ("Motorola", 1997). The RAM and ROM of this crypto chip arc
greater than that of most card chips, but the EEPROM is only half that of some
others.

•

Hit.achi, also in March, announced the "launch" of a 16/8-bit card chip, the
HS/3109, a version of the H8 family specifically customised for Mondex cards.
(Mondex, owned and sponsored by MasterCard, is a major potential electronic
purse card issuer). The meaning of the term 16/8 was not explained by Hitachi,
but possibly indicates that processing, and data transfer and storage, employ
different word sizes, one being 8-bit and the other 16-bit. Hitachi does not list a
sheet for the HS/3109 amongst the data sheets that are published on its web site.

•

In August, Siemens promulgated some information about a chip designed for
smart cards, the SLE 44CR80S, which was also, promoted as a high-security
chip and, therefore, presumably intended for financial sector applications. The
statement particularly stressed the chip's small size, given as

15mm 2

(Hochholzer, 1997).
•

In October, 1997, at Cartes '97, Philips, a smaller manufacturer, introduced the
MIFARE.PRO a dual interface card chip family, based on the long established
Intel 8051 chip. The chip can be accessed both remotely, and through contacts,
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but, at present, uses symmetric encryption. Philips says that, eventually, the chip
will be the more powerful "cornbi" SmartXA, discussed shortly, and will
incorporate a FAMEX crypto·coproccssor enabling asymmetric encryption

(MIFARE.PRO", I 997).

None of the announcements gave the clock speed, which is likely to be the normal

5MHz used in chip cards. MasterCard selected the Hitachi chip for its Mondcx
electronic purse and Visa the Motorola and Siemens designs for its Visa-Cash
alternative.

As yet neither purse scheme has a major application. Although the

MIFARE.PRO chip is at present being touted as most suitable for public transport
ticketing, the promised crypto-coprocessor suggests that Philips has an eye on the
potential market for a financial application.

Apparently, the major chipmakers

believe that an enhanced crypto·chip with limited RAM and large ROM is what the
financial market requires, but so far, the institutions themselves have established
only pilot schemes. However, multiple applications require large EEPROM or other
rewritable memory.

Table I. Prominent smart card chips

Manufacturer

Product No

M68HC05SC49A
HS/3109
SLE44CR80S
MIFARE.PRO
with sacs 1 dual
interface
*Eventually MIFARE.PRO ts to have
Motorola
Hitachi
Siemens
Philips

RAM
(bytes)

ROM
(kilobytes)

EEPROM Bits
(kilobytes)

896
256
256
256

20
14
17
20

4
8

the 16-btt SmartXA chtp.

R
8

8
1618
8
8*
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2.7.3 Busic or "no frills" designs.

If a less sophisticated chip wns acccpt.'Lhle, it might be possible to reduce card costs.
Probably with that in mind, French researchers have designed a smart card chip for
limited payment systems (SCALPS).

The researchers merged the processor and

coprocessor on a small chip dedicated to public-key cryptography, added parts
needed to obtain a low-cost smart card and claim to have drastically reduced
complexity without affecting the chip's usefulness (Dhem, Veithen & Quisquater,
1996). Toshiba also claims to have a

"no~frills"

chip and estimates that prices will

drop below 200 yen, or US$2.00, per card with the introduction of its CZ-3018 card.
Toshiba says the new card has a chip with an 8-bit CPU, 6K of ROM and 128 bytes
of RAM, supports enhanced data security and meets both the standard ISO/IEC 7816
and EMV standards. The lower costs are primarily achieved by downsizing the
memory capacity ("Toshiba introduces", 1996).

So far there arc no reports of

commercial organisations seeking to exploit either the French or the Japanese,
proposal.

2. 7.4 A "de-luxe" design

It may be technically feasible to increase both the speed and the memory of smart
card chips. The European Chip Architecture for SmartCArds and secure por1:1ble
DEvices (CASCADE) project, part of the European Strategy for Promotion of
Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT) Open Microprocessor Initiative
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(OMI) initiative, seeks to develop a Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RJSC) chip
with a 32-bit architecture, 32K of non-volatile memory and a clock speed of 20M Hz.
The project was launched in 1993 as a cooperative effort hctwccn French companies
(Gcmplus and Dassault), British companies (Advanced RJSC Machines (ARM) and
Domain Dynamics) and a number of universities. The stated aims of the project
were to achieve:

•

more programmability for shOrter time-to-market and greater versatility,

•

better configurability with multiple applications at the user's will,

•

an ability to handle the unscrambling of real-time audio-visual data of consumer
entertainment applications, and the

•

ability to support enhanced human-card interfaces such as voice control (Peyret,

P., 1994).
More technically, the designers claim:
•

non-volatile memory life of lO years,

•

clock speed of 20MHz,

•

more memory in "flash" technology,

•

a 32-bit word,

•

a lower power requirement ( 1.8V), and

•

RISC technology.

In a March 1997 press release, Gemplus said that Texas Instruments would be
manufacturing the chip in 1998 ("Cascade a new chip", 1997). However, there are
still no reports of any commercial application and Motorola, one of the dominant
chip manufacturers of smart card chips, spent large sums to up-grade its facilities for
producing the usual 8-bit chips ("Motorola, 1997).

(Note: In May 1999, Atmel
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purchased the Motorola Smart Information Transfer (SIT) division that manufactures
tht.:: M68HCSOSC49A.) A reasonable conclusion i."i that although a more powerful

smart card chip may be technically feasible, commcrciul factors arc likely to delay its

introduction for some time yet.

2.7.5 Contactless card potential

Contactless smart cards, unlike contact versions, will probably find their mam

market in rapid access, rather than financial, applications. Therefore, in addition to
memory size, significant parameters are reading distance and data transfer rate, but

security may be relatively less important.

2.7.6 Memory size

A limitation of the devices is that they necessarily have smaller memories than

contact versions, due to the need to provide space on the silicon for additional
circuitry such as coils, capacitors and charge pumps, but the situation might
improve.

Motorola, in a joint venture with Matsushita, is developing a new

contactless card memory called YI (Fox, 1995, p. 22). YI is one of the perovskites

(strontium bismuth tantalate) a material similar to some used in high temperature
super-conductors. A chip using Y 1 might have a rewritable memory up to I00 times
greater than one using standard silicon dioxide, and a life with a greatly extended
number of rewrite cycles (Johnstone, 1998, p. 38). The technology is also known as
ferroelectric memory or FRAM.

2.7.7 Reading distance

Another contactlcss card problem is uncertainty about the maximum

rca~ing

distance, as can be seen from the following estimates. Although the range may seem
to be increasing this may not necessarily be true as the different distances arc
achieved with different technologies and frequencies.
•

3mm -!Omm ("Smart Card Technology", 1994)

•

!Ocm (Duffy, 1996),

•

metre (Owen, R., 1995).

•

metres (Johnstone, 1998).

A different author, Rank!, gives the following distances:
•

capacitive coupling

•

inductive coupling

•

lmm,
-reading

I metre,

-writing

IOcm (Rank! & Effing, 1997).

The cards used by ERG in the HongKong ticketing projeCt, described in section
2.7 .9, use inductive coupling. An advantage of "close-coupled" cards is that they are
subject to less wear than contact cards and the reader is less vulnerable to vandalism
but the need for near contact would probably mean that they have no application in
public transport ticketing.

2.7.8 Data transfer rates

The high frequencies used mean that high data transfer rates can be achieved and can
vruy over the entire range (9.6 to 76.8 Kbaud) specified for contact cards by. ISO
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7816.

Proximily cards usc higher frcquuncics (13.56MHz) than vicinity cards

(125KHz} and, data transfer rates, therefore, vt~ry from over 100 Kbytcs/scc to about
ten. Both pcrtOnnnnccs lie within the range specified by standard ISO 14443. Two
specific estimates of the contactlc.<.;S card data transfer rates follow.

o

19.2 Kbytes/ sec (Owen, R., 1995) and

o

106 Kbytes/scc (Duffy, 1996).

As can be seen, the information is dated and the current situation is probably rather
better._-- A data transfer rate of lOOKbytes/sec results in a ticketing process of about a

tenth of a second.

2.7.9 Dual chip cards .

. In HongKong, Gemplus has devised a dual-chip card. The technology provided by
Gemplus incorporates the latest technology in smart card usage, and the application
is a result of a joint effort by

Cit'~ University and Hang Seng Bank.

Technically, the

card is fabricated with both cont'·(\ctless and contact chips, with the contactless chip
\\

supporting the access applications and the contact chip supporting the store(\-value
function ("Banks launch", 1997). Apparently the two chips are not connected, thus
maintaining security at the cost of some foregone flexibility in application design.

2.7.10

Combi!Dual Interface cards

Many contactless card applications, usually in transportation, use a dual interface
card in which the microprocessor can be accessed either through contact or remotely.
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Software usually conforms to the MIFARE architectural platform developed by
Philips and the chip is often an Intel 8051, produced hy Philips,

pres~mai?IY

under

licence. The arrangement results in u rather power hungry device with relatively
short-runge access. Since 1998, Philips has been advertising a SmartXA 16-bit chip
with 4k RAM, up to 32k ROM and up to 32k EEPROM. The chip has a crypto coprocessor and Philips claim it can handle asymmetric encryption with up to 2048-bit
keys.

Security is said to be maintained through the use of hardwired firewalls

(Mifare News, 1997-10-01).

2.7.11

Other potential advances

Other potential smart card hardware advances may be achieved. Possibilities are:
•

improved geometric density,

•

more powerful coprocessors,

•

improved plqstic card manufacture,

•

improved chip embedding,

"

new memory storage materials.

The last three possibilities deserve rather more detail. Currently the plastic used in
card manufacture is either Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS) or Polyvinyl
Chloride (PVC). ABS, which involves injection moulding, is more durable and
cheaper for small production runs, but cannot have a magnetic stripe added. PVC,
which is laminated, is cheaper for large quantities and is easier to emboss but has a
shorter lifespan, less resistance to extremes of temperature and presents a hazard for
the environment. Printing on ABS has made progress in the last few years, which is
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an imporlant consideration becat.~sc it is hoped that advertising will pay for the cards
(Bcnhammou, 1997). Other matCdals have been tried but so far have proved too
\

costly. There arc now proposals to cmb:d the chip with a metal lead frame around it
to protect it from llcxure of the card (Bcnht~mmou, 1997), and use new yttrium and
ferroelectric materials mentioned earlier.

2.7.12

More compact rewritable memory

Initially, because space on a smart card chip is critical and ROM requires only one
quarter of the space required by EEPROM, most card operating systems were
created using a ROM mask, one of the chips manufacturing masks. The

opera~ing

systems were thus hardwired (see section 4.3.4) and usually optimised for a specitic
application or applications; a technique that resulted in a robust, secure system, but
made the use of the one card for various applications, let alone the creation of a
multi-application card, very difficult, if not impossible. The space constraint still
applies, but there is now a tendency to store part of the system code in EEPROM.
Hopefully the use of non-volatile, rewritable memory- may lead to a successfu!
multi-application card (see section 7.3.4).

2.8 Conclusions

As already noted, at present smart cards have limited memories and slow processors,
but eventually a design that is capable of the authenticmion, stored-value functions
and portable record keeping that is required for vehicle management, will be
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devised. However, a discussion of whether and how such a card might capture the
.necessary mass market, and a detailed :tnalysis to determine what capacity and

performance must be achieved, is deferred until chapters five and six. The best
idcntiticmion concept amongst the new technologies may he the combination of
smart cards with biometrics, but although improved smart cards will probably

continue to be designed and manufactured, whether any biometric method of
identification will achieve a universally acceptable standard of performance is less
certain.

Nevertheless, at present, a smart card system seems to be the most

promising possibility for personalising an equipment or device to a specific user
(Noakes- Fry, 1994, p. 202). In particular, if the system could capture the template of
a user's identifying feature to a smart card during an enrolment process and compare
it with a supplied template derived from a scanned image, then, if the two templates

match, positive identification would have been achieved.

Alternatively the user

might be required to supply a PIN which the smart card could compare to a

previously stored item and then, given a match, send a code to a decoder that would
then, and only then, activate the equipment or device. TherefOre, referring back to
the major applications of a smart card as reported by the New Zealand Futures Trust,
(Butler, 1996) identification followed by coded activation promises to provide the

personalised, extendible authentication that is required, whilst there are no apparent
technical impediments to eventually storing value and maintaining necessary vehicle
management records.
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3 SMART CARDS & VEHICLE MANAGEMENT

3.1

Introduction

Chapter one

identifies the

components of vehicle management as

traffic

management, usage control, maintenance and security, and chapter two considers the
current state and the potential for improvement, of smart cards, biometrics and other
relevant technologies.

Continuing to employ the sequence introduced in chapter

one, the present chapter examines how the aforementioned technologies might be
applied to improve management of each of the listed components, and mentions the
additional driver convenience that might be achieved as a by-product. The approach
involves dealing with each identified aspect in tum, but traffic management and
vehicle security deserve the most attention because. as will be seen, in both cases
controversial matters must be addressed. The controversies arise because the four
main groups concerned with vehicle management (authorities, fleet owners, ownerdrivers and drivers) do nL't have completely identical interests and are unlikely all to
favour the same management solution. Therefore, an attempt is made to take a
balanced view and, when considering how the technologies might be applied to the
management problem, to identify advantages that might be attractive to each group.
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3.2 Traffic Management

3.2.1 General

As defined in section 1.2.1, traffic management involves observing and influencing
the behaviour of motorists (an activity in which identification is usually essential)
and rapidly recording \!vents (a task suggesting a degree of automation). Smart cards
could facilitate several parts of this process: in particular,
•

monitoring behaviour,

•

obtaining the facts relating to accidents and other incidents, and

•

collecting fees, charges and penalties.

These points and a few subsidiaf1J matters are now considered

3.2.2 Behaviour monitoring

One day, if the mounting road death toll or the selfish and irresponsible behaviour of
a few motorists becomes unacceptable to the electorate, control of road traffic might
approach the tight regulation imposed on air traffic. Whilst control is unlikely to
reach the point where drivers must file the equivalent of a flight plan before
commencing a journey, it is not inconceivable, in urban areas, thut vehicles be fitted
with the equivalent of an identifying beacon and be subject to individual or group
direction regarding speeds, diversions and "special charge" or exclusion zones. The
technology is already used on buses in Brisbane. If smart card systems ever became
normal in vehicles, the authorities responsible for monitoring and enforcing traffic,
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pollution, and congestion regulations, could make usc of them. The card could be
part of a basic system, analogous to aircraft radar logging and cockpit voice
recording, and

~:ould

provide a simple "black box". Similar technology to that used

for road pricing could be used to interrogate vehicles as to the driver's licence details

and :-;peed - but motorists might not be enthusiastic.

On a less fmuristic note, even if remote interrogation facilities were not available, a
traffic officer equipped with a suitable reader could obtain at electronic speeds those
details that, at present, are laboriously recorded with a ball-point pen. The concept

of a smart card drivers' license is not new. A Swedish invention, the "kittelock",
alr~ady

implements it and has been recommended for an ESPRIT award, (Stott, R.,

1995). In Austria, in another application of the concept, a multiple application card
issued by Kapsch, an Austrian telecommunication company, stores details of the
motorist's license and insurance cover, and acts as a token to unlock the doors
(Duffy, 1996),

Finally, in the USA, the National Committee for Information

Technology Standards (NCITS), formerly the ANSI, has produced a draft standard

for a smart card driver's licence, but, so far, there seem to have been no
implementations ("Driver's license", 1999).

Given an on-board smart card system, the automatic identification of both vehicles
and drivers would be possible, and data that were collected automatically could be
analysed in real-time to determine traffic conditions at selected times and places.
Extensions to the system might be possible: e.g., if the smart card incorporated an
electronic purse application, a fee could be extracted from any vehicle entering a
designated congest;on control area. Furthermore, if the card was mounted in a
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transceiver, it is even possible that, in rcciprm:al conununications, drivers could be
advised of traffic conditions ahead of their presumed route, and diversions

recommended.

Harrop lists a number of trials and initiatives of this nature

undertaken in the US, Europe and Japan (Harrop, P., 1993, pp.II0-112).

3.2.3 Black box

Ascertaining the facts concerning actions prior to, and at the time of, an accident can
often be difficult. Wigan, quoting "IVHS America (1994) IYHS Crash data needs"
(a report of the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) America project),
writes,

"An onboard 'black box' recorder would be an invaluable legal and
enforcement resource. If such systems are designed to record even the last

100 seconds before a collision, then identification and privacy issues can
arise. If such systems are designed to record continuously and especially if
they were to transmit data for central storage and analysis, then a substantial
surveillance pattern emerges.'' (Wigan, M., 1994).
That may be so, but the 'black box' might also allow blameless drivers to prove their
innocence.

3.2.4 Road fee collection

Smart cards could be part of a more general, automatic, "road fcc" collecting system.
An experiment by the Transport Operations Research Group of the University of
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Newcastle on Tync, in Automatic Debiting and Electronic Payment for Transport
(ADEPT), has developed a new generation of road-usc pricing. The experimental
technology incorporated an 'intelligent' communications transponder and smart card
in the vehicle for automatic non-stop payment (Blythe, Burdon, Clark, Givens &
Rourke. 1994). Results of an ADEPT experiment at Cambridge arc claimed to have
proved that road pricing is technically feasible, although some problems remain,
mainly relating to "multi-lane enforcement, the performance and security of smart
cards and the operational issues surrounding integrated payment" (Dlythc, Clark &

Rourke. 1994, p.45).

However, other authors are less optimistic: for example,

Harrop writes, "These and other challenges will provide a recession-proof source of
employment for the talents of many electronics engineers for years

lO

come."

(Harrop. P., 1994). Furthermore, Clark states, "What is certain is that it is a debate
w~

will hear more of over the next few years." (Clark, J., 1994). Four years later. in

September 1998, under the special conditions that apply on the small island state of
Singapore, an electronic road pricing (ERP) system was installed on three highways
and at entries to the central business district ("More about ERP", 2000). It replaced
an Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) covering the central business district and a Road
Pricing Scheme (RPS) implemented on the island's three main expressways: both
schemes were manual and had been found to be cumbersome, labour-intensive and
inflexible. The ERP uses a smart card installed in a special in-vehicle unit that
communicates with toll stations by radio and incorporates an electronic purse issued
by NETS, a consortium of Singapore banks. Worldwide. Certified Wide Area Road
Use Monitoring (CWARUM), a more far-reaching and futuristic scheme, is under
discussion (Malik, 1998).

Clearly, road pricing is under consideration by many
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national and regional governments, but a more detailed examination of how smart
cards might be used to facilitate it, is left for future study.

3.2.5 Parking fee collection

The use of electronic purse smart cards as a way to pay parking fees has the usual
advantages of cashless payment; in particular, avoiding the threat of vandalism of,
and theft from, coin meters.

In addition, purse use could enable authorities to

accumulate statistics that would be of value in planning; however, two major

prerequisites are:
•

the widespread adoption of card purses, and

•

standardisation (preferably international} of the technology for parking fee

collection.
Trials using both contact and contactless cards have proved the technical feasibility
of the proposal (Luk, J.Y.K .. 1995)

3.2.6 Pollution and congestion control

Civic authorities are becoming increasingly concerned about pollution in urban, and
especially central business district, areas. Pollution from wood or coal fires is more
obvious, but the carbon monoxide and nitrous oxides from poorly tuned vehicles are
more toxic (Ponneah, 1998). Sensors to determine the lambda, or air/fuel ratio, are
already fitted to modem vehicles (Hillier, V.A.W., 1988), and their readings might
be recorded on an "inMvehicle" smart card.

At present. there is no external
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monitoring of sensor readings, but, given a smart card system that was politically
;.u;ccptable to the electorate, authorities could interrogate vehicles remotely and
ascertain the recorded toxicity level in the same way as licence and registration
munbcrs might be obtained (sec diagrams 3 and 4).

3.2.7 Vehicle related purchases

Automated payment for many purposes might be unpopular but could also have

desirable aspects for the motorist. Automatic electronic fuel vending systems are
already installed at the depots of some. major closed fleets (Arazi, 199 I, p. 648), and

one can speculate that automated car washing is likely to follow. As mentioned in
chapter one, about one in 10 vehicles is a fleet vehicle and, although no data has
been collected, it is not inconceivable that, collectively, they could travel as much as
half of all road miles travelled. Currently, petrol stations have the capability to
record data for fleet owners and are increasingly under pressure to accept payment
by both credit and debit cards; a method of payment that requires expensive, on-line
authentication of many different cards, for what are usually relatively small, lowmargin sales. A smart card incorporating an electronic purse provides an attractive
option from the point of view of the retailer (Dick, D., 1995). Perhaps. one day, the
driver will be able to open lhe fuel tank filler from within the vehicle, pay either with
a contactless card or by placing a contact card in an adjacent reader, and have the
tank filled by a robot arm ("Robot", 1997).
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3.3

Usage Control

3.3.1 Journey records and vehicle handling

Usage control is more likely to be favoured by owners than by authorities and

drivers.

Fleet vehicle drivers are customarily required to keep a record of their

journeys, and, by recording the odometer reading and time of each start, a smart card
supported vehicle Jogger would facilitate the chore; particularly if, by way of a

keypad, a code number could be entered simultaneously to indicate the trip's
purpose. The maximum deceleration (indicating an emergency) or maximum speed
between vehicle activations could also be recorded and, since the smart card would
probably be personalised, there would seldom be uncertainty about who was . t1e
driver. These features might bring a significant improvement in recording of fleet
vehicle usage, because, although they have been on the market for some years,
automatic vehicle Joggers have been too expensive for most applications.

Basic

A$750;

more

versions,

with

limited recording capability,

start at

about

comprehensive, but still limited, versions cost A$1500 or more; very expensive
loggers can record vehicle handling techniques such as gear changing or driver
alertness; and, no known version accepts input from the driver. Nevertheless, whilst
fleet managers might welcome a cheaper alternative, employed drivers might resist
their introduction (Wigan, M., 1994).

Owner~drivers

might accept the envisaged

systems if they were not too expensive and privacy was maintained, but it is arguable
that little would be gained by their use. The reaction of a small sample of fleet
managers is discussed in section 7.8
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3.4 Maintenance

If vehicles had suitable intcwctive readers, service mechanics could record the
completion of maintenance activities, such as oil or tyrc changes, on a vehicle's
smart cm·d, and the card could then be programmed to display in-vehicle reminders
when servicing was due. Drivers could also use a card system to record faults or
suspicious symptoms as they were observed; thus, to some extent, relieving
themselves of the need to make a report at the end of the journey. In section 1.2.3
the possibility has already been mentioned that, in vehicles fitted with OBD, faults
that are diagnosed automatically could be recorded automatically on an installed
smart card. With automatic fault recording, the validity of claims for repair under
warranty might be more easily established, leading to reductions in fraudulent claims
and extension of warranty periods.

3.5 Vehicle Security

3.5.1 General

Security is the aspect of vehicle management likely to be of most interest to ownerdrivers, because vehicle theft is common in modem society, but, as mentioned in
section 1.2.4, a discussion of vehicle theft has been relegated to Appendix 3. There
seems to be a consensus amongst criminologists that approaches to deterrence
focusing upon detection, arrest and conviction arc unlikely to be effective (Hamel,
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1994). Instead, the manufacture of more secure vchicl_cs und other target hardening

strategies arc advocated (Clark & Harris, 1992). Accordingly, after a brief mention
of standards, which list a number of security precautions, those precautions will
each, in turn, be outlined: an approach which should not be taken as an indication
that the criminologists' view is accepted unrcscrv!!dly. On the contrary, since the
cost of target hardening eventually falls upon the owner, as a required

sf:btcgy it can

be castigated as "punishing the victim". Here, however, only the technical a<;pccts of

security are addressed.

3.5.2 Standards

A British standard, BS AU 209, describes a range of vehicle security precautions.
These include:

•

vehicle perimeter security (i.e., door, boot and bonnet locks),

•

alarms on disturbance or breach of the perimeter,

•

immobilisation (i.e., steering and ignition locks), and

•

aid in the recovery of stolen vehicles (i.e., vehicle identification and vehicle
tracking).

A recent Australian standard, 3749 Part 2, covers the performance and installation of
alarms/immobilisers.
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3.5.3 Perimeter security

Better locks may i,mprovc perimeter security, but any normal window glass may be
broken and, therefore, although contactlcss smart cards might enable more

convenient access through the vehicle perimeter than keys, they do not greatly
improve resistance to a crude attack, followed by pilfering.

3.5.4 Alarms and immobilisers

Authorities differ about the usefulness of alarms which, in the literature, are often

grouPed with immobilisers as a single device.

Generally, immobilisers merely

require the user to present the correct token. Bovelander has drawn attention to
Kerckhoffs principle, that security should rely only on the key (not the algorithm)
anq to the shortcomings of "security by obscurity" as it is sometimes called
(Bovelander & Van Renesse, 1995). Unfortunately, most immobiliser vendors do
not accept the Kerckhoff principle and are loath to disclose how their devices work.
Naturally, their attitude gives rise to misgivings about immobiliser effectiveness
against attack by professional thieves.

The British Insurance Industry Vehicle Security Scheme (BIIVSS), out of a total of
964 points allotted for various security features that could be fitted to a vehicle,
awards 650 for a properly installed, approved alarm/immobiliser system (Ashley,
1993). At about the same time another British organisation, Partners Against Car
Theft (PACT), carried out tests that purported to prove that alarms were ineffective
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(Adams, 1993).

Livermore, commenting on immobiliscrs, says defeat by thieves

with expert knowledge is certain for "after markcl'' devices, because these electronic
immobiliscrs can all be de-installed (Livermore, 1993). He docs not elaborate on
this rather surprising statement and most cng!nccrs would probably contend that

there arc many engineering processes that arc reversible only with great difficulty.

Apparently the Western Australian Government concurs with BIJVSS and PACT,
because, in 1996, it agreed to pay an A$30 subsidy to support the installation of an
immobi!iser, whilst alarms did not attract the subsidy ("Coalition's", 1996). Since

the cost of an alann/immobiliser that met the Australian Standard 3793 lay between
A$300 and A$600 and an immobiliser alone between A$130 and A$200, the subsidy
seemed unlikely to alter significantly the public perception of the

cost~effectiveness

of the devices. By the end of 1997 the W A Government had actually spent only a
twelfth of the budget for the subsidy and, under the W A Road traff1c Act Section
24(2), has now made fitting an immobiliser compulsory before a vehicle can be
licensed or transferred.

In 1996, in WA, about 20% of the State's one million light vehicles were fitted with

some alarm or immobiliser ("Car theft action", 1997), and in SA, in 1995, only 13%
of stolen vehicles had an

anti~theft

device activated (Motor vehicle theft in SA,

1995). Perhaps therefore, assuming the proportion of vehicles fitted with

anti~theft

devices in SA to have been similar to that in WA, the devices do give some
protection, s!nce otherwise one might expect vehicles that were stolen to have
devices fitted in the same proportion as those that were not (i.e., 20% not 13% ).

I
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According to police statistics, in 1999, car theft in WA fell by 19.6%; but the RAC
points out that if vehicles subjected to malicious damage or theft of parts arc
included, the fall is mu'ch smaller, and suggests that the reduction could, at least

partly, be due to overall improvements to car security s)istems by vehicle
manufacturers ("F6\vcr", 2000).

Anti-theft devices tend to be installed on more

modern and expensive cars and, since 1992, all Australian produced cars have had
immObilisers factory fitted -

but neither expensive, nor recently Australian

produced, cars are prominent in the range of cars most commonly stolen - see
Appendix 3. All commonly marketed immobiliser systems provide the driver with a

token (e.g., a tag or transponder) that de-activates the immobiliser and these tag
activated systems have the disadvantage that the tag can be stolen or the driver can
fail to activate the system wh(m leaving the vehicle. A smart card could form part of
an immobiliser system for a vehicle and, by requiring submission of an encrypted
code, could make an electronic attack more difficult. In that case, the driver not only
has to have something (i.e., the card) but must also know something (i.e., the code).
Furthermore, the card could be programmed to immobilise the vehicle after a
suitable delay, so that even if the driver left the card in the vehicle, any thief must
then still either discover the code or by-pass the immobiliser system. However, as
already pointed out, even a smart card system could do little to thwart the crude type
of attack in which the perimeter is forced and the contents looted.
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3.5.5 Multi·point immobilisation

In immobiliscr design, the more points at which an immobiliscr acts the more
effective a deterrent it will be. since the thief is put to more trouble in by-passing a
multi-point system ("Multi-point imrnobiliscrs", 1995). A smart card might provide

a code that could be made essential for the operation of any designated electric
device, including locks that were electrically unlatched. The number of codes or

"differs", to use the language of the British standard, could be quite large. The
operation of the fuel and ignition systems might be made to depend on a signal
'

provided by the smart card and, also, without that signal, the "look-up map" in the

microcontroller of the engine control unit made unavailable. Inevitably, multi-point
protection adds to the cost.

3.5.6 Aids to recovery

Aside from either overt or hidden identification marks, aids to recovery consist of
tracking schemes, of which there are several options.
•

Land·based schemes that rely on a beacon in the vehicle being located by
resection from receiving stations.

An example is the QuikTrak scheme in

Sydney described by Adams (Adams, 1996).
•

Global Positioning Systems (GPS). These use satellite signals, require line of
sight, and are used by major fleet owners to track their shipments.
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•

Some types of ccllpbonc network could be used.

For example, the Federal

Communications Commission, in 1996, mandated that within five years the

technology must be in place to fix the location of callers to within 400 feet.
•

If road pricing and congestion control were introduced, the accompanying toll
stations could track vehicles.

None of these schemes require the use of smart cards, but tracing a vehicle by means
of the cellphone network might be facilitated by their use.

The possibility may

become the subject of another study and is not discussed further here.

3.6 Improved Convenience

In introducing this chapter mention was made of the additional driver convenience

that might be achieved as a by·· product of a system to improve vehicle management.
Although this benefit is unlikely to be significant for most drivers, for luxury
vehicles with power-operated seat and mirror adjustment, a smart card could store
the cardholders' preferences and automatically adjust these ancillaries when the
smart card

w~s

inserted. Similarly, cruise control, radio, CD/ROM and tape players

could be set to the holder's preference. In a more futuristic scenario, relating for
example to a "drive by wire" vehicle, the card might even contain settings for
steering ratio, suspension rigidity, a GPS display or "clear distance ahead'' warning
(Lammers, 1999).
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3.7 Conclusions

A smart card system could probably provide a useful "in-vehicle" alternative to

today's manual, on-hoard automatic logg:ng, or external automatic methods of
collecting vehicle managcmcnl data. System advantages might include generally
improved convenience for authorities, llcet managers and, perhaps also, fleet drivers:
but owner-drivers might be unenthusiastic. A smart card system might also bring

marginal improvements in the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data being
recorded, and the card itself might provide a useful component in security, since it
could be the critical part of a locking system, an immobiliscr, and at least one
tracking system. The tracking aspect might be more attrJctive to owner-drivers than
the preceding ones, but security must be balanced against its cost: a consideration
deferred until chapter six.

Possibly the greatest improvement would occur if all

these measures could be integrated into a single system. Unfortunately, a number of
difficulties impede the development of any (especially, integrated) system and these
are discussed in the remaining chapters.
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4

PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES

4.1

Introduction

Chapter one presents the assumption, amongst others, that smart cards will be used
in vehicle management only if their use for other purposes becomes widespread.
Chapter two claims that the technology to support smart card based vehicle
management either exists or could be readily developed, and chapter three discusses
how it might be applied, but concludes with a hint concerning obstacles to
implementation.

In this chapter, those obstacles that do not relate directly to

commercial competition are described, beginning with the need to standardise,
reduce costs, and improve smart card capacity and performance to a level that would
support a multi-application card. At this point, it should be noted that a multi·
application capacity requirement is more demanding than mere vehicle management.
Other problems involving security and biometrics are then considered, and, finally,
political and individual concerns are addressed.

4.2

Multiple application smart cards

A multi-application capability, precisely defined, is the capability to take a smart
card housing one or more different applicatiom;, add another application without
reference to the applications already on the card, and do this without disturbing the
others or taking any special action with the application being loaded. Above, the

I
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assumption has .:llrcmly been made that the development of multi-application cards is

an t:sscntial prerequisite to their usc in vehicles. Happily, consumers may also want
such a development. as evidenced by the Smart Card Forum reporting a consensus

amongst its members to that effect. The Forum quoted research that purported to
prove that 50% of members thought the multi-application card would be either

excellent or a good idea. Only 15% thought it was a poor idea (Barr, Allen & Burke,
1997. p. 64). The finding is suspect, although plausible, not only because market
research is sometimes faulty, but also because the Forum was established in 1993 by
Citicorp, Bellcore, and the US Treasury Financial Management Services Division, to

accelerate the widespread acceptance of smart cards that support multiple
applications. If the development of a multi-application card is essential before smart
cards are used in vehicle management, the formidable preconditions for any such
development must first be met.

A list of essential criteria for multi-application

success could include:
•

market acceptance of at least de facto standards,

•

a potential for long term economies of scale,

•

a common technology that is fraud resistant,

•

a satisfactory business case for each player,

•

the involvement of a high volume but low value application such
transportation or payphones,

•

a critical mass of cards in use,

•

a ubiquitous infm<;jtructure to accept cards (developed through alliances), and

•

brand identification and holder trust in the brand (Allen & Kutler, 1997, p. 15).

a~
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As will be seen, these preconditions arc, lo some extent, aligned with the problems
and atlitudes that arc discussed in this and the next chapter.

4.3

Standardisation

4.3.1 Objectives and obstacles

The smart card industry recognised at an early stage that standardisation would play
a major role in the development and acceptability of smart cards (Bannerjee, 1997).
Standards are being set which are:
•

specific to smart cards, and may be thought of as dealing with either external
physical characteristics, or the internal workings of the integrated circuit (e.g.,
communications and operating systems) or,

•

specific to applications rather than the technology, such as those relating to
identification and financial transactions (e.g., payments or the electronic purse).
Standards may be the key to ensuring that smart cards and their infrastructures
are interoperable, but progress is impeded because the requirement is continually
changing as the technology develops and further applications are found. Where
standardisation is achieved, confidence in smart card solutions and their
attractiveness in meeting business requirements will increase. According to the
NZ Future's Trust, quoting the Central Computer & Telecommunications
Agency,
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"Smart card manufacturers and scheme operators have a strong desire to
develop

international stand:.mls

in

order to

achieve high

levels of

interoperability" ("CCTA Report", 1995).
The statement may he true, but the manufacturers and operators also try to ensure
that any accepted standard is as close to their own technology as possible, since in
this way the effort needed to achieve compatibility is minimised.

If this second

motivation predominates the result might be a power struggle and delay. Ideally, it
should be possible to use any smart card, in any reader, anywhere in the world, but
this ideal is a long way from realisation and, indeed, might be realised only with
overwhelming inter-industry and international cooperation. The inevitable reduction
in variety will be painful for those who have developed unique products, and most
standardisation work-groups are about sharing the pain. A further consideration is
that, in the process of achieving interoperability, standards must not inhibit
technological advances. If the efforts of the official organisations do not produce a
standard, eventually, judging by history, a so-called industry standard wili become
established, which all commercial participants will have to support if they are to
operate successfully in the marketplace. An industry standard is, in fact, merely a
specification that is being proposed as a standard by some powerful sponsor or
consortium of firms.

4.3.2 ISO standards

ISO standards appear to be the most important and relevant agreements, within the
framework of which most other standards have been developed. Although already

outlined in section 2.3, the essentials nrc repealed here to provide a basis for the
description of other cllorts to achieve a degree of compatibility. Standard ISO 7810
covers the dimensions and physical characteristics of smart cards. Communications
with contact cards arc covered by standard ISO 7816, which has six parts, of which
parts one to three define communications with the cards, and four to six deal with
matters relating to the card operating system, such as data clements and file
structures. Parts seven and eight are still in draft, but will extend parts four to six.
Parts nine and ten are in an earlier
commands

and

protocols

for

draf~

stage, and will define further inter-industry

synchronous

communications,

respectively.

Contactless cards are covered by two standards, ISO 10536 for close coupling, and a
planned standard ISO 14443 for remote coupling (Fancher, C. , 1997). A proposed
standard for vicinity cards, ISO 15693, is not yet even in draft. There are a number
of other ISO standards, but they have little relevance to the use of cards in vehicle
management.

It should be noted that Japan has its own independent standards

organisations (e.g., JEIDA) that are also active.

4.3.4 Standard card operating system

If the card itself could be standardised, the next most important aspect might be the
card operat.ing system. To date, smart card issuer:; have written what are essentially
proprietary applications that are integrated with the card operating system and are
not interoperable or portable, For a combination of technology, cost and security
reasons mentioned in sections 2.3 and 2.7, 12, few chipmakers offer a smart card chip
·that does not have at least part of an operating system hardwired as part of the
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integrated circuil. Even fewer firms offer smart card operating systems that arc not

designed for a specific chip (Guthery, 2000). Consequently, there arc at least a
dozen different smart curd operating systems offered by various hardware and
software vendors. ft would seem that if multi-applications are to be successful, there
is a need for standard open platforms on which to deVelop smart card applicatiOns
quickly: including those that are supplementary or "after issuance".

Application

issuers must be conVinced that another (genuine or fraudulent) application on the

same card cannot interfere with •. or otherwise affect, their own (see section 4.2).
Alternative proposals to achieve this situation are offered by several industry
groupings.

4.3.5 MULTOS

Mondex and

Ma~terCard,

wilh cardmakers Gemplus and Dai Nippon and

chipmakers Motorola, Hitachi and Siemens, (but, significantly, excluding Visa)

promote an "industry standard" operating system, MULTOS, that seeks to ensure
that multiple applications may reside on a single smart card without interfering with
each other.

MULTOS is claimed to be the first open, high-security, multi-

application operating system for smart cards, enabling a number of different
applications to be held securely on the card at the same time. Its promoters say it
may open up the smart card market, creating new avenues of convenience for users

while delivering savings and opportunities for the industry (MULTOS, I 997).
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4.3.6 Windows for Smart cards

Recently, at the Cartes '99 Paris convention, Microsoft arrived on the scene as a
powerful latecomer with Windows for Smart cards.

Microsoft has promoted its

operating system not only for network security, but also for health, payment, loyalty
and, more recently, subscriber identity module (SIM) cards for the GSM cellular

phone market. At the convention, the accompanying toolkit to enable developers to
write SIM card applications using Visual Basic was expected to become available
early in the year 2000 ("'Microsoft releases", 1999), but at the time of writing (June,

2000), there had still been no report of its release.

4.3.7 Java API

As a consequence of the lack of a standard card operating system, only with
difficulty can applications operate with cards from different vendors. One solution
is to install on the card a program called an Application Programming Interface
(API) that will translate application commands into a fonn readable by a range of
cards and their operating systems. JavaSoft, a business unit of Sun Microsystems
Inc., with some support from other industry leaders, (including Visa) has claimed
that the Java Card API 2.0 will solve this problem ("Sun Microsystems", 1996). Sun
Microsystems claims that:
•

the Java Card API is a specialised Java application interface, optimised to
provide critical Java functionality to smart card developers, and

XI

•

is the Jirst industry standard language and open API for smart cards that allows

applications to run on all standard ISO 78J6w4-compliant smart cards.
Java's scalability and platform-indcpcn~~nce arc said to provide the ideal

environment for creating smart card applications, a standardised process for adding
new features and changing old ones, and clearly established commercial terms

describing the rights and responsibilities of participants.

Unfortunately, it seems

that, at least until recently, each card manufaclUrer defined its own Java byte code

set, and so it is probably not possible to take an applet of the card of one
manufacturer and run it on the card of another (Guthery, 2000).

Gemplus and

Schlumberger, who together make about 70% of all smart cards, support the Java
Card API ("Smarter Java", 1997). But, see earlier paragraph, Gemplus also supports
MULTOS!

However, ,the financial institutio'hs, which c:.:e likely to be'· the most

powerful issuers, will probably determine the outcome. Siemens, the third largest
card

m~er,

also appears to be keeping all options open because, in July 1997, it

licensed Java technology from Sun Microsystems ("Sun and Siemens", 1997). An
open system, or operating environment, like Java Card, encourages Widespread
support, because there are published specifications about how the environment
works. The Java API may be thought of as an adaptor between, on the one hand, any
of a range of operating systems or chip instruction sets, and, on the other, selected
Java programs and applets: however, it is probably a memory and power hungry
solution as illustrated more fully in section 7 .2.1 and Figure 16.
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4.3.8 Backend software

Another, somewhat different, potential solution to the problem of multiple nonstandard operating systems relies on a suite of software that resides partly on the
cards and partly on the terminals that read and, if necessary, write to the cards. One
proposal, known as the OpenCard Framework, comprises three software layers, two
of which (CardService and Application Management) reside on the card and
effectively adapt the card's operating system to match the other layer (CardTerminal)

that resides on the reader. It is Java based, but in this way, at some cost in card
processing resources, many smart card types may be enabled to work with almost
any reader.

A consortiu·.TI that includes IBM, Visa and American Express (but

excludes MasterCard, Hitachi and Mondex) promotes the framework (OpenCard
Framework, Oct, 1998). A second related concept, is Visa's Open Platform, which
is being promoted by GlobaiPiatform, an organisation whose primary objective is the
development and publication of standards and specifications that might be used by
companies implementing multiple application smart card programs.

The Open

Platform is said to enable the fast and easy development of globally interoperable
smart card systems, and is comprised of three integrated elements: the card
specifications, the terminal specifications, and the workbench tools. The concept
seems to be similar to that of the OpenCard Framework, but the organisation claims
to be different from the Framework's consortium in that it has a "crOss industry"
membership and, indeed, it includes several tclcconununication companies, known
as telcos, but no major financial institution ("Open Platform", 2000).
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4.3.9 Electronic payment standards

Even if a standard operating system, or an acceptable alternative, emerges, there
would still be a need for standardisation within applications.

One of the most

important application areas relates to electronic payments. Whilst awaiting the
promulgation of an official payment standard, which, hopefully, will be incorporated
into the ISO framework, a specification has been developed by Europay, Mastercard
and Visa (EMV), that covers the interaction between smart cards and readers for all
payment system applications (debit, credit and offline) (Rank! & Effing, 1997). The
specification was intended to create a common technical basis to compete with

Mondex specifications: at the time MasterCard had not purchased control of
Mondex. The EMV specification is a substantial document that aims to ensure that
any payment system smart card may be read by any reader if both conform to the
standard, but, according to some manufacturers, it is actually not quite specific
enough to achieve this aim. The first version was based on cards with symmetric
encryption and the matter of key transportation was unresolved ("What contains",
1995). The EMV standard was declared by its sponsors to be "functional" in 1996.
but many large, particularly French, applications do not conform to it. The Estonian
Institute of Cybernetics has provided a summary of the contents, grouped into three
parts:
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"Part

1:

Electromechanical

Characteristics;

Logical,

Interface,

and

Transmission Protocols
This part of the specification concentrates on physical and logical clements
of the interaction between smart cards and electronic tcrtninals used for

payment transactions ....
Part II: Data Elements and Commands
This part defines data elements and files, the commands required to execute
financial transactions and terminal requirements. When data elements arc

exchanged between cards and terminals, they become data objects. These
objects can be simple or complex depending on how they have been

processed. All data objects reside in data files. Data files in a card, when
viewed from the terminal, appear in a tree structure whose main branches are
application definition files that are application-specific. This .structure allows
diverse applications to be maintained separately within a single card ....
Part III: Transaction Processing
This part defines the content and flow of payment transactions for both cards
and terminals, establishing common core functions for

international

interchange transactions. However, card issuers may also.create fl)nctions
that

are unique

to specific applications

("Technology/smartcards", 2000).

and

payment systems .... "
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4.3.10

Common electronic purse specification

A specification being developed by the ComitC EuropCcn de Normalisation (CEN),
prEN 1546, covers the electronic purse. Apparently in an attempt to pre-empt other

efforts to develop an industry standard for the purse, in

Ma~c.h

1999, a consortium

"released" the common electronic purse specification (CEPS). The specification,
reportedly, is based on the former CLIP purse system discussed briefly in the next

chapter.

The consortium consisted of CEPS Co of Spain, Kartensysteme of

Germany, Europay and Visa. Mastercard, which owns the Mondex system, is not a

member (CEPS, 1999).

4.3.11

PC/SC specification

Another effort to produce an application specific specification, by a consortium of
leading companies from the PC and smart card industries, seeks to promote the
acceptance of smart cards in the PC/Internet environment.

The intention is to

develop a set of open standards enabling PCs to work with such smart card
applications as network access; especially in electronic commerce. In particular, the
Workgroup members identified the need to standardise interfaces to readers, and
considered the specification of common PC programming interfaces and control
mechanisms as critical areas to be investigated ("PC/SC Workgroup overview'',
1996, September 12). If the effort is successful the conforming smart card readers
will become, in effect, standard PC peripherals. Microsoft's "Windows for Cards"
appears to be the first operating system to support the "standard". A second version
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of the specification

IS

being

draf~cd

("PC/SC Workgroup specifications update",

2000).

4.3.12

MIFARE

Yet another application area that would benefit from standardisation is transportation
ticketing. Since the standard ISO 14443 for contactlcss card communications is still
not finalised, it seems likely that the European standard, CEN 1545, for data elements
in contactless cards, or de facto standards such as the Philips designed MIFARE
system, will dominate these applications for some time. However, both Motorola
(now Atmel) and SGSThornson (now STMicroelectronics) have announced that they

intend to develop cards based on ISO 14443. The two makers claim to believe the
planned ISO standard provides better security and wider interoperability than

MIFARE (Costlow, 2000).

4.3.13

Other standards organisations

A number of other organisations are attempting to ·establish stanQ.ards for smart
cards. Probably the mo·:;t successful of these is the European Telecommunications

Institute (ETSI) which has achieved worldwide acceptance for the Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) card used in one mobile telephone system
(Guthery, 2000).

Another example is the National Committee for Information

Technology Standards (NCITS), formerly the Americun National Standards Institute
(ANSI), that has produced a standard for a driver's licence on an electronic card
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(Electronic, 2000). There arc several commercially sponsored groupings purporting
to further standardisation but, ulas, they arc prohably driven more by marketing
agcmlas th:.m any technical necessity.

. 4.3.14

Certification authority model

Standardisation of smart cards, their operating systems and key applications may not
be all that is required for interoperability. Robin Towncnd, of Intellect Australia Pty
Ltd, a Perth manufacturer of smart card readers with international standing, says
'

there are two issues blocking the faster rollout of smart cards and that a common and
open operating system is only the first. The second is the need for banks to work out

.a certification authority model ("Curly questions", 1997). A certification authority is
a trusted third party that issues and manages credentials in the form of certificates for
individuals or entities.
'

Commonly, the authority checks with a separate

investigating body to verify infonnation provided by the party requesting the
certificate. All over the world, organi:mtions are setting themselves up a'\ certifying
authorities.

Within Australia, SecureNt:.'i, a Melbourne company, is offering to

address this second issue with three forms of digital certificate (personal, corporate
and server).
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Economic considerations

4.4.1 Cost estimation

All estimates of the future cost of smart cards are based on two a'isurnptions;
•

the cost of electronic circuitry will continue to fall, and

•

a mass market will emerge.

Before either a multi-application card or a "killer" application appears, costs may
need to be reduced. Put another way, if a mass market is to be developed, the cost of

smart cards must be kept low. With an estimate in 1992 that, by 1995, the annual
"

market would be one billion cards, it was expected that, by then, the cost of a smart

card would be US$3.00 (Baker, 1992).

Neither the volume, nor the cost, was

achieved (Amdur, 1997).

4.4.2 Components of system costs

The cost of a smart card system is more than the cost of the cards themselves. Other

costs are:
•

hardware peripherals, such as terminals or readers,

•

software, for both smart cards and their infrastructure,

•

network costs, and

•

enrolment of users (Svigals, 1994).

Svigals does not mention the development costs of applications, which would need
to be taken into consideration. There might be comparative gains for smart cards

mnong~t

these other costs. For example, co~t~ in validating current magstripc card~

at EFfPOS terminal~ might be reduced if smart cards were u~cd, but probably would
not vanish. Agnin~t the co~t~ of smart cards must be ofL'iel bencfits,'i'lsuch as the
potential reduction in fraud, and the greater durability of smart cards.

4.4.3 Card costs

A comparison of the cost of mags tripe and smarC cards follows.

Table 2: Magstripe and smart cards compared

Parameter
Life (years)
Cost (US$)

Ma~stripe

2
0.10 to 0.50

Smart card
10
1.00 to 20.00

The life of a smart card is estimated· to be lO years, versus tWo years for a mags tripe
card, but·smart card cost estimates vary greatly. (It may be worth noting that the
primitive smart cards used in the simulation to be described in chapter six, cost

A$20 each.). Duffy estimates that a complete smart card might cost US$1.00 to
US$20, whereas a magstripc card might cost from US$0.10 to US$0.50 (Duffy,
1996). His estimate makes no mention of the cost of emb~dding the chip in the card.
Cordonnier, in 1995, gave the average price of a card as us~·4.00 (Cordonnier,

1995). In 1997 he estimated the average cost of a smart card, including its sha•·e of
the infrastructure overhead, as US$20, and the cost of a contact smart card as from

US$2.00 to US$10 (Cordonnier, 1997). In the earlier estimate he may have been
including memory cards and in the later one con tactless types, but, even so, docs not
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appear to be able

tl

report th<ll costs arc falling.

The Gartner Group provide

different estimates again.

Table 3: Magstripe smart cards and optical cards compared.

Card type

Maximum
Data

Processing
Power

Cost of
Card

Capacity
40 bytes

$0.10 Magnetic Stripe
none
$0.75
Cards
$1.00I Kbytes
none
Integrated
$2.50
Circuit Memory
Cards
$7.00-$15
8/16-bit
IC Processor
8Kbytes
CPU
Cards
$7.00-$12
4.9 Mbytes
none
Optical
Memory Cards
Source: Gartner Group (Stand: June 98). All costs are m US$.

Cost of
Reader and
Connection
$750
$500

$500
$3,500$4000

4.4.4 Components of card costs

Components of the cost of the card itself include the plastic rectangle, estimated at
US$0.45 to US$0.55. In 1996, assuming mass production, the chip was estimated to
cost from US$1.00 to US$2.50, but this cost was expected to fall to US$0.75 US$1.50 by 1997 (Duffy, 1996).
In tabular form the estimated cost of contact smart cards could be as follows.

Table 4: Smart card costs
Component
Microchip
Plastic card
Embedding

Cost (US$)
$1.00 to $2.50
$0.45 to $0.55
N/A
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Although the cost of embedding the chip in the card must be recognised there is no
published information available as to what the cost might be.

4.4.5 Other costs

Even a basic reader is estimated to cost more than US$1 00, whilst retrofitting a
magstripe reader, for example an ATM, to read smart cards might cost from

US$2,000 to US$3,000 (Duffy, 1996; Fancher, 1997).

Consideration of what a

smart card supported vehicle management system might cost, and what owners
might be prepared to pay for it has been left until chapter six.

4.4.6 Cost trend

It appears that the fall in costs expected by Baker did not happen and, even now,
there is no evidence of any such trend. Perhaps, instead, gains from more efficient
production are being absorbed in developing improved cards.

4.4 Card capacity and performance

4.5.1 Required capacity

Chapter two gave an indication of the potential for increased chip power, but the
question now to be addressed is whether or not any increase might be enough to
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provide a multi-application capability. Assuming costs can be kept at an acceptable
level, i(!smart cards arc to be attractive to all partiCs (issuers, financial instilutions,

mcrch:mts and the public) and arc to support multiple upplications: then they will
need to provide on-card, asymmetric, encryption facilities, and, eventually, biometric

identification. A multi-application capability i!' expensive in computing resources,
and encryption even more so ("CASCADE FIRST", 1994). The definition of multiapplication capability in section 4.2 implies that the applications may belong to
different entities and be loaded at different locations, that inter-operability har.; been
'

achieved, and that applications must be isolated from each other. This ideal open
system does not appear to be imminent, bur, when and if it arrives, it will almost
certainly make further claims on the limited chip resources.

Finally, biometric

identification, for true security, should match supplied and recorded features on the
card itself, rather than merely supplying a template for comparison elsewhere. Smart
card chips will need to improve in both speed and memory if they are to meet these
requirements. With the exception of the CASCADE chip, until recently, 'the chips
being promoted or used, for reasons explained earlier, seem intended for financial
applications and have little spare capacity for anything else ("Motorola", 1997).

4.5.2 Extensibility and personalisation

Two further tenus need definition. In the smart card context, extensibility is the
ability to add further applications to an existing smart card. Hitherto, in general,
extensibility has been limited because an application written for one smart card type
could not be installed on another; a problem already discussed under standardh;ation.
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Personalization is the process of taki,ng a "generic" smart card ancl customising it

with duta that arc specific to a

singlc~application

or multi-application card and the

'

indiv·~~~~al cardholder.

While identification data might be inscribed on the plastic, to

personalise the curds the programmer will need to cmb~d personal statistics in the

chip and customise applications stored on the chip. The process. an essential service
to imp!t!ment any smart card applications system, is conceptually identical to the
personalisation
implementation.

of

vehicles

and

ccJlphones,

being

merely

different

m

Personal identification is essential to provide secure access for

smart card holders to pr;emises or company networks, and Internet or other electronic
commerce applications.

Mere possession of the card should not be sufficient.

Personalisation also enables issuers to build brand recognition and customer loyally
by enhancing frequent shopper and similar loyalty programs ("Standard Register
partners", 1997).

Ease of both extensibility and personalisation._is important for

issuers and those employing smart cards as part of an application. The facility might
not be relevant to vehicle management, but it must be borne in mind that for the
smart card to be accepted for vehicles, it will need to have other uses.

4.6

Security

,,
\ ·,

4.6.1 Aspects of security

Although smart card technology is making steady advances, most.mass markets h.we
not yet used it to anywhere near its potential. Qne reason may be that for many
applications such as electronic purses, bankcards, pay-TV cards and phonecards, it
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has proved almost impossible to achieve the high level of security demanded at a
low enough cost. If a smart card is to be used to improve the security of facilities or

systems, then the card itself must be secure, and unauthorised persons should not be
-<~blc

to counterfeit it, read it, manipulate its contents, or usc it. Security may be

considered at the chip level, the card level, the application level, or the system level.
Breaches might be systemic or individual. E. T. Patrikis, First Vice President of the

Federal Reserve Bank of New York defines a systemic risk ac; " ... the risk of an event
which could bring markets or clearing and settlement systems to a httlt, or cause the
failure of additional market participants." Elsewhere, more succinctly, he refers to
systemic breaches as "show-stoppers" (Patrikis, 1996).

4.6.2 Systemic

At the individual level, a fraudster might possibly discover the PIN (or biometric
template) of an individual and abscond with money or gain access to information.
The individual concerned could be severely inconvenienced, if not ruined, but for the
issuer the loss would probably be supportable. However, in some

f~ture,

smart card

supported, global financial system, if criminals found a way to counterfeit cards, the
world's financial system might be destroyed in an attack similar to that attempted by
Germany against Britain during World War ll (Bank of England, 1997). In this
attempt, a large number of five pound notes were allegedly scattered over Britain by
airdrops.

Although subsequent reports claim the notes were used to finance

Germany's spy system and found there way to England indirectly (Hottl, 1955),
whatever the distribution route, the notes were indistinguishable from the genuine
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item and, as a result, no Jlnancial institution or merchant would accept the
denomination until a new issue was .r.oadc with a distinctive gold wire through it.
Many people holding perfectly genuine notc!-i suffered loss.

An oftcn~pcrccived

advantage of cash money is anonymity, but the flip side of anonymity is risk. If' a
hacker wns able to counterfeit DigiCash or Mondex cards', the entire currency mighl
become worthless ("Timorous trade", 1997). A somewhat different systemic breach
might occur if, through a failure of non-repudiation, an individual could prove that a
withdrawal from the deposited money had been taken by fraud.

No doubt the

deposit taker (presumably, the card issuer) would be obliged to make good the
individual's loss and, thereafter, dishonest people could claim that withdrawals

t~ey

had actually made were the work of fraudsters: to the great embarra'isment, if not
loss, of the deposit taker.

4.6.3 Chip level

Chip security begins with the design of the chip, which is arranged, not only for
efficiency, but also for the protection of the stored data: therefore, the design team
usually

includes the card

manufacturer's representatives.

Chips

must

be

manufactured in as secure an environment as are, for example, banknotes; so, all
chips, whether acceptable or faulty, must be accounted for (Baker, T., 1992). Chips
normally may be operated in one of three modes; test, development or user.
•

The chip manufacturer must be able to test the chips.
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•

The card manufacturer must be able to develop the chip, usually by adding
programs to the non-volatile, rcwritable memory and ensuring that these
programs cannot be tampered with.

•

The application developer must be able to add stifl more programs and, similarly,
prevent further tanipering.

Before the card re3ches the user, the test and development modes should have been
irreversibly disabled. Various techniqu,es arc used for this purpose, amongst which
are:
-'--~

providing a power spike to the chip that causes essential, polycrystalline silicon,
fuses to 'blow'; and

•

precision sawing to remove part of the circuitry (Myers, 1996; Paterson, 1991 ).

Delivery must be handled in a secure manner similar to that used for banknotes or
bullion (Paterson, M., 1991), and any attempt to tamper with the chip should cause it
to self-destruct (Myers, 1996; Paterson, 1991).

Finally, until recently, a single chip was used because, among other problems,
multiple chips may have connections that are vulnerable to attack: a consideration
that limited the size and, hence, the power of the chip circuitry. Since, as already
mentioned in section 2.7, a dual-chip card is being trialed in China, it might seem
that this restriction on multiple chips had now been relaxed, but that is not the case
as the two chips on the card are not connected.
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4.6.4 Chip cracking

Despite all these precautions, chips probably may he reverse engineered or
"cracked". At least four groups claim to have proved that it can be done.

The first was Bcllcorc Labs. Julie Krueger, acting executive director

or the Smart

Card Forum, and Rebekah Schloss, senior product manager, IntcrBold, and member
of the Forum's board, have commented on the Bellcore research.

"In September 1995, Bellcore announced a theoretical technique to crack a
smart card or other RSA cryptographic processor by inducing faults through
mechanical means, and monitoring the resulting changes in the output

ciphe1text. The press coverage that followed cited a number of authorities
whose conclusions, in general, are that the technique, while it is only
theoretical, is important for the industry to be aware of, and cracking one
smart card through a rather elaborate scenario does not compromise the
security infrastructure." (Krueger & Schloss, 1996, p. 1).

The second group comprised a team of researchers from Cambridge University,
which, under the leadership of Professor Ross Anderson, categorised a variety of
types of attack on' the

S~"curity
.,

of smart cards. The team had in mind the increasing

number of systems, from pay-TV to electronic purses, that rely on the tamper
resistance of smart cards and other security processors, and, hence, the team
described a number of attacks on such systems - some old, some new and some that
are simply little known outside the chip· testing community.

The researchers

9H

concluded that trusting tamper resistance

1s

problematic: smart card security

IS

routinely breached, and even a: device that was described by a government signals

ugcncy as 'the most secure pror.:cssor generally available' turned out to be
vulnerable. Designers of secure systems were advised to consider the consequences
with care (Anderson & Kuhn, 1996).

However, an unsigned web page by

Semiconductor Insights Ltd sets out to rebut the Cambridge team's claims.

Its

rebuttal depended mainly on the contention that the microchips attacked by the

Cambridge team were chips with parallel ports, unlike those used in smart cards
which have only a serial port and a reset ("TAM PER RESISTANCE", 1996).

The third group was from an Israeli University. According to a report by Markoff in
the New York Times, two Israeli scientists, Adi Shamir, a professor at the applied
mathematics department at the Weizmann Institute, and Eli Biham, a member of the
faculty of the computer science department at the Technion, reported that, in
addition to the so-called public key coding systems that were found vulnerable by
the Belicore team, private key data coding systems, such as the American Data
Encryption Standard, or DES, might be successfully attacked if a computer processor
can be made to produce an error (Markoff, J., 1996).

The fourth group, Cryptography Research, a private consulting company m San
Franscisco, was reported in the New York Times to have used a technique 'that relics
on the fact that semiconductor chips must use electrons to do calculations. The
Company showed, for instance, that the key from an RSA system might be extracted
by watching an oscilloscope graphing the power consumption of a card (Wayner,
1998). Some counter measures were also mentioned.

4.6.5 Counterfeiting

Counterfeiting, a different form of attack, has t:voked conflicting comments.
Stephan Seidman, editor

or the Smart Card Monthly, wrote in

1994 that, in twenty

years, not one counterfeit smart card had been reported anywhere in the world
(Seidman, 1994). Strangely, Svigals, at <!bout the same time, quoted a Wall Street
Journal report of a 1992 cellular phone system probable revenue Joss of US$400m,
due to chip based fraud. The attackers got good identification numbers from cellular
transmissions, and replaced the

ro chips in the cellular phones with gcneral·purpose

chips programmed to emit the pirated identification numbers. One massive attack
used modified cellular phones for a week and then discarded them (Svigals, 1994, p.

Ill). More recently, the Smart card Developer's Association (SDA) and two UC
Berkeley researchers announced that the GSM SIM card could be cloned. Although
this was a research exercise and not an actual theft, the potential for peculation wa<;
demonstrated.

In addition, the association drew attention to other weaknesses

which, it alleged, were partly due to government agencies requiring that

confidentiality be weakened (SDA clones digital GSM ccllphones,

1998).

Therefore, it seems likely that, as with telephone SIM cards, other smart cards could
be counterfeited, stolen, or misused. It is possible that the fear of a similar systemic
breach has played a part in the reluctance of financial institutions to implement the
electronic purse, or wholeheartedly to support electronic transactions.
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4.6.6 Card

Apart from the chip. it is possihlc to make the card itself difficult to counterfeit. The
materials used arc not c<tsy to work with, <tnd features could hr..: included analogous
to the watermark, or hologram, of a banknotc. Even laser engraving, which hurns a

subsurface layer of the plastic, is a fairly secure print, and can be removed only with
great difficulty. It should be born in mind, however, that a bogus card will probably
not be used in the presence of the person being deceived. The bogus version often
does not need to look like a genuine item, only to behave like one.

4.6. 7 Application

At the application level, the card may provide a cryptographic facility that helps to
protect information stored in it, and the facility could be enhanced by an asymmetric
"challenge and response" protocol, to render the card virtually proof against
spoofing and masquerading. Unfortunately, protocol protection uses a lot of the "oncard" computing resources (Leach, 1995). Although the card's processor security is
capable of being controlled by the card issuer (through the card personalisation
process), the control comes with an additional need for a secure key management
system to be designed and implemented. In most 'smart card based' applicat;ons,
the business users have to take the word of the smart card vendors that .security has
been properly implemented, and trust that they will not abuse their privileges.
Another problem relates to card testing. Because of the security protection that is
built around the chip, most of the security features of the smart card logic cannot be
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tL'!'itL'd without
han~

hlo~king

the card or destroying it. Any tests, even if identified, may

hL·cn performed only on a small production sample ( Kang, I C)tJ6) .

.t.6.8 Security Certification

The creators of smart card products may obtain security endorsement through the
Information Technology Security Evaluation (ITSEC) or Common Criteria schc:mcs.
The procedure involves:
•

a claim by the product sponsor as to the degree of security offered by the
product, and

•

a rating under the scheme that represents the extent to which the product
achieves the sponsor's claim.

This kind of certification is not totally satisfactory because not all users may be
aware that a high rating might be merely a consequence of a modest claim.
Nevertheless it is not easy to see how a more stringent system could be devised

(Reid & Looi, 2000).

Biometrics

4.7.1 Performance

Biometric identification has been suggested as a partial solution to the security
problems impeding the widespread usc of smart cards, but requires sophisticated
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expensive hardware; and, although smaller biometric identification devices arc in
sight, size is slill u problem for mobile applil::ations (Kim, 1995). Furthermore, the
usc of the image of any human feature depends on computationally intensive image
registration techniques (already described in section 2.4) and arc currently beyond
the capability of any smart card processor. In current systems the smart card is used
to store a template of the biometric feature of the card owner, and the creation of a
matching template from a supplied feature, followed by any comparison of the two,
is undertaken elsewhere, using a more powerful processor; a technique that fails to
exclude the possibility that the communication between the card and the computer
could be intercepted, and the system breached by manipulating the communication.
If the work of comparison is to be done in the card, more powerful card processors
will have to be developed, or simplifications found. A major problem is that the
banks require a False Rejection Rate (FRR) of less than I in !00,000 (Carter, 1995,
p. 3). In this connection, MYTEC, a leading designer of biometric identification
systems, has published the following statement about the performance of its system:
"FAR: (type l error) False Acceptance Rate is wht:n someone other than a
legitimate user is accepted. MYTEC Targets: FARI/10,000.
FRR: (type 2 error) False Rejection Rate is when the legitimate user is not
recognised by the system. MYTEC Targets: FRRI/100,000. These numbers
are industry specifications, and as we are currently testing large populations,
we are confident that the MYTEC system will exceed these specifications."
("MYTEC Training", 1996).
It is difficult to share MYTEC's confidence, because no independently tested system

has achieved anything approaching that performance, and other vendors' claims are
still an order of magnitude from it. National Registry Inc. (NRI) in r'lnjunction with
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Unisys claimed, at the American Bankcring Assoc. conference in May I91)6, to have
met the hanking requirement, but released no actual figures ("NIH at ABA
Solutions", 1997 Feb 10). Financial institutions arc believed to argue that fal!;c
acceptance is a less grievous fault than false rejection, because, for a potential
intruder. it makes no difference if the chance of penetration is one in 10000, or only·
one in 100 (Carter, 1995). In either case the intruder will probably be discouraged
and think twice before attempting to intrude: whereas, even occa'iional false
rejection might result in a ruinous loss of custom.

4.7.2 Certainty of uniqueness

False acceptance may be considered from a different angle.

Identical twins have

identical hands and will experience little trouble in being identified as each other
with the hand geometry method, and even between family relations the false
acceptance for hand geometry is probably much larger then the false acceptance for
rand . . . m!y chmen people. Fingerprints, on the other hand, are the result of a genetic
random process, and fingerprints of identical twins or other family relations are
believed to have no correlation (Miller, 1994). Therefore, when choosing between
fingerprints and hand geometry, there is a logical bias in favour of fingerprints.

4.7.3 User acceptance

User acceptance might be an issue for smart card system developers attempting to
use biometric identification.

An ECU study showed that for many people the
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intrusiveness of the ~.:ollcction method, the length of the enrolment time, the
likelihood of system failure, and the speed and throughput rate at the time of usc,
were all major issues affecting the acceptability of an application. A framework for
the treatment of the issues was developed, but its effectiveness has not been tested

(O'Loughlin. 1998).

4.7.4 Testing

The testing of biometric identification methods still poses great difficulties and a key
issue for the Biometric Consortium's National Test and Evaluation Center (now
known as the US National Biometric Test Centerj was the development of test and
evaluation method(s) for repeatable statistically-significant performance tests. The
main question the Test Center sought to answer was as follows: how might testing
technicians obtain reliable receiver operating curves (ROC) from a device, and make
meaningful comparisons with ROCs of other, possibly non-biometric (e.g.,

password), devices' The Center listed a number of subordinate questions grouped
according to whether the tests usc humans, simulations, or recordings/reproductions
respectively.
•

If a human sample is used, how are the individuals selected and calibrated? Will
the same humans be needed for all future tests, or can a sufficiently large sample
be used to make this unnecessary?

•

If simulations arc used, what types of simulations will be used, and how will they

be used? If fabricated body parts arc used, how shall they be constructed and
used?
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•

If recordings and reproductions arc used, how will the sensor and recognition
system be separated?

This last question directs attention to a difficulty peculiar to the group. In vo1cc
systems the sensor (e.g .. a microphone) and the verifier arc usually separable, and
speech may be recorded and the exact record repeatedly played back into the device.
For multidimensional verificrs/identitiers (e.g., image-based systems), there is a
difficult problem, because some use adaptive scanning, thus making the sensor and
the verifier inseparable and the repeated use of exactly the same image impossible.
Different devices might also require different illumination, poses, and resolution,
further complicating the recording of a databa~e (Campbell & Alyea, 1995 ).

4.7.5 Industry testing and certification

Presumably because of slow progress by the Biometric Consortium, a number of
USA vendors of biometric ID systems have formed the International Computer

Security Association (ICSA), whose main task is to raise the level of public
confidence in biometric identification, whilst improving the accuracy

and

applicability of each product. To accomplish the task, it undertakes the testing and
certification of biometric identification products (ICSA, 1997). Another group, the
International Biometric Industry Association (lBIA) represents the biometric
industry (i.e., scanner) manufacturers.

Yet a third group, the Biometrics

Authentication Programming Interface (BAPI or BioAPI) seems to represent the
computer industry.

To date none of these groups appear to have captured the

complete confidence of major potential purchasers.
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4.8

Political and individual concerns

4.8.1 General

A number of political and individual concerns may be significant in impeding or
promoting the widespread usc of smart cards, although only indirectly relevant to
their possible use in vehicle management.

4.8.2 Tax avoidance.

Governments may be concerned about tax avoidance. There is a perceived risk that
an individual with a source of income in a low income tax country could use a smart
card in conjunction with a PC/SC application (as described in section 4.3) to live,
and spend the income, in a high tax country without paying the higher tax. Although
the financial systems and on-card applications necessary for this activity are feasible,
no reference has been found suggesting they are available.

4.8.3 Hot money

It is sometimes contended that the widespread, uncontrolled usc of electronic purses
could make management of national financial systems difficult, and that the
unregulated movement of "hot money" might destabilise governments. The term is
used here in the sense defined by Walter Wriston:
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"Money that can move. If you get nervous and [JUll everything out of the
market, at the end of the day you'll he holding hot money.'' (Wriston, 1996).
This is a different co1H.:cpt from "dirty money" (the proceeds of illegal activities),
formerly called ··hot money". The annual turnover survey results published by the
Bank of International Settlements, show that the average daily turnover of global
exchange markets in spot. outright forward, and foreign exchange swap contracts,
was estimated at US$1.2t in 1995 (Patrikis, 1996). Today, 1999, the daily flows
probably exceed US$2t. These money flows take place over dedicated networks, not
the Internet, and, as the Asian financial crisis showed, they are capable of
dcstabilising governments: but, smart cards are probably not involved. Relative to
the total of "hot money", mane;' transfer by means of electronic purses seems
insignificant. Estimates of global ruonetary flows have been relegated to Appendix 4
but, in section 5.3. 7 are briefly related to accrual transactions.

4.8.4 Dirty money

Ar.'1ther concern is that money laundering might be facilitated.

In certain

circumstances this could be so, since, if there was no limit to the amount that could
be loaded onto a smart card, dirty money in an electronic purse would certainly be
easier to carry and conceal than the suitcases full of note!-i that are popularly
supposed to be used. However, the law could prohibit "open limit" purses and be
enforced in the same way that large cash transactions arc today monitored through
the banks, so the contention probably carries no great weight.
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4.8.5 Consumer choice

Even if the problems discussed in the prcv1ous paragraphs could he solved,
Governments might still he nervous about the widespread usc of smart cards. In
addition to public hostility to the perceived invasion of privacy and potential for
surveillance, discussed in the
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paragraph, consumer advocates contend that there

is a chance that individuals may be deprived of choice. Today, despite their legal
right to do so, many workers feel too insecure to demand their wages in cash.
Instead they accept, in some cases reluctantly, their employer's insistence that wages
be paid by bank transfer, and the banks' imposition of fees for the service.
Consumer advocates contend that a similar situation could develop with electronic
purses. People might be given no choice but to use them, and be forced to accept
whatever charges are levied ("Smartcards", 1996).

4.8.6 Consumer protection

Anyone, who is cheated, defrauded, or even suddenly impoverished as a result of a
smart card shortcoming, may be expected to call on his/her government for help. If,
for example, a purse card issuer failed financially and was no longer be able to
redeem the tokens that it had sold, a government could be put under pressure to
indemnify the losers. Naturally this possibility makes politicians wary. On the other
hand, governments, particularly local governments, will probably be supportive of
schemes to use contactless cards as access tokens for public transport, because there
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is perceived to he a need to improve the image of puhlil: transportation, and persuade
the public to minimise the usc of private cars (Higgs, 1996).

4.9

Privacy and surveillance

4.9.1 Perception of privacy

According to the US Smart Card Forum, in the arenas of consumer acceptance and
policy development, no issue is more visible or important than privacy (Allen &
Kutler, 1997, p. 248). As a result, smart card business propositions will only be
successful if consumers, policy makers, and all other parties, understand the role
card technology could play in protecting privacy, whilst efficiently and securely
delivering services and benefits. While privacy has many meanings, in the consumer
context it is commonly defined as:
•

the consumer's interest in knowing
•

how his/her personal information will be used by business or government
agencies, and

•
•

the benefits which will accrue to the consumer from such use, and

the extent to which the consumer can choose to limit, or prevent, that use
(Consumer privacy, 1994; Allen & Kutter, 1997, p. 76).

Invasions of privacy may be grouped into three categories; surveillance, the scanning
of databases for information to be used for reasons other than those for which the
databases were created, and unjustified identification.
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4.9.2 Surveillance

Surveillance, probably the least controversial infringement of privacy, may be
defined as the activity whereby logical or physical areas arc kept under intermittent
or continuous scrutiny, but individuals are identified only if unacceptable behaviour
is detected. Examples are the videotaping of football crowds, or the analysis of
expenditure patterns for anomalies.

4.9.3 Control of personal data

Clearly, the use of smart cards will raise social issues. A privacy policy could begin
with the premise that the cardholder owns the data on the card, and should have
defined rights and resp0nsibilities concerning them. For example, the policy could
enunciate the holder's
•

•

right to know
•

what data are stored on the card,

•

the uses to which those data are to be put and

•

the benefits accruing to others as well as to him/herself, and

right to seek remedies if, in the holder's opinion, the data are not accurate.

The policy could also define the limits within which the holder could control the
accumulation and use of the data ("Cashless society", 1995). From a different point
of view, corporations and others who are contemplating llsing the features of the
smart card to encrypt sensitive

inforn~ation,

are concerned that governments might

legislate to ensure that the encryption method embodies a facility to enable
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authorised officials to read the encrypted inli.mnatil1 n (Wriston, 1996). J\llhough

there is nothing new in such Jcgislatinn, it may be regarded as authorising scanning

and. hence, an invasion of privacy.

4.9.4 Unjustified identification

It has already been argued, in section 2.4.1, that accountability, for which a possible

definition is 'the matching of individuals to their actions', begins with identification.
The identification of individuals is important to many government agencies and
corporations, because it contributes to efficiency and the control of fraud, and may

offer benefits to clients as well. Indeed, a focus of information systems security in
recent years has been the intensification of efforts to establish identity. Identification
involves conflict between two conditions.

On the one hand, flawed identity

checking results in duplication, fraud, disruption, costs and risks; and, on the other,
rigorous identification is invasive, and its effectiveness may be undennined by
unpopularity, falsification and evasion. Biometry, a promising but as yet uncertain
identification technique, is, in many senses, merely an extension of natural methods
by harnessing technology. Whether the public senses a danger in the establishment
of such an extension will depend on its sensitivity to privacy.

High-quality

identification offers the promise of the avoidance of error and fraud, and privacy
advocates often have difficulty expressing their opposition to it; nevertheless, the use
of biometric<; needs to conform to the standards and expectations of the public.
General-purpose schl·mes may represent a threat to the fabric of contemporary

112

society (D;.1vics, 1994). but even specific-purpose biometric schemes raise tssues
which need to be addressed. As Clarke puts it,
"Where tran:mcti<.m trail dala arc gathered and processed by corporations with
an interest in marketing, the activity is viewed by many people as consumer
manipulation. Where governments do this, it may represent anything from a
balanced and fair mechanism for protecting the public purse, to an oppressive
exercise of power by the State over the citizen .... There are inevitable and
necessary compromises that have to be made to privacy interests, in order to
achieve a satisfactory mix, and privacy issues accordingly generally involve
an exercise of discovering a suitable balance" (Clarke, 1996, p.13 & 18).

Some people, especially in the US, for example Agre and Harbs, believe that, in
most circumstances, the unambiguous irrefutable identification of individuals
without their com:ent is an invasion of privacy (Agre, P. & Harbs, C., 1994).
Hibbert supports this view,
''Many people are concerned about the number of organisations asking for
their Social Security Numbers. They worry about invasions of privacy and
the oppressive feeling of being treated as just a number.

Unfortunately,

(Hibbert) can't offer any hope about the dehumanising effects of identifying
people with numbers. •• (Hibbert, 1999, p. I).
Contrarily, a national opinion survey carried for the Columbia University in the USA
in 1996 by the Equifax/Harris Information Service, claimed to show that a majority
of people may be becoming more optimistic in their outlook towards privacy
protection (Harris & Westin, 1996). Most people would agree that scanning should
be restricted to specific situations. For example, usually it would be reasonable to

ID

~xp~ct

a lender to sc:m
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credit record of a borrower, hut indi!-.criminatc datah<J!-.C

scanning, or the scanning of data

collcct~.:d

li1r !-.tHliC

unn:lat~.:d

purpose, would ran.:ly

be justifiable.

4.9.5 Vehicle identification

If a card forms part of the electronic systems of a car, it might become impossible for
the driver to remain anonymous or deny anything recorded on the card.

The

potential would exist for authorities to use this feature to supplement enforcement,
surveillance and scanning (Wigan, M.. 1994).

A survey. commi!-.sioned by the

Australian Automobile Association, concluded that many motorists thought vehicle
tracking was "great for stolen cars but ... unacceptable ... for stolen moments"
(Motorists' views, 1996). Despite the survey's conclusion people may be becoming
more tolerant of electronic identification techniques (Butler, G., 1996). A general
conclusion is that smart card technology, if properly designed and implemented. may
enhance both the fact, and the perception, of the consumer's ability to exercise a
much greater degree of control over personal information than is the case with any
comparable delivery system (Consumer privacy, 1994).

Nevertheless, since the

technology, perhaps desirably, may also facilitate legitimate law enforcement, the
basic issues of control and tmst must be addressed.
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4.10 Resistance to change

A final problem might he the

wcll~known

human characteristic, "resistance to

change", a characteristic that is derided by those seeking to introduce changes, but is
understandable, nevertheless.

If one has mastered a way of dealing with one's

situation or environment it is hard work coping with change and, if no gain from the

change is perceived, resistance is a logical response. It is, therefore, the task of the
innovators to persuade and convince, rather than compel. Ideally, there should be
some gain for those who must change. Hopefully, in most situations, users will have
a choice between options, but there are already indications that the first people to use
smatt cards in large numbers might be beneficiaries and commuters by public
transport (Lunt, P., 1995).

Neither group may be considered powerful, nor will

either benefit much. On the other hand the Australian Federal Bureau of Consumer
Affairs takes a more optimistic view. It writes:
"Changes in financial services are not happening overnight, and to a
significant extent the success or failure of innovations is being determined by
consumer demand.

Most importantly, some of the new developments do

have a real capacity to benefit consumers." ("Cashless society", 1995, p. 2).

4.11 Conclusions

Standards for the smart cards themselves are reasonably acceptable and mature, but
standards for card operating systems and applications are still at the stage where
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indu~try

groups arc promoting competing ~olutions; consequently, intcropcrability

issues remain unresolved. There is

:t~

yet no evidence of' any fall in smart card costs.

Vehicle insur:mce premium reductions arc likely to be less than the cost of vehicle
security. so a smart card ~upportcd security system will probably be incidental to
other smart card at.!vantagcs. It follows that improvements in the capacity and speed
of smart cards arc

e.liSCillial

and there is a need for open systems so that other card

advantages may be exploited. Smart canis arc virtually proof against cracking by
individuals, but are conceivably vulnerable to attack by well-funded organisations
with world-level expertise. Biometric methods of identification have yet to meet
required standards, their testing is difficult, and the test results controversial.
Governments have concerns about consumer choice, consumer protection, "hot
money" and "dirty money". Human rights activists may be expected vigorously to
oppose invasions of privacy, but with the proper design and control, smart card
technology could actually enhance individual control over privacy.

The crucial factor might be the difficulty of gaining the agreement of competitors to
standardisation. If communications between devices and interoperability between
systems could be achieved, the multi-application card might become a reality, a mass
market emerge, and costs fall. Problems of security and identification would remain,
but might be sufficiently controllable to be acceptable to the community.
Standardisation is being hindered by the efforts of commercial organisations to gain
competitive edge. This situation and related problems are examined in chapter five.
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5 COMMERCIAL ATTITUDE & APPLICATIONS

5.1

General

This chapter continues consideration of the assumption that a probable precondition
for smart cards to be used in vehicle management is their widespread general use
which, in turn, probably depends on standardisation. Currently,

~ommercial

efforts

to identify a business case for smart cards seem to focus on a search for competitive
edge, rather than standardisation.

Therefore, the likelihood is examined that an

acceptable business case for some smart card system will be found and some "killer
application" emerge, tn provide the core of a multiple application card whose
acceptance might create the environment needed for the adoption of smart cards in
vehicle management. In that event, many of the organisations currently fighting for
dominance might have to accept niches, whilst the industry as a whole might
burgeon.

Following this line of thought, having identified the "players" some

possible "killer applications" are evaluated.

5.2 The smart card industry "stakeholders"

The "stakeholders" in the industry, each of whom must foresee a potential for profit,
may be grouped into four categories, as follows:
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•

Manufacturers who endeavour to sell the technology to the next group. They
include:
•

Chipmakers who have been described with the major names listed in section
2.3.

•

Card makers who embed the chip in the card and may design the card
operating system. As part of this process the card maker usually supplies the
chipmaker with a mask that installs most of the operating system in the chip
ROM. This mask forms one of up to 15 used in chip manufacture. Major

card makers are Gemplus, Schlumberger, Bull, Siemens (lnfineon), Phillips,
Oberthur, Orga., Datakey and Toshiba, but there are at least ten others.

•

Peripherals manufacturers who make the readers, terminals and other
supporting hardware.

•

System providers, who constitute the market for the first group and co-operate in
order to create the market. They include:
•

Card issuers which either are, or are prepared to assume the responsibilities
of, a financial institution. Cards with applications that have no financial
implication, for example identification cards, need only a sponsor. Cards
with financial applications, however, need an issuer who is likely to be a
bank or other organisation normally responsible for supplying credit cards,
debit accounts, checks and electronic tokens, but might be an insurance,
transportation or telephone company.

An issuer sets the card or account

holder's credit limit, pays for his/her purchases, funds the free credit period
and any extended credit, and displays its name on the card ("Electronic
Cash", 1996).

II~

•

Acquircrs or funds dearing houses which arc finandal institutions that
support merchants by providing a service for processing card-based
tran;;actions ("Glossary", 1999). Acquircrs arc actually, but not necessarily,
banks, and, often, either arc issuers or else control or own the issuer. For
example, Mas!crcard and Visa, potential issuers, arc each owned by a
consortium or banks.

•

Organisations whose programmers personalise the card. Recall, from section
4.5.2, !hat pcrsonalisation is the process of taking a "generic" smart card and
customising it with data that are specific to a single- or multi-application card
and the individual card holder. Almost all applications require the card to be
personalised. These organisations are usually hired by, and are answerable

to, an issuer.
•

Merchants who provide goods or services and accept payment by way of the
cards.

•

Holders, members of the public who are prepared to use a smart card.

Naturally, amongst these players there is discussion about who will benefit the most,
and what proportion of the cost each should bear: their expectations of benefit
impact upon the prospects of any potential application category.
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5.3

Financial applications

5.3.1 Transactions generally

Today. almost everyone carries some sort of financial card, be it debit, credit, or
stored value.

Naturally this situation suggests financial applications as being

candidate "killer applications" for smart cards.
follows.

Discussion of some possibilities

Commercial transactions may be classified as either cash, or accnlal, in

nature. Cash transactions take place virtually instantaneously; the item purchased
and the cash being exchanged simultaneously (Horngren & Harrison, 1989, p. 86).
A stored value smart card application, including an electronic purse, might be used
to implement a cash transaction. Accrual transactions are initiated when either an

item or cash is transferred, but the reciprocal transfer that completes the transaction,
occurs later. All parties to the transaction must be assured that:
•

the other parties are genuine, identifiable and locatable,

•

the implementing messages are correctly attributed and unaltered, and

•

the confidentiality of the message contents is preserved.

In accrual transactions, smart card applications could be used to facilitate the
eventual payment, to provide the essential mutual identification, and possibly to
provide secure storage for any encryption keys. Transactions involving credit cards
are accrual in nature.
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5.3.2 Bank attitude

Before discussing the possible nature of smart card supported transactions the
nttitude of the trading banks, especially the US hanks, will be considered. Smart
cards have yet to be adopted worldwide by financial institutions because, although
fearful that others will take the business, banks are wary of participation in the
development of smart card systems; being concerned that the business case for their
use is weak (Lunt, 1995). This caution is particularly true of the USA financial
community which, being the engine driving world finance and commerce, has a
global influence. A reason for the USA reluctance, advanced by many writers, is
that the existing investment in an infrastructure relying on magnetic stripe cards and
an elaborate communications network is too great to abandon until it truly fails

(Fancher, 1996; Duffy, 1996). Whilst the existing system suffers steady losses due
to fraud, the losses are not systemic and, although increasing, are not yet sufficient.
in many eyes, to justify the change to smart cards (Duffy, 1996). Svigals contends
that the reason that the United States lacks a realistic, smart card, credit-card, action
plan is simple: the two major bank credit-card associations (Visa and Mastercard)
are service companies, and derive their revenues from their investment in networks
and online authorisation services. The merchant pays for each online authorisation;
the fee being a 1.5 to 2 percent discount based on transaction value. In 1995 those

fees amounted to US$10b (Svigals, 1996). Although Svigals docs not make his
opinion more explicit, his contention implies that he believes the credil card
companies oppose the introduction of smart cards as electronic purses because they
do not wish to lose this cash tlow. If his contention is tmc. Visa and Mastercard

I
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seem to have adopted different strategies.

Visa promotes VisaCash, an online

payment system in which the.! smart card functions rather like an instantaneously
cleared personal cheque, whilst Mastercard has purchased Mondcx, a largely offline
system where the smart card functions like a digital traveller's cheque. On a more

optimistic note, it

IS

possible that the introduction of financial smart card

applications might be more rapid if a cheap reliable system of biometric
identification could be developed and introduced.

5.3.3 Cash transactions

To evaluate the potential for smart card implemented financial transactions, it is

necessary first to estimate the size of the market. A discussion of the mechanisms by
which the currency might be created and controlled, and of the forms not involving
smart cards, lies outside the scope of this thesis, and it should be noted that there are
sceptics who think stored value cards may never be popular. For example, Bert Ely,
in an article for the Cato Institute, writes:

" ... it will be much safer to hide ten US$100 bills in one's home rather than carry
a US$1 ,000 balance on a stored-value card used frequently to make small

purchases." (Ely, 1996, p. 2).
Sceptics there may be, but most authorities seem to think the electronic purse could
function in the area at present employing coins and notes. A number of estimates of
the total value of annual cash payments worldwide and the references upon which
they are based have been relegated to Appendix 4.

Sufticc to say here that a
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reasonable l~stimatc might he US$101. This total may be small in value relative to
that of transactions as a whole, but if, for example, smart cards were used for a major
part of the transactions at present effected using cash, then almost everyone would
have such a card. and their adoption for vehicle management would probably follow.

5.3.4 Electronic purse definition.

Section 2.2.1 listed .stored value transactions as one of the application categories of
smart cards. A smart card that provides a store of value as one of its functions is a

novel financial instrument, and the financial institutions will probably be major
players in its development. In section 2.2 a distinction was drawn between stored
value cards and their subset, the electronic purses. Both contain spendable digital
tokens, but the purse may be reloaded and is more suitable for open systems.

5.3.5 Electronic purse contenders

Given the size of the market, it is not surprising that there is the usual struggle for
dominance, as evidenced by a report issued in September 1996 by SJB, a company
selling data about smart cards. The report claimed that a battle was in progress
between the five major potential purse card issuers, which SJB identitied as
Mastercard, Mondex, Visa with VisaCash using Banksys technology, CLIP and
Proton (Battle, 1996, p. 1).

Since Mastercard has now purchased a controlling

123

interest in Mondex, presumably, the "big five" have become the "big four". David
Jones, editor of SJB's Card Technology Today (CTI'), wrote
'Two major questions loom over the Big Pivc purses.

Will there he scnous

competition from non-banks? And is there scope for an international purse?"
As to the possibility of new competition, Jones says the banks are well placed to
issue the electronic purse, for four main reasons .
.. First, consumers already look to banks to supply payment instruments.
Secondly, retailers already look to banks to process card-ba<>ed transactions.
Thirdly, banks can make use of their international networks (e.g., Europay,
MasterCard and Visa) and their national networks for settling purse transactions.
And finally, banks have, or are on the point of having, the necessary sman card
technology in place.'
However, CTT, whilst it did not pursue the idea of an international versiOn,
elaborated on the possibility of competition by pointing out that:
•

there was no reason why only banks should issue a purse,

•

phone companies already issue stored value cards,

•

card usage could be widened to include many types of small retailer, and

•

mass transit operators are active in the field, since transport operator Creative
Star is running one of the world's biggest purse schemes in HongKong (see

sections 5.9.2 and 7.6.6).

An article in the Economist in April 1997 considered the question indirectly. By
then Proton, still the largest distributor of purse cards, had made a deal with
American Express; no minnow by card issuer standard<>. but nevertheless not large

12.4

enough

lO

guarantee Proton indepcmlencc. The article hinted at an eventual alliance

between Proton and Visa ("Electronic money", 1997 April 26). Four years on, there
is still no report of any such alliance but if it did eventuate the outcome would sec
Mastercard {Mondex) competing with Visa (Proton) and leave CUP (sponsored by
Europay) unlikely to survive outside Europe. The possibility does not augur well for
an international purse except within Europe, where the introduction of the eurodollar
might nullify one of the arguments for a pan·European purse. In short, the prospects
for a smart card supported cash transaction mechanism are not yet favourable.

5.3.6 Accrual transactions

The second financial area in which smart cards might make a major contribution is
in electronically conducted accrual transactions, or e-commerce. Apart from foreign
exchange transfers or "hot money", which will be briefly defined and then excluded
from the discussion, if one accepts the estimates formulated in Appendix 4,
e-commerce currently probably forms less than one percent of total world commerce.
There are many definitions of e-commerce but electronic monetary transfers may be
grouped into three broad sectors:
•

"hot money" flows,

•

e·commerce or business to business (b2b) payments, and

•

e-tailing, e-shopping or business to consumer (b2c) payments.

These are now considered in more detail.
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5.3. 7 Hot money

"Hot money" has already been discussed in section 4.8.2, and is valued in hundreds
of trillions of US dollars. At US$2t per day, US$700t per year may be a rcasonuh ·c

annual estimate. It is true that the volume of elct:tronic transactions using dedicated
communication links controlled by the financial institutions is gigantic, but in this
activity only a relatively small number of financiers arc involved, and, even if smart

cards were used, most people would be unaware of that fact. Most authorities, when
discussing

e~r;ommerce,

exclude "hot money".

5.3.8 E-commerce

Electronically conducted accrual transactions between major organisations (the most
common meaning of the term e-commerce) are valued merely in billions of US
dollars.

Many writers include Internet shopping in this sector, but a separate

discussion of lhat category has been deferred Ia the nexl paragraph.

Delail of

estimates of the total and the references upon which they are based have again been
relegaled Ia Appendix 4 bul a plausible estimate is probably aboul US$210b. To
obtain some sense of proportion this estimate can be contrasted with the world's
GDP of aboUI US$35t or lola! share-market capilalisalion of US$321.

The wide

variation is probably a consequence of differing definitions, but the market is
certainly growing.

In this type of e-commerce, authentication might be the most

useful function of smart cards, because they are capable of delivering all needed
controlled and traceable accesses; although it is true that money tlows could
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probably continue hy tmditional channels.

Despite that likelihood, there is a

growmg hody of opinion that the need for identification of all parties to an
c-commcrcc transaction could 'drive' the introduction of smart cards.

5.3.9 E-tailing

Internet shopping, the third sector (sometimes referred to as e-tailing), is made up of
individual buyers who purchase using the Internet and usually buy small items such

as computer programs, magazine articles, and CD-ROMs, and, at least in the USA,
effect payment with credit cards. Currently, this market is smaller than the market

for the "purse" and, umil recently, could be measured in millions of US dollars. Yet
again estimates of its current total and supporting references have been relegated to
Appendix 4, but a reasonable figure might be US$ lOb. From the perspective
illustrated in Figure 4 it may be concluded that the claims sometimes made that
e-shopping is about to change the world is premature. Exacerbating the problems of

e-shopping are those of handling micropayments, which are briefly discussed in
Section 7.6. Finally, it should be noted that even if thee-shopping total is smaller
than predicted, individual purchases over the Internet could have implications for
those states, or political entities, that depend on sales taxes for revenue.
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5.3.10

Security problems with c-shopping

Traders are bclicyed to be wary about making major purchases and reluctant to pass

their authorising numbers across an Internet that they may not regard as secure: they
have good reason for their caution. The description of a fairly recent scam shows

how, using stolen or irregularly acquired credit card numbers, a group stole US$47m
from members of the US public. The amount stolen from any one person was small

but, according to the report, both Visa and Mastercard made a profit from the scam
(Wallich, 1999; Faughnan, 1999).

ln 1996 Walter Wriston formerly CEO of

Citibank believed that the major impediment to the expansion of electronic
payments is the sectlrity of the Jntemet and, in particular, the US Government
determination that it must be able to decipher all ciphers (Wriston, 1996), but two
years later Charles Goldfinger, Chairman of the European Financial Issues Working
Group, belie'ved there to be a growing consensus that secure payment could be
achieved by a combination of PKI and digital signatures (Goldfinger, 1998). The US
may have been persuaded because it now permits the use and export of
''unbreakable" encryption schemes.

Theoretical solutions designed to overcome

security fears are being advanced in most developed countries, and small schemes
are being implemented. The solutions range from the use of trusted third parties, to
encrypted digital numbers representing cash that are purchased from an issuer who is
bound to redeem them when they are presented. The schemes depend on reliable
identification, and probably any of the candidate standard smart card schemes
discussed in section 4.4 (Multos, Javacard. and Windows for smurt cards) could
provide this feature if the business community could agree on one of them.
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5.3.11

Summary

Tile electronic purse possibility appears to be stalled in a competitive tug-of-war and
because the business case is weak, but c-commcrce is growing rapidly, and if the
business community ac'ccpted smart card systems a'i a facilitating mechanism, smart
cards could become as ubiquitous within that community as photocopiers are now.
For the general public, that situation would be matched only if e-shopping equalled
the growth of e-commerce, which it has yet to do. As with the electronic purse, the
acceptance of smart card based system(s) would imply public familiarity with the
cards and the existence of the infrastructure needed to support them, and their
adoption for vehicle management would probably follow.

5.4

Telecommunications

In many countries the telecommunications industry. is directly owned by the
Government and, even privately owned telecommunication companies, known as
telcos, are heavily regulated.

There are logical reasons for this situation.

Telecommunications:
•

has a substantial direct effect on the national economy,

•

by its nature, tends to be monopolistic,

•

requires global, let alone national, standardisation,

•

uses a limited public resource (the frequency spectrum), and

•

requires an enormous capital investment in infrastructure.

I
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The telecommunications industry is already the lurgcst user of smart cards, and

h:~s

experience with their usc both in cellular telephones and in payphoncs. Furlhcrmorc,
there is

<Ill

increasing convergence between the computing and telecommunications

industries. Therefore, telecommunications would seem to be an industry likely to
produce a "killer application" that might form the core to which other applications
could be added.

At first glance SlM cards might be thought to be the most

promising possible "killer application", because they are used to manage both money
and communications, and more Sllv1 cards have been put into use than any other true

smart card. A discussion of possible reasons why this has not happened is deferred
until chapter seven.

5.5 Oil companies.

Oil companies have always endeavoured to persuade their outlets to make better use
of their sites by offering services in addition '(o the dispensation of fuel, oil and
lubricants, and, in particular, payment by credit, or debit, fuel cards. Although the
companies have a substantial investment in the databases created from the data
obtained from fuel cards, if vehicles generally included a smart card system with a
stored value application, the cost of obtaining on-line authorisation for purchases
could be reduced.

Further, if motorists habitually used smart cards to purchase

petrol and other items at petrol stations, the cards could become an extended source
of marketing information (Dick, 1995). However, control of the data might move
from the oil company to the car owner.

Accordingly, oil companies might be

ambivalent about any moves to establish such systems.

Each company may be
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expected to favour a proprietary system that "Jor..:ks in" its customers and, thus, the
inevitable "conflict of interest" obstacle to standardisation might reappear. On I 4
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March 1997, in the UK, in an apparent effort to circumvent cuslOmcr resistance to
this strategy, the Shell Oil Company launched "Shell Smart", a cooperative effort by
Shell and a number of substantial companies in different fields.

The companies

were:
•

Commercial Union

•

Dixons

•

Hilton Hotels

•

John Menzies

•

The Link

•

RAC

•

Shell

•

Vision Express

•

Victoria Wines.

No other oil company participated ("lnTouch", 1998). Even this scheme is likely to
encounter customer resistance because, for example, the customer who likes Shell

petrol might not like Victoria wines.

5.6 Major retailers

Cooperative, departmental and mail order retailers, world wide, arc seeking to
encourage customer "loyalty". Supermarkets, which usually provide free parking for
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their customers. might be keen to promote a smart card parking system if it would
enable them to identify and reward their better customers (Duffy, 1996).

The

customers, themselves, would prohably prefer a card that was valid at any
supermarket of their choice; a conflict of motivation likely to delay the introduction
of any scheme.

5.7

Entertainment

Smart cards could be used to authorise viewing of in-house entertainment, such as
pay TV, in much the same way as for access to public transport, although the
possibility of petty fraud is greater, since the holder is likely to have undisturbed
access to the reader (Seidman, 1994).

An advantage from the entertainment

provider's point of view is that, given an appropriate connection, the smart card
could be either reloaded or nullified without the need to visit the in-house terminal.
The payment scheme eventually chosen might depend more on the outcome of
competition between telecommunication companies than that between smart card
issuers; a choice that might not be made for some time.

5.8

Local authorities

Local authorities, such as city councils and shires, arc unlikely to agree upon any
single scheme, and might be expected to be cautious about pioneering any high

133

technology solution, but have at le:tsl two potential, vehicle related, smart card
applicntions.
•

The control of congestion and pollution. For example, as described in section
3.2, in Singapore smart cards arc used to support a system that imposes a fcc
upon the drivers of vehicles that enter a designated central area.

•

The control of parking.
towards a smart
magnetic-stripe,

Luk has suggested a

card~based

system.

disposable~card

two~stage

strategy for moving

Civic authorities could first institute a

system, and after a period, perhaps three years,

upgrade it to a reloadable, smart card system.

He believes that public

acceptance, rather than technical difficulties or the need to raise revenue, will be
the controlling factor.

In discussing problems, he points out that an

infrastructure would need to be established to sell the cards and recharge them,
and that a funds clearing house would be required, and claims that banking
institutions are reluctant to be involved in low value transactions such as phone
calls or parking (Luk, 1995, p. II). That might be so at present, but if smart card
systems began to be installed nationwide, the banks would be loath to let the
business go to others.
In Perth, as elsewhere, the city fathers are waiting for the bandwagon to move before
jumping aboard. Two major prerequisites arc the widespread adoption of electronic
purses and standardisation (preferably international) of the technology for parking.
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5.9

Federal and State Governments.

Governments, worldwide, arc inwstigating the possibility of electronic regulation
and delivery of services (especially social services), and the potential for smart card
systems in applications of this nature (sec section 7.5.5).

All these possibilities

might have an indirect, but only road pricing a direct, effect on vehicle management.

5.9.1 Road pricing

Road pricing is under consideration by many national and regional governments
(Harrop, 1994). Roads are a national investment, but the return on the investment is
uncertain, and the methods of collecting it, currently either through general taxation

or through fuel taxes, are controversial ("Options", 1966). Recognising that road
pricing is an emotive, as much as logical, issue, Governments are proceeding
cautiously. A call for submissions from the NZ Ministry of Transport seems to

indicate that government support for a road pricing will not be forthcoming unless
the alternatives become insupportable ("Options", 1996). If benefits, such as better
funding for road construction, reduced congestion and pollution, and increased
safety, can be demonstrated, governments might adopt a more positive attitude. If
that happens, ease of use may dictate an automatic toll system, and give a boost to
the installation of smart cards in vehicles (Harrop, 1994). As described in section
3.2, and demonstrated by the Singapore ERP, a technical solution to the problem of
efficiently collecting road tolls seems to be within reach. A non-technical problem is

135

the difficulty of !oitandardi!-iing both charging and charge collection systems
(Electronic toll collection, 1997).

5.9.2 Public Transport Ticketing

A promising commercial area in which smart cards might make a substantial, initial
impact is transportation. since contactless cards might provide a convenient way of
authorising access to the transport medium, and a rapid method of payment. From
the transport operator's point of view this rapidity is highly desirable for its own
sake, but, in addition, the operator would be able to acquire valuable statistics about
the passengers. The major disadvantage of contactless smart cards is their cost. A
secondary problem is that current systems are vulnerable to individual petty fraud,
although the possibility of a systemic fraud appears small. Major schemes are being
conducted in many parts of the world, of which the largest is in HongKong. In
Australia, Transcard, a multi-function, rcloadable, stored value, transportation access
card is being trialed in Sydney. A small scheme was first implemented in the suburb
of StMary's, and then, in 1996, expanded into western Sydney generally. Consumer
research conducted by McNair, indicated that although users found contactless cards
convenient to use and readily acceptable on buses, this was not true of shopkeepers,
who failed to provide vending devices.

Consequently, card usage has failed to

expand to any marked degree. If expanded acceptance does occur, the c;.u-d issuers

will want to exploit the user base and add other applications, which might put
pressure in the financial institutions either to develop contact cards, or to exploit the
contact interface of a dual interface option. In South Korea the Pusan Bank plans a
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large (I million cards and 10,000 terminals) pilot scheme and proposes to usc a dual
interface card in this way (''South Korea bank", 2000). If these: and other schemes
prove successful, in the future a symbiosis between banks and transportation
operators might develop.

5.9.3 Health.

At least two possibilities exist for the application of smart cards in health. First, a
card could be used to store its holder's individual health record, and the cards of a
population of patients then analysed to produce a reference databa'ie. There is a
growing need to store, retrieve and analyse, large volumes of data because the
number of tests available to medical professionals is increasing rapidly. A smart
card system might meet the requirement efficiently (Hnnnan, 1994). A smart card
supported health record system has been implemented in France. The concept is
analogous to that common in business, where not only are records kept of
transactions and analysed to provide a view of the sitnation of the business, but, in
addition, industry associations keep aggregated records of the situations of their
members, so that any member is able to see how it is performing in relation to the
other members. Second, since health administration commonly involves benefits
and other public contributions. administrative, as opposed to medical, detail could be
stored on the card. Germany has introduced this type of system (Duffy, 1996). If the

possibility of storing either medical or administrative information is fully exploited,
smart cards are likely to become more familiar to the general public.
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5.9.4 Welfare

In several states in the USA. biometrics, sometimes in conjunction with smart cards,
have already been introduced as an authentication device to prevent fraud (Campbell
& Alyea. 2000). Several authorities have suggested an extension of this system to

usc the smurt card as an electronic purse, but the suggestion docs not yet appear to
have been tried.

Nevertheless, it seems a likely candidate for application

development, since the number of cardholders would be fairly large and individual
holders would have difficulty in pressing any objections. In September, 1998, the
Asia Pacific Smart Card Fomm, whose members include most leading Australian
smart card companies, wrote to four Federal Ministers complaining about the delay
by Centrelink in deploying smart card delivery mechanisms ("Smart-card makers",
1998). The Government response has not been made public (see also section 7.5.5).

5.10 Conclusions

In the discussion of possible applications, the requirement of the holders has been

considered only

a<;

a factor to be taken into consideration by the other players.

Holders would probably like a multi-application card to reduce the number of cards
they must carry, and the ability to choose the applications on their cards.

In

particular they might wish to have debit, credit and electronic purse facilities on the
one card. This may cause conflicts as to the security required for each upplication.
For example, no existing card could support both public and symmetric key

l3H

cryptography.

From the acquirer's point of view cost justification of this

combination is marginal. There seems little chance of making prolits until a "critical
mass" of merchants with compatible readers exists. According to the UK Smart
Card Club, experience has shown that banks and retailers do not negotiate
successfully on an industry-to-industry basis. Thus there is a conflict between, on
the one hand, the open, multi-application vision of the banks and holders and, on the
other, the desire of the merchants to capture the "loyalty" of their customers ("In
Touch", 1998). The "players" in the smart card game must each see an opportunity
to benefit. As always, commercial factors will eventually prevail over technology
and Government fears. Once the manoeuvring and negotiation to achieve mutually
acceptable positions is over, investment in smart card applications may increase and
a "killer application" emerge. In that eventuality other applications may scramble to
attach themselves to the same card to form a multi-application system. When some
"critical mass" is reached the much predicted explosion in card use might occur.

6

SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS

6.1

General

Some questions could not be answered by reference to the lilcraturc.

No vehicle

management system appeared to have been analysed to determine what rcwritahlc
storage might be needed, and although the potential to control the operation and security

of a vehicle using a smart card as a token was obvious, no device to demonstrate the
potential has been constructed to date. No infonnation was available a<; to owner and
driver attitudes to light vehicle management and neither was there any report of what
they might pay.

Therefore, to clarify these matters, specific investigations were

undertaken.

6.2

Non-volatile rewritable memory estimation

A set of data flow diagrams was prepared to enable the estimation of the memory

requirement for a smart card supported vehicle management system. These diagrams
follow. A description of the required data stores forms part of the system repository

that is at Appendix 5.

The system modelled by the diagrams is fairly comprehensive and assumes the vehicle
is fitted with a transceiver enabling external entities to extract data (and, perhaps, even
cash) from the smart card without the need for physical contact or stopping.

This

electronic purse feature would be useful for toll payments as well as regulation, since
cash could be added at ATMs; and, if banks and authorities provided the appropriate
facilities, it could be used for petrol purchases and parking charges.

The model

incorporates a provision for the driver to input a usage code to identify the purpose of
the journey for usage control. Securir.y could be either two-factor (card and password)
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or better (card and template derived from a biometric feature). The arming code so
derived could be made a necessary input for the operation of any/all of the 10 to 20
microcontrollers in a modern car, and since these devices control the engine, the
gearbox, brakes and many other features of the car, bypassing all of them to steal the car
would be very difficult.

The smart card processes proposed in the model are in six groups, namely:

•

enrolment,

•

driver identification,

•

data transmission,

•

sensor polling,

•

vehicle management, and

•

data extraction .
Enrolment enables all the external entities to be identified on the smart card and the

extent of their authority, rights and obligarions, defined. In an ideal design the card
might be a dual interface card, with the authentication of the driver provided via the
contactless interface, and all other detail via the contact option. With such a design, no
external reader would be needed to provide access, whilst the other functions could be
supported by a securely located card. However, if the card incorporated an electronic
purse, or other payment function, the current misgivings of the financial institutions
about the security of contactless interfaces would have to be overcome. In the modelled
system, vehicle activation occurs when an authorised driver supplies the con·cct
authorisation and a usage code, or when the owner activates the vehicle in valet mode
for servicing. Interaction with external authorities, or merchants, is supported, and a
process can p'ersonalise the vehicle to suit the driver and control the speed. Sensor
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readings would be repeatedly polled und stored in a cyclic queue, and finally, the owner
could extract periodically, the data stonxl on the smart card and ohtain a report of starts,
usage, payments and spccified sensor records.
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oJmnc!cr. thron!c >cUing, lime

Poll vehicle sensors

.........................

VEHICLE
PULSE
GENERATOR

Stomb!cRcaJings

SENSOR READINGS
PrcviousRcadings
Store the sensor
readings as apppropriate
(At start, at each pulse
maxima only)

ScnsorRcaJingsAsAppropriatc

• Max deceleration since !a>t start.
Max speed since last ~tan
L~~t stan time
Turn: last read
Last 30 pen odic rc::.Jings ( 1 sec inlcr'>'als)
speed
dccclcra1inn
OJom<·tcr
011 pr.:ssurc
Power (throttle opening)
EngmcRcn•

Note I. External entity VEHICLE from the Context Diagram hns been expanded
here to show relevant sensors and items.
Note 2. Data store "ScnsorReadings" from Level 0 has been expanded to indicate
relevant readings.

Figure 9
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DIAGRAM 5
Identify driver

flnvcrAc<:c~\

~.1

Validall:

Dri1~rAurhSupplkd

driver

UsagcCodc

DriveriD

DrivcriiJ
L.astStOJrtTimc
DrivcrRecord

5.2
Ann

AnningCndo..·

vehicle
SV51Cill5

AnningCodc

V:~lerCodes

:'iA

5.3
ValctSctSupplicd

Valet aml

Set v;rlcl
mode

VaktAm1ingl
DisanningCodc

OwnerEnroiAuthData

Scn;orRcadings

Notes:

1. Data flow "DriverJourney" to data store ''DrivcrRccord" has been expanded into its clements:
UscCodc

DrivcriD
LastStarlTimc
2. Valet mode is a state in which the owner has sped lied limits for date, speed

travelled
Figure 10

~nul

distance
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DIAGRAM 6
Extract logged data

I

\

OwncrAuthSupplicd

OwncrQucry

OwncrAcccss
OwncrDctails

6.1
Validate qucrycr

Data required

SENSOR READINGS

6.2
DataAequired

Extract data

*Ma){ dccclcmtion since last start.
Max sp...'Cd since last start

~--------j Last st<lrttirnc

Time last read
Last JO pcrintlic fl!atlings ( 1 .1c~ intervals)
speed

deceleration
OUometcrRcnding

1\faxOi !Prcs.lurcSin~cl..:lstRcno.l
Power (ThrottlcSclling)
EngincRe~·s•

Drivcr_rccord
RcsponscTo
Owner

Figure II
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DIAGRAM 7
Manage engine and personalise data

PcrsonalismionData

Engine mtlllagcment
criteria. (Malt power@

P~rsonaiScttings

revs or max revs @

power]

7.1

7.2

ThrottleSetting

Personalise

Manage engine

seating and
mirrors etc
See Note

Actual
engine
readings

Actual

personal
settings

ScnsorReadings

Note: The owner would dictate the personalisation settings. The
rlrivP.r r:nulrl nPnntiRfP. with thP. nwnP.r
Figure 12

PersonalSettings
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The data flow diagrams and the system repository (Appendix 5) that supports them,

show tlmt existing normal smart cards with 8 bit processors and 8K of EEPROM would

be inadequate to provide

~til

or even most of the desired applications. The "data stores"

section of the repository shows an estimated initial requirement to store over 2K of data;
therefore, assuming a factor of three as an allowance for expansion, the entire 8K could

be used for data. Use of a factor of three is common in other engineering disciplines:
for example, the Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers proposes a figure
between 1.5 and 4 depending on the degree of uncertainty (MacGregor, 1967). The
object code of the program at Appendix 8, to compare a stored codeword to a supplied
word, required 338 bytes, some of which was used for offsets and other constants.
However, at least 200 bytes was required for the basic process of getting a data item,
comparing it to a stored item and responding appropriately.

Using this figure for a

comparison as a yardstick, the 19 processes envisaged in the model, have been
estimated to require an additional 9600 bytes (rounded to lOK) of memory. Estimates
for each process, including stacks and queues, have been shown with the process
descriptions in the System Repository at Appendix 5. The estimate is lent additional
plausibility by figures from a paper recently presented to the CARDIS 2000 conference.
Here the authors showed that the cardlets for synthetic benchmark handlers, each of
which considered four kinds of Application Programming Data Unit (APDU), required
from 2-to 4.5K bytes depending on the smart card used (Castella-Roca, Domingo-Ferrar

& Planes, 2000).

To the requirement for storage space for vehicle management

processes and data stores, must be added space for other applications.

A multi-

application card would require an interface between the applications and the chip
instruction set, which could take the form of an operating system such as !vtULTOS, or

!51

an application programming interfnce, such as the Java API, superimposed on any of a
range of proprietary operating systems.
In tabular form:
Table 5: Card memory requirement
Data
Processes
Other applications
Interface

8K
JOK
8K
2K

Total

28K

A conclusion is that even current 16-bit smart cards could not support the
comprehensive system modelled. However, although the required memory is not yet
provided by any commercially available card, the manufacture of such a card is within
the technical potential oftoday's manufacturers.

6.3 Vehicle Fleet Manager Opinions

As determined in chapter one, about ten percent of Australia's light vehicles are fleet
owned. To ascertain fleet manager opinions, the questionnaire at Appendix 6 was sent
to the managers of what were believed to be five of the biggest vehicle fleets in W A,
eliciting responses that proved to be almost identical. In each case the present system
relies on data obtained as a result of purchases made with a magnetic stripe fuel card.
The static detail on the card, the amount of the purchase, and the odometer reading as
advised by the driver, are recorded by the petrol station, the information is assembled
centrally by the oil ClJmpany that issued the card, and a periodic report is sent to the
fleet manager.

The c<mvassed managers felt that the system was reasonably

satisfactory; particularly, if the same driver customarily drove the vehicle. There was
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occasionally a problem with defect reporting when the vehicle was driven by a number
of different drivers, and managers would have welcomed more information. The main
objection to the available alternative automatic logg,ing systems was their cost.

6.4 Security and a Simulation

In chapter three potential vehicle security was described under the headings of
perimeter security, alarms and immobilisers,

multi~point

immobilisation and aids to

recovery. Apart from a possible contribution to better locking, a

~mart

card system

could do little to improve perimeter strength. since this is mainly a function of materials
and manufacture, but it might impact on the remaining three aspects.

Current

irnrnobilisers are reasonable value and a smart card system might improve their security
because it would be a two-factor system requiring something the driver knows, as well
as something he carries (or is). The state diagram that follows--shows the different
security states that could be achieved with the system envisaged.

I
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STATE DIAGRAM
Vehicle security slates

OPEN
Doors unlocked
Theft alarm activated
Seats and mirrors
adjusted

Ctard in<icrtcd in contact reader.
Authentication code matched
{PIN, biometric or other) or
[Valet code keyed in!
Arming t:odc sent to igniti(m ;md fuel systems.
Rclcusc code sent to brakes, steering and
bonnet catch.
(Locking release prcssun: reservoir

prcssuriscd opened)
Doors lockable I unlockuhlc manually.

READY
Ignition and fuel system~ arrncJ
but off
Doors as manually selected
Brnkcs, steering and bonnet catch
released to manual operation

Card removed from proximity of
reader when valet code not set

Card in
proximity to
contactless
reader

(Release code
supplied to
doors)

Ignition and fuel systems disarmed.

Locking release pressure reservoir
depressurised. (Battery operated pump)

ormal

Switehe

If no weight on any seat for 'X' seconds
and all doors and windows closed then

ehicle

.0:

ontrols

doors, brakes, steering and bonnet all
locked. Theft alarm sensitised.

RUNNING
LOCKED
Ignition and fuel
systems disarmed.
Doors, brakes,
steering and bonnet
catch locked.
Theft alarm sensitised

Notes

I. If valet code keyed in the
vehicle may only alternate
between ready and running.
The owner may remove the card

2. A dual chip card is assumed
to be in use

Figure 13

Ignition and fuel
systems on.
All systems operate as
norma!.
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The system might be a little more convenient, since if the smart card was removed the
vehicle would automatically be immobiliscd. To demonstrate the technical simplicity
of a smart card controlled vehicle security system, a hardware simulation was

constructed. The block diagram of the simulation that follows demonstrates the twofactor aspect of a smart card system. The Pascal code needed to extract the activation
key from the card is at Appendix 7, and the Motorola assembler code needed to
compare it to the key stored in the vehicle actuating microcontrollers is at Appendix 8

THE SIMULATION
A block diagram of the main components of the system

Computer

-c
l+Si',,----,-

ICodc from keypad

f

Reader
transponder or scanner
Smart

card

\

1

L..--i-1

\

Micro

j

Controller

\ '-----j.,/

\

'•,

,.·

/L._ __ _ J

The area within the dotted
ellipse to be encased in rigid
thermosetting resin so that it
cannot be bypassed without

damaging the device
Figure 14

Device
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The simulation was constructed using a variety of compommts, sec Figure 15. Th'.!
smart card was from Smart Silicon Systems Ltd (SSS) and incorporated a Hitachi
HS/310 chip supporting their smart card operating system (SCOS). Since only a basic
reader was available, enrolment was carried out us.ing lhe SSS Mercwin program that
loads on a PC and enables the reader to be manipulated. The PC was required because
the available card was application specific and not programmable by the researcher.
For a more realistic simulation a programmable card, such as the Java cards, Smart Card
for Windows or GemXpresso would be needed together a reader with an integral
keypad, as these are now available at a reasonable price. Alternatively, in the unlikely
event that access was granted under contract by Mondex International, a program could
be written for a Mondex card in MEL. During enrolment a codeword wa<; stored on the
card, but in a more sophisticated system, a biometric template would have been used.
Using a standard terminal emulator package, ProComm, the same codeword was stored
on a microcontroiler that was representative of the microcontrollers found on a modem
car. The particular microcontroller is a Motorola MC68HCll that is commonly used as
an engine controller.

Using a Motorola development board the small assembler

program at Appendix 8 was also stored on the HCll. Finally, the Pascal program in
Appendix 7, running on a PC, enabled a user to direct the smart card to pass the
codeword to the microcontroller where the assembler program compared it to the
previously stored codeword and, if the two matched, sent a group of pulses to the
thyristor between the power supply and the device. If the thyristor did not first receive
the pulse..li, power could not reach the device. Security, therefore, depended upon the
user having been enrolled, being in possession of the smart card, and knowing 1he
codeword to activate the Pascal program.

Additionally, it depended upon the
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microcontroller and thyristor being mounted on the device in such a way that they could
be neither removed nor bypassed without incapacitating the device. With potting resin
this would be possible.

THE SIMULATION AS BUilT
Fan
Simulates
a vehicle
device
Switch

From P.C . to microcontroller

Smartcard

Figure 15

The simulation demonstrated only the security aspects of vehicle management and, in
particular, no attempt was made to assess the response time of the card used. In a more
ambitious simulation a com bi card, as described in section 2. 7 .6 could be used, if a
programmable version could be found, and the feasibility of contact with external
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authorities examined. For the limited ,h;monstration to hl! expanded into a smart card
management system installed on a vehicle, a number of vehicle modifications would he
necessary and some devices would need to be installed, as ronows.
•

First is a smart card access module (SAM). A contact reader component of this
module would be required to obtain the activation key and any data required for
personalising the vehicle. The SAM should be able to write data obtained from
sensors (rpm, temperature, etc.) to the card.

Prob~ems

with vibration causing

intermittent disconnection of contacts may have to be solved.
•

Second, a contactless terminal component would be needed to respond to the access
control signal if a dual interface card was used.

•

Third, microcontrollers, together with thyristors, or some other circuit control
devices, would be needed for each system that wa<; to be activated under the control
of the smart card. A modern car already has about 20 microcontrollers, and some of
these could be incorporated into the smart card system.

•

Fourth, sensors would be needed to capture the different dala items to be recorded
on the card.

In a number of cases these sensors would already be present and

supplying input in analog form to instruments, or the engine control unit.
•

Fifth, an input device might be needed to enable the driver to interact with the card.
This could be a keypad to accept a PIN and/or codes covering usage. If a biometric
feature was to be used to identify the driver then an appropriate scanner would be
needed.

•

Sixth, if the application called for the contactless payment of tolls or parking
charges then some form of transmitter would have to be installed.

ISX

•

Finally, an output/display device could possibly he required if the application
envisaged external

authorities,

or others, communicating

with

the driver.

Conceivably the output could be by voice using some form of wireless transmission.
This list presumes that current automotive technology has continued in use.

In the

event of futuristic developments such as "drive by wire" control, or a manufacturing

and distribution

process driven

by e-commercc technology,

other

presently

unforeseeable modifications might be necessary. Whether or not these developments
occur the modifications would add to the cost.

6.5 Security cost and Perceived Benefit

6.5.1 Perceived need for security.

Potential security benefits must be related to their

ne~d

as perceived by owners and their

cost. There is no unanimity as to the needed level of security. Geason quoted UK
Home Office Consultants on this point. In 1985 the Consultants believed that better
vehicle design could contribute to security and indicated that necessary security features
should include:
•

better locks for doors, steering, and ignition, laminated window glass, protected
bonnet and boot catches and audible reminders of carelessness, such as leaving
doors unlocked.

These features might cost more than many owners would pay, but the Consultants then
mentioned:
11

alarms,

I
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•

central locking, and

•

engine immobilisation.

6.5.2 Cost of smart card facilitated vehicle security

When considering card system security, as with all security, the need must be balanced
against the cost and, according to Geason, the Consultants estimated that car buyers
might pay up to US$100 extra for effective security.

However, she also quoted

manufacturers as saying "security doesn't sell cars"(Geason & Wilson, 1990). Since
fewer than 10% of claims against vehicle insurers relate to vehicle theft, it is unlikely
that any reduction in premiums will be enough to pay for the cost of adequate security.
A general conclusion is that, if smart card supported security systems are to be part of

vehicle design, the systems should be incidental to other features for which the buyers
will be prepared to pay. What Austraiian motorists might be prepared to pay is now
examined. If a smart card security system could be provided at close to the same cost as
an immobiliser, then it would probably be chosen because of the extra facilities it wuuld
provide.

Since individual owners seemed to be satisfied with present

us~:ge

and

maintenance control arrangements, it may be assumed that they would not be prepared
to pay much to improve those aspects of any management system. Security is probably
their main concern, and therefore, in an effort to determine how strong was that
concern, a questionnaire was distributed to 300 vehicle drivers in the Edith Cowan
University , Mount Lawley car park and eighty five responses were obt<lint:d. The
questionaaire is at Appendix 9, and a table summarising the responses follows. The
results, necessarily limited and possibly not truly random, nevertheless suggest that

I
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owner-drivers would like better security, hut would he prepared to pay only from

A$1 00 to A$500 for it.

Table 6: What motorists might pay for security

CAR PARK OPINION SURVEY
QUESTION

What would you p~y for
ultim~tc security'.'
What would you pay for prcuy
good sc.:urity~

NUMBER ANil PERCENT GIVING INDICATED RESPONSE
!\lore
$500
$100
ToU!I
$25
$11)
Less I y" IN<>
$50

I

I
1.2':1-

.

26
JU'lH

9.6'::¥

I I

I

I

32
]8.5'fr

H
I! A%

ll
J4.1J<;t.

23
27.7'7<

4

12

'"·

1·U
'l
II
l.U

u

'

6'7<

I

I

,,

1

HS
100%

30

Arc alanmlimmobi1iscrs worth
fitting~
alamllimmobiliscr~

.

..

l ()()'h.

H.4'.f.

Is standanl security enough?

What would you pay for an

"

2
2.4%

.

1
8A%

"'

47%

11
20.5%

3
36

4
4.8%

14
15.7%

"

36%

55
64'k

71

14

H5

84'7<

16%

](){)'k

100%

H5
IOO'k

%

Fleet managers accepted that the present security arrangements already cost something,
and for a better system, would be prepared to pay a litt.le more. None was prepared to
give an opinion as to a specific figure without detail about what a smart card system
might do: however, in conversation, for a total system providing both security and
management, one percent of vehicle cost was mentioned. This would be about A$200
per vehicle.

6.6 Summary

As a result of these investigations it has been determined that a smart card suitable for
use in vehicle management would probably need a dual interface should have between
20K and 30K of rcwritablc memory. 1\ dual interface chip might meet the technical
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requirement for access and activation, but might not gain widespread usc for reasons
unrclat::d to vehicle management (e.g., Jinancial institution misgivings about security).
Vehicle Occt owners might be interested in a smart card supported management system
if it was cheaper than existing vehicle logging devices, but the upper limit of one
percent of vehicle value is possibly based more on optimism that any firm limitation.
Apart from very elaborate security involving biometric identification, only ten percent
of owner-drivers indicated they were prepared to pay more than one hundred dollars.
For a full system, vehicles would require quite extensive and expensive modifications.
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7

RESULTS & PREDICTIONS

7.1

General

The first chapter poses four questions.
•

What technical advances are needed and what might be expected?
Technology generally is considered in chapter two, and some aspects specific to
vehicle management, in chapter six.

Now, required improvements and technical

expectations are described in sections 7.2 and 7.3.
•

What problems might impede improved personal mobility?
Problems, as it turns out mainly of a non-technical and non-commercial kind, are
discussed in chapter four.

In sections 7.4 and 7 .5, this chapter considers what

solutions might be feasible and whether regulatory action might facilitate them.
•

What commercial developments and changing public attitudes might result m an
environment conducive to a smart card supported system.
This question resolves, after discussion in chapter five, into an evaluation of the
possibility of a "killer application". The prospects of each of the candidate "killer
applications" are evaluated in section 7 .6, and, as an alternative, a projection of
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possible growth, based upon published actual figures and industry forecasts,

1s

presented in section 7.7.
•

What is the perception of the need for improved personal mobility, including better
vehicle management?
Chapter three outlines the possibilities for better management but perception may not
be the same as reality, and this aspect is examined in section 7.8 before drawing a
general conclusion.

7.2

Required improvements

7.2.1 Chip architecture

When considering the advances needed to make smart cards practicable and acceptable
for a wide range of applications, it must be borne in mind that events may be influenced
by apparently unrelated developments such as faster higher-capacity communications
disintennediating the motor industry, the development of alternatives to liquid fossil
fuels, "drive by wire designs", a heightened public concern about pollution, and any
number of other currently unforseen possibilities.

However, disregarding such

unpredictable events, it is still clear that improvements are required to the cards
themselves, both hardware and software; to peripherals and infrastructure; and, to
associated technologies such as biometric identification. From this limited perspective
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the outline or an ideal multi-application architecture might be like that illustrated in the
block diagram at Figure I6.

Card
management
system
induding
security
management

Independent
applications

Java applcts &
applications
Java YM
(8-JJK ROM)

Operating system ( 14K ROM)

Hardware

Figure 16: An idealised smart card architecture.

The card management system may be considered analogous to a data base management
system and it will be needed to control the loading and unloading of applications, and to
maintain their security, integrity, and independence. Block labels indicate the functions
of other components in this scheme. This architecture would be needed to support the
multi-application card that has been assumed to be necessary to promote ubiquitous smart
card use.

7.2.2 Chip improvements

As estimated in chapter six, existing normal smart cards, even those with 16-bit
processors and 16K of EEPROM, are inadequate to provide all, or even most, of the
desired applications. A more powerful card is needed. In a multi-application card for
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general use, the chip will need a cryptographic facility which will probably be
asymmetric. For reassurance, the key is likely to be at least I024 bit, and much of the
work of encryption will be carried out in a hard-wired co-processor. For security, at least
parts of the facility should be in ROM; and, for speed, access will require more RAM
than is now normal in card chips. If the chip is to compare biometric features, then it will
need even more processing power. To produce acceptable results, it will need to have
increased reliability, faster enrolment capability, and improved discrimination between
biometric features. It will be recalled that in chapter six the requirement, fqr non-volatile,
rewritable memory for a comprehensive vehicle management system alone was estimated
as l8K. As mentioned in section 2.7.4, chips with 32-bit words and 32K of rewritable
non-volatile memory capable of being installed in smart cards have been designed, and at
least two, the CASCADE chip and Motorola's M-Smart Jupiter, even manufactured. No
applications are known to have followed, probably because the resultant smart cards so
far have been considered to be too expensive by potential issuers. Both the CASCADE
and the Jupiter chips need 32-bit processors because their code is interpreted rather than
native (P. Spalding, Senior Engineer, ERG, personal communication, July 11, 2000).
Given a large enough demand it is probable that the requirement could be met. Overall,
bearing in mind that the potential for card improvement is heavily weighted by that for
chip improvement, what emerges is a requirement as follows:

Table 7: Required and available chip features.

Feature

Now available

Probably

Required
EEPROM
RAM
ROM
Clock speed
Word size
Circuit density
Power
Current

32K
IK
30K
20MHz
16 bit
0.35 micron
1.8 v
< I to 10 rnA

16K
256 to 640 bit
25K
3 to 14MHz
8 or 16 bit
0.7 micron
3 to 5 v
< 200mA

Note: The parameter values shown under "now available" arc not all available
on any one card chip.

This hardware requirement could be as illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 17.

Clock management 20MHz

Crypto·
Coprocessor

II

Power Management I.SY

CPU

I

DSP
(Biometric
feature
matching)

16·bit word bus

I
_L

Rewritable
memory
32K

-

R

ROM

A

20K

"'

Figure 17: Required chip features.
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7.2.3 Card manufacture and chip embedding

Reductions in curd costs, as distinct from chip costs, would be helpful and this might be
achieved partly by obtaining economies of scale, as discussed in section 7 .4, and partly by
more efficient manufacturing technology. The main task in manufacture is to embed the
chip in the card: a far from a simple process. There are two technologies.
•

With PVC laminated cards, the core lamina is printed and has a recess milled in it, the
chips are fanned with contact plates into modules that are attached to an epoxy
bonding tape. The tape, which bonds on one side to the plastic and on the other to the
chip silicon, is chopped into units that are pressed into the milled recesses, a coating
of resin is applied and then ground flush, and outer transparent laminae are added.
The work is almost completely automated and, although even in 1992 an output rate
of 1800 cards per hour had been achieved (Baker, !992), further improvements may
be possible.

•

With ABS cards the process is different. The chip and contact plate module is placed
between outer laminae, and the core lamina is injected to fill the space and surround
the module (Benhammou, 1997). At least for small runs the basic process is cheaper,
but the cards are more difficult to print.

In either process, some manufacturers embed the module in a lead frame to protect it
from stresses imposed by flexure of the card: no doubt, this adds to the cost. What is
needed is a satisfactory method of printing
manufacturing large batches.

6h ABS, together with a cheaper system for
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7.2.4 Biometric identification

Biometrics technology needs improvement in three areas.
•

The most obviously useful development would be a biometric identification method
that met the financi.al institutions' required FRR of 1 in 100,000.

•

A second requirement is a smaller cheaper scanner.

•

Finally, there is a need for a reliable standardised testing methodology that will enable
specifications to be written so that vendors' claims may be compared independently
and objectively.

In this respect the International Computer Security Association

(ICSA) certification, and similar efforts, should be regarded merely as an interim step.

7.2.5 Vehicle management

Potential improvements in vehicle management have been given in chapter three, and the
necessary consequential modifications for their implementation in chapter six.

If

consideration is limited to improved security, keys that incorporate transponders, without
which the vehicle will not start, are now commonplace; but,
developed and it should employ biometric identification.

two~factor

security should be
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To summarise, the technology improvements needed arc:
•

more powerful, cheaper smart curds, structured to support multiple applications,

•

either more discriminating biometric identification tcclmology, or a more relaxed
FRR requirement,

•

cheaper smaller scanners,

•

more reliable, standardised biometric identification devicr.-testing, and

•

kits to implement inexpensively the modifications listed in chapter six.

7.3

Technical expectations

7.3.1 General

Assuming the requirements have been identitied, the question of if, and when, they might
be met, must be addressed. Although not yet 'adequate to support multiple applications,
smart cards will certainly improve in size, circuit density, power required and memory
over the next few years.

170

7.3.2 Circuit density and size

Circuit density increases and size reductions would seem to be inevitable in both the
research and manufacturing environments. For example:
•

Chicago University has announced that it can make chips with tiny features using a
process called SCALPEL; a process that uses electrons rather thJn photons to define
the etching of chip circuitry.

Densities of the order of 0.076 microns are claimed

("C"tting chips'', 1997).
•

Intel has announced that it now has a technique that enables it to store twice as much
memory on the same area of a chip, and IBM has said it had found a way to replace
aluminium conductors in a chip with faster, cheaper copper ("Chips ahoy", 1997).

These advances might eventually be exploited in smart card chips, but even without such
spectacular advances, chip density has been increasing. For example, three years ago the
circuit density of CMOS transistor chips, including EEPROM technology. were at the 1 8
micron level; whereas today's state of the art is 0.6 microns, which is expected to fall to
0.35 microns by the year 2000 (Benhammou, 1997).

7"3.3 Power supply

Contact cards have chips that normally require SV supply, whilst SIM cards conforming
to the GSM ll. I 1 standard, function with only 3V; but the variation in power supply is

t7t

probably more a matter of conformance to standards than a technical necessity, and today,
card chips requiring only I .8V arc manufacturable.

7.3.4 Memory

Memory, especially non-volatile memory, is a different matter.

As Henry Mundt,

executive VP, global deposit access for MasterCard International, and Mondex CEO,
Michael Keegan, said in a joint interview with Electronic News, in 1997,

"MULTOS is 'the Windows for sm<lrt cards' and current-generation smart card
microcontrollers (MCUs) will be capable of supporting MULTOS, but the true

benefits will come when chip makers can get more memory around their logic for
smart cards, which they expect will occur in 1998.

When the ICs can offer 16

kilobytes EEPROM and between 28 and 32K ROM in the tight 25 square millimetres
of silicon on the cards, the multi-application card will be a reality," Mr. Keegan said.
"Such ICs will be freely available in the '98 time frame," he predicted.

"The

MULTOS platform is viable now," he said. "It's just not as capable. Listen, a PC
was still a practical product when we were running new applications with the PC's
120K of memory. The real story is that we're now looking at a programmable smart
card (with MULTOS), and that has not happened before. Every solution had to be
hard-wired by the silicon maker." ("Smart cards in spotlight", 1997, p. 8).
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Allowing for marketing optimism, and bearing in mind that MULTOS is only one option
for the industry, it seems likely that the technology Mr Keegan described would be
available as soon as there was a commercial requirement for il. Today, in the year 2000,
only the CASCADE care! and MIF ARE.PRO with the SmartXA chip come close to
providing the features he named. and it should be noted that for vehicle management the

card might need even more EEPROM than he envisaged. Keegan made no mention of
cost. The major non-commercial Mondex smart cards pilot scheme completed so far is
that by the Exeter University, whose Joint Technology Applications Project (JTAP) report
in late 1999, concluded among other things that:
" ... smart cards are moving towards support for multiple applications on the card, but
this is severely limited by the memory capacity of present cards." (Cannon &
Wooderson, 1999, p. 3).
It would seem that as yet there is insufficient demand for large memory chips.
There

is

also

a potentially

magnetoelectronics.

improved

rewritable

memory

technology,

called

New magnetoelectronic devices, based on the integration of

magnetic and semiconductor materials, can be used for developing smart magnetic
sensors, magnetic media reads and MagRAMs (magnetic RAM memory).

Initial

statements say that the technology may produce memory devices that are cheaper, require
less power, be faster to read and write, and be a!-i enduring as any of the ctmenl nonvolatile memory technologies (Wayt Gibbs, 1999).
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7.3.5 Contactless requirements

For the contactless card the requirement

IS

for speed rather than memory and the

expectations are more optimistic. According to Roy DaSilva, NEC Electronics' product
marketing manager, NEC's capability in ferroelectric RAM (FeRAM) will help the
company gain entrance to the smart card market. He said:
"We are entering this market backed by the fact that we have already made significant
investments in ferroelectric RAM, which gives the speed of RAM with the
programmability of EEPROM and permanent storage of ROM in a single device."
("Smart cards in spotlight", 1997, p. 8).
Again, the optimism should be regarded with caution. FerroRAM has a serious weakness
in that each "read" must be accompanied by a refresh operation that restores the memory
state. The process takes only about lOOnS but a power failure during that time could
corrupt memory. Nevertheless, judging by the New Scientist article quoted in chapter
two (Fox, 1995), the required performance might be achieved. Furthermore, the JT AP
project team, reporting on the use of the Mondex purse by the Exeter University, believes
that FeRAM will become the preferred memory for all smart cards in the near future
(Cannon & Wooderson, 1999, p. 18).
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7.3.6 Biometric identification

Current performance rates arc FAR, negligible, and FRR, 1:1000. These rates arc well
short of the financial institutions requirement of FAR, l :20 and FRR, l: I00,000. There
seems little likelihood of any biometric method meeting the FRR required by the financial
institutions within the next few years. Not only does such a development seem unlikely,
but one must question the need for such a high standard. Possibly, the problem might be
ameliorated by the use of variable thresholding in which the laxity of the threshold is
automatically adjusted to match the imrortance of the transaction, or commercial

pressures may force the financial institutions to accept a lower FRR.

Biometric

identification, despite the FRR problem, will probably improve.
•

Smaller, better scanners will almost certainly be developed, and, if the market
expands, costs may fall. For example, Veridicom is promoting a capacitive sensing
fingerprint scanner that is claimed to be no bigger than 2.5cm square and cheaper than

current opt.ical types, and ldentix has countered by claiming that it will soon have
developed an optical scanner no bigger than a 25mm cube - but neither finn has
released any performance figures.
•

Better perfonnance and testing, faster enrolment and verification and reduced
invasiveness will almost certainly be achieved, although the difficulty of truly
objective testing of biometric methods has still not been solved. Sandia Laboratories
undertook an as;.;essment of biometric methods in 1991 and this is believed to have
beelt updated in 1995, but an inquiry about the outcome drew the response that the
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re~ult.s

were not being released. Therefore, it is difficult to be hopeful about any early

breakthrough, but neverthclc.ss, under the auspices of the Biometric Consortium,
research into testing methods is continuing, and presumably, in time, method.<> will be

developed that will enable the independent, repeatable testing of products. In the UK,
a workgroup of the Association for Biometrics (AfB) has developed a statement
outlining its view of best practices in testing biometric devices, but, a'> yet, there are
no reports defining any specific method of testing, let alone results from actual tests.

7.3.7 Summary

In the light or the requirements and expectations described in this and the preceding two
paragraphs, and despite the accompanying caveats and shortcomings, informed opinion
appears to confirm the conclusion reached in chapter two that today's technology could
produce a functioning, if not fully satisfactory, smart card supported vehicle management
system. With the possible exception of biometric identification the obstacles to a better
system appear to be non-technical, and the technology will be found to be adequate when
and if the demand emerges. These non-technological obstacles are now examined.
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7.4 Possible progress in overcoming non-technical difficulties

7 .4.1 Standardisation

Section 4.3 describes the lack of stamlardisation as one of the major obstacles to the
widespread use of smart cards. Progress in defining and conforming to standards has
been slow because regulatory authorities believe that conformity should not be imposed,
since attempts to do so might stifle innovation. However, a degree of standardisation is
inevitable once the technology stabilises and the pace of innovation slows. What usually
happens is that, initially, each contender seeks to become the dominant player, and force
all the others into niches or supporting roles, but as soon as any one contender seems
likely to be successful the others unite. At this point a single standard or dual competing
standards may be agreed, and regulatory assistance might be useful. At present, in smart
card technology, there is little to be done except await the outcome of the ongoing
struggle for competitive edge.

7.4.2 Cost reduction

Cost trends for the past ten years are discussed in section 4.4. The improvement needed,
which is partly technical, is a reduction in cost, but this is unlikely to happen until design
is stabilised and a mass market created, because cost reductions may not be achieved until
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economies of scale justify more investment in automating the process.

More recent

reports show no eVidence of any cost fall. Late in 1999, Exeter University reported its
Mondex system cost per issued smart card as being £15 plus £20 for programming and
personalising, which is expensive compared to (admittedly limited) magnetic stripe
solutions; and, Edinburgh University cancelled its Mondex project, citing cost as the
reason (Canon & Wooderson, 1999).

Christophe Dolique: formerly of Oberthur, is

quoted in the January 2000, online issue of Card Technology Today, as estimating that in
1999 smart card chips cost an average of US$1.33. If true, this estimate does indicate a
fall in cost ("Juiced up chips", 2000), but should be weighed against the evidence to the
contrary presented in section 4.4 and here.

A FaulknerGray report by Don Babalon

quotes Andrew Phillips, aUK-based analyst for the Dataquest unit of the Gartner Group,
as giving the average price of microprocessor cards as:
1998

US$3.05

1999

US$3.79.

(Babalon, 2000). Apparently the desired. reduction has yet to be achieved.

7.4.3 Improved chip and transition to it

The specification for a chip to provide the required improvements in performance seem
elose to being met by the specification for the CASCADE chip, rcp011edly to be produced
by Texas Instruments for Gemplus in 1998.

However, Motorola (its card chip

manufacturing now by Atmel), Hitachi, Siemens (now Infincon) and SGS-Thompson
(now STMicroelectronics) are all producing card chips of the current type and have not
announced any intention to· produce anything to c01Tipare with CASCADE. Motorola has
~nnounced

an M-Smart

se~ies

that includes a "Jupiter" chip, that is 32-bit and uses RISC

technology, but gives no detail of its rewritable memory size.

In addition to the

requirement for an improved chip, there will be a need to cope with a difficult transition
and so, for at least an interim period, smart cards may need to be dual-chip (contact and
contactless) and hybrid (retaining a magnetic stripe).

7.4.4 FRR reduction

As mentioned earlier a biometric method that met the false rejection rate (FRR) of the
financial institutions is highly desirable, but the actual standard specified (I :100,000)
must be questioned. The institutions are said to claim that the very high standard is
required because they cannot afford to offend genuine customers, but with the current
system it is not unusual for an ATM to malfunction and fail to perform as requested. The
institutions seem able to absorb any resentment that ensues. Problems with the rejection
of authorised persons could be solved by offering alternative methods (Fak, 1991 ).
Eventually, failing a device that meets the rcquiremenL, public demand may force its
relaxation.
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7.4.5 Biometric ID method industry certification

Until the time that a reliable biometric testing method is developed, purchasers will have
to rely on the certification processes of the ICSA, IBIA and BioAPI. The ICSA process
has already resulted in six products being certified ("Standards set", 1998).

Product

specifications, with which vendors will be required to comply, will probably follow.
Smaller scanners and faster processing methods are likely to emerge. Although the use of
biometric identifiers is expanding, this has been in areas where fairly relaxed false
acceptance and false rejection rates (FAR & FRR) are acceptable. Employers, welfare
organisations and exhibitors, amongst others have required clients to identify themselves
by providing a biometric feature for scrutiny. These applications are effective even with
very lax false acceptance and rejection rates. Examples are the Atlanta Olympic gar.;es,
attendance recording in the workplace, identification of beneficiaries, and rapid
processing of international travel approval at airports. It seems likely that for the next
few years, acceptance of biometric identity verification using smart cards will occur only
where lax false rejection rates are acceptable and the people to be identified are relatively
powerless. General acceptance may not occur until the banking requirement is lowered or
met. No evidence of any such development has been discovered.

I
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7.4.6 Contactless card costs

The main apparent market for the contactless card is in public transport ticketing. People
who normally travel by public transport are unlikely to be wealthy, but because of the
extra circuitry, contactless cards are more expensive than contact versions and, in view of
the nature of the target market, this expense may discourage their widespread use. In
section 2.7 the potential for better rewritable memory with ferroRAM is mentioned, but
the source gives no indication of the likely cost of the new technology (Johnstone, 1998,
p. 38). The flaw in ferro RAM mentioned in section 7.3 is not as serious a drawback for
ticketing as it might be in a financial application, such as the electronic purse or
e-commerce, because readers could be designed to reject corrupted tickets and the
consequences could be handled in the same way as those for defective tickets rejected by
a multi-rider.

7.4.7 Vehicle Security and cost

Immobilisers are now factory fitted to Australian assembled cars, and this class of vehicle
is probably safe from theft by impulse thieves so long as the driver takes reasonable care.
However, Victorian experience shows that they are not immune to the attentions of
professionals ("Thieves beat car giants", 1996). Cheaper vehicles arc still easily stolen
and even middle to upper range cars, as they become older, will become vulnerable to the
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less organised thieves, partly because their mysteries will

b~comc

known to the thieves

and partly because many owners will fail to maintain the anti-theft devices in as-new
condition. Despite advances in technology, economics will dictate the level of protection
and, without either incentives or compulsion, owners will probably merely continue to
rely on insurance to indemnify themselves against loss.

7.4.8 Summary

With the exception of the lack of ·standardisation and problems with biometric

identification, most non-technical problems relate to cost and their solution will probably
depend on the achievement of improved cost-effectiveness.

7.5

Regulatory expectations

7.5.1 Traffic regulation enforcement

Although traffic regulations vary from one country to another WA is fairly typical and

will be used as the main example. When of interest the special situations in other
countries and states will be mentioned.

Are changes in traffic management to be

expected in WA or elsewhere? There are repeated calls for improvements in traffic
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management to achieve reductions in accidents, road congcistion, pollution and the cost of

road construction and maintenance, but there is some hypocrisy.

Accidents could be

reduced if speeds were reduced, and extra automatic speed traps might achieve this
object, but extra traps would cost more money whereas, if they achieved their object,

fewer tines would be collected. Road congestion could be avoided if more commuters

used public transport, but it is hard to separate a motorist from his car, since each wants
someone else to use the public transport. Exhaust pollution is easy to detect and could be
reduced by normal enforcement methods, but moves to do _so havt! proved unpopular.
Taxes on fuel, and vehicle registration fees, after meeting the cost of road construction
and maintenance, are a net contributor to public revenues. ("Facts", 1997). In short,
although there are occasional calls for action (such as road pricing and stricter
enforcement), remedies using smart cards or not are unlikely to be implemented in the
present climate of opinion. Discussion with Main Roads W A indicated that it is regarded
as politically hazardous to strain the link between a man and his motor car and, therefore,
changes will probably rely on education and other non-coercive influences upon
behaviour.

7.5.2 Road pricing and parking fees

The use of smart cards in vehicle management would be given considerable impetus if
traffic authorities created more turnpike roads, or congestion controlled areas, and
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parking authorities established parking zones that accepted payment via smart cards. All
three of these possibilities are under investigation worldwide.
•

installed. The contact cards are inserted into in-vehicle units that transmit and receive
signals to and from overhead gantries to achieve the contactless access function. The
card is a stored value card that can be used, not only to pay tolls but also for other
cash transactions in supermarkets and petrol stations.
•

In Melbourne, Victoria, in a venture called OneLink, the Perth company ERG had
problems with finalising its automatic fare collection scheme, and was able to
complete only with the support of the international giant Motorola ("Motorola-backed
ERG", 1997). The project, after overcoming these problems, now appears to be
functioning satisfactorily.

•

In Sydney, an electronic system for collecting harbour bridge toll fees uses a stored
value rechargeable smart card, and there is a toll system for the Sydney Eastern
Districts tunnel.

Nevertheless, there seems little chance of specific action in W A.
•

A proposal to build a turnpike road from Karratha to Shark Bay has disappeared
without trace ("Toll road planned", 1996).

•

Congestion and pollution control by charging vehicles for entry to specified zones has
not been given any public airing .

.""'

,, ',\

In Singapore (see section 3.2.4) a full system that uses contact cards has been
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•

An "issues and directions" document distributed hy M:lin Ro;Jds W A, gave traffic
congestion as a key issue, and then, under "current directions", listed nine remedial
<lctions. but not road pricing.

•

Under the heading "futmc directions", the tentative option, "Look at dist:ouraging
unnecessary road use through possible road use charging", was twclflh in a list of 14
possibilities ("Issues", 1996).

•

City and Local Authorities, when contacted by telephone, said their organisations
might move to a smart card supported parking system if this becomes the nann
elsewhere.

In short, if the authorities are moving towards a user and polluter pays policy, the
movement is slow.

,7 .5.3 Minor control improvements

A study of policy papers issued by Main Roads, W A, seems to indicate that traffic
management will be a matter of minor traffic control improvements, such as improved
intersection control, data collection, and education. Officials are at pains lo a'isure lhe
inquiring public that any surveillance is only to monitor traffic patterns and densities and
that there is no capability to identify vehicles, nor is it policy to seek it. The official
perception is that higher authorities fear that the public will be hostile to any sy,<.;tcm with
a potential to support surveillance.
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7.5.4 Summary of traffic regulation prospects

Apparently congestion and pollution arc to be controlled by informing and educating the

driving public, und there is no proclaimed intention to change the present traditional
methods of monitoring driving behaviour.

A number of statements in the discussion

papers do indicate a government wish to encourage the use of public transport and, no
doubt, any smart card application that improved its convenience would be welcome. but
no regulatory action to compel the application of the available technology is
foreshadowed. Apparently, regulatory authorities intend to follow, rather than lead, and
the use of smart cards will gain no direct support from them.

7.5.5 General Government applications

Even if there is little expectation of regulatory action directly relating to roads and
vehicles, there is the possibility that some general government strategy may lead to the
widespread use of smart cards.

According to a report in the daily newspaper The

Australian, the Federal Government, in January 1998, announced that it would begin to
buy application space on about 2.7 million private smart and credit cards in 1999
("Government agencies", 1998). This was a rather surprising statement as the multiapplication card is, as yet, hardly a reality. The number, 2.7 million, .o.;eems to suggest
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that the Government had the Tclstra card in mind. In September 1998, as mentioned in
section 5.9.4, a number of leading smart card companies wrote to all Federal ministers,
warmng that the country risked being lcfl behind because of Government inaction
("Smart card makers appeal to Canberra", 1998).

However. it could be that the

Govemment had become aware of the difficulties of what was proposed. In the UK, the
Federation of the Electronics Industry (FE I), in 1996, pressed the Government to establish
a multi-application smart card for all government employees, that would fulfil key
requirements of Government, and be a slimulus to. and basis for, commercial
applications. Two years later a follow-up showed that no progress had been made ("Role
of Government", 1998) and, even now, there are no reports of any action. The situation
in the US and Canada has followed much the same pattern.

It seems that the

implementation of smart card systems is unlikely to be driven by regulatory action.

7.6

Commercial expectations- non-vehicle

7.6.1 Introduction

Failing either solutions to the non-technical problems or regulatory action, the next
question is whether normal entrepreneurial processes will cause some "killer application"
to emerge to form the core of a multi-application card of which one application might be
vehicle management. Candidate applications arc examined in this section, commencing
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with those in finance. The three financial possibilities introduced in section 5.3: namely,

a cash payment substitutes system, including an electronic purse, c-commcrcc and
e-shopping are now evaluated as possibilities.

7.6.2 The purse and banks versus merchants

Financial institutions (sec section 5.3.2) are accepting smart card technology only slowly.
In the USA the investment in the excellent existing infrastructure, the handsome profits
made from online credit and debit authorisations, and the fear of a systemic breach, will
probably ensure that financial institutions are followers rather than leaders in any move to
make wider use of smart cards. Credit and debit cards may be upgraded by using smart
cards instead of magnetic stripe devices, but there appears to be no move by the
institutions to promote a multi-application capability. The trial of an electronic purse
system in Manhattan by four major US financial organisations has been reported as a
failure, as has a trial in Guelph by the Canadian Mondex banks. In Manhattan, Citibank
with VisaCash combined with Chase Manhattan and Mondex in a joint pilot scheme. Six
hundred merchants, who were not required to pay for the readers, are said to have been
frustrated by early technical faults and, although about 95,000 cards were issued to
residents, only 53,000 loads to the cards were recorded - an indication that many cards
may not have been used at all (Foderaro, 1998). In Europe there are unresolved conflicts
over who will pay, and how much, and some financial institutions are trying to force
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merchants to pay what the merchants regmd as excessive fi..--cs for participation: for

example.
"All present electronic-purse pilots have proved unsuccessful because they have
not had enough merchant support"

says Societe Nationalc des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF) treasurer Eugene Caffart
and, ag<.tin,
"We prvvide a critical mass of users, and we expect the users to pressure shops to

accept the cards later." (Amdur, 1997, p. 4-5).

Merchants may see the electronic purse as a device that will enable the banks to
participate more profitably in the cash transaction market and may regard it as a bank
solution to a bank problem for which they should not be expected to pay. In Australia the

four major banks (National Bank, Westpac, ANZ, and the Commonwealth Bank)
announced in November 1997 that they intended to run a major trial and issue eight
million Mondex cards starting in July 1998 ("Smart card invasion", 1997). Whatever
their plans may have been, the banks appear to be having second thoughts, because since
1998 their activities have been confined to closed pilot schemes.

Exacerbating the

problems of digital cash systems, whether implemented with smart cards or online, is the
difficulty of handling micropayments. As Ison of Commonwealth Bank put it
"We are attempting to derive sufficient revenue from a transaction of, say, one
dollar to pay for its processing infrastructure and deliver a commercial proposition
to the five parties in the transaction, the cardholder, the merchant, the system
operator (issuer), and the two banks involved." (lson, 1996, p. 16).
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Likewise, from an article in the June 1999 issue of Sdentific American,
"In the US at least, all the hanks that once supported micropaymcnts have taken
their resources elsewhere" (Wallich, 1999, p. I).
Surprisingly, within three months of the Scientific American article, the Aberdeen Group,
an internationally respected market surveyor, :;tated that,
" ... the future acceptance of digital cash will challenge traditional means of
exchanging value ... " ("Dash to digital cash", 1999, p. 7).
Finding an issuer prepared to pay for a major issue of smart cards may be difficult, but
achieving a substantial volume of transactions may be even more so. The conflicting
aspirations of banks and merchants and the difficulties of handling micro-payments seem
unlikely to be resolved soon.

In addition to the disagreement between bankers and

merchants, the financial institutions are fighting amongst themselves.

7.6.3 Payment standards

Failure to achieve either a common protocol standard for smart card payment applications
or a common operating system has been covered in section 4.3. Major candidates for the
protocol standard, the EMV :md Mondex specifications, are still competing. The struggle
over what operating system or application interface to use continues, with MasterCard,
and Mondex, seeking to establish MULTOS, Visa, with a rival industry grouping,
pressing for the Java API and Microsoft making a late but powerful push on behalf of its
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Windows for Smart Cards. There is no indication that a compromise is ncar in any of
these areas.

7 .6.4 Purse battle

Behind the negotiations to achieve common standards for operating systems, interfaces
:md payment protocols and a fair share of profit for each stakeholder, the battle for the
electronic purse market continues (see section 5.3.5) and until settled will probably
frustrate efforts to establish a viable system in the US. It may be that US financial
institutions wi!l accept smart cards as debit or credit cards in an effort to reduce fraud, but
probably will not pursue the idea of an electronic purse without some strong incentive to
offset the attractions, and fees, of online transactions. Insufficient attention may have
been given to the attitude of potential purse holders. Issuers write of the cleanliness,
convenience, and improved divisibility of digital money contained in smart cards, but
until the cards are able to be used as freely as money, holders may not be impressed.

7.6.5 Internet payment protocols

In addition to the purse, other potential smart card supported financial applicar.ions are

cash micropayments and accrual transactions (categorised as either e-commerce or
e-shopping) consummated over the Internet.

There is still no agreement on Internet
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payment protocols.

Visa and MasterCard have co-operated in developing a secure

electronic transaction (SET) protocol for usc in electronic payments, but although this
protocol may be suilablc for substantial transactions it is over-engineered for handling
individual purchases or the

micro-payment~

that arc likely to be the main traffic in

e-shopping ("Can current technologies", 2000). If SET wa'i accepted for c-commerce, an
increase in transactions supported by identification and encryption using smart cards
would probably follow, but there are many competing systems, some involving trusted
third parties and others asymmetric key encryption using software installed on PCs. In
short there is no sign yet of a C:t111Sensus, whilst merchant~ are unlikely to invest in smart
card readers or join any system until it is widely accepted. Today there is talk of seeking
compatibility between the PC/SC protocol and SIM: cards in cellular telephones, with a
view to facilitating e-commerce between mobile entities. The goal seems plausible
because the SIM card already incorpor::,tes a payment capability. One may doubt the need
fore-commerce on the move and note that the SIM: card is a European rather than a US
device, but GSM or PC/SC controlled access is one of the applications most likely to
form the core of a multi-application card, since the former is already being implemented
by FranceTelecom with a Cartes Bancaires card, and the latter enjoys the powerful
support of Microsoft and does not depend too heavily on the acquiescence of financial
institutions.
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7.6.6 Public Transport Ticketing

Despite their competitive struggle the financial institutions may have no choice but to
agree on a payment protocol, because transportation companies have seen the advantages
of contactless cards in automating fare collection and could leverage the ticketing
application by adding a purse function. In addition to the Octopus project being run in
HongKong, transportation organisations are conducting trials all over the world. There
are trials in South Korea, London, Paris, Rome, San Francisco and, in Australia, the
Sydney Transcard scheme. All'_ of these trials have shown promise but, with the exception
of HongKong, none has been a runaway success and, again, apparently, the problem lies
ir. merchant acceptance. Some financial institutions regard a purely contactless ·card as
. unsuitable for a financial application because a contactless application may lasl no more
~han

a third of a second, too short a time in which to process a ericryption algorithm. A

dual-interface card may overcome this objection at some cost. Contactless cards as yet
may be too expensive to be economic purely as access tokens. In this respect the Sydney
Transcard scheme is particularly interesting becaUse its contactless card, in addition to
giving access to several different transportation services, includes a stored value
application. Transcard has published research results showing that 56% of users were
satisfied with the system, but the only information released about merchant attitudes was
that 35 percent of consumers reported that the cards were not readily accepted by
shopkeepers (MacSmith, 1996). However, if merchants do not support a stored value
application by providing readers in substantial numbers, then users are unlikely to want it.
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In W A, the only indication of a possible application is that the Department of Transport,
as a feature of their "System 21".(...initiative, claim.<; to be considering smart card
technology as u \VL\Y to improve ticketing within ten years. Although as yet, it shows no
sign of doing so, public transport ticketing may become the "kill.er application" that the
.smart card indu.stry requires, because it enjoys a de facto standard in the MJF ARE
specification and it has issued more smart cards than any application except
telecommunication.

7.6.7 Telecommunication

The point was made in section 5.4 that the telecommunication industry has more
experience with smart cards than any other sector. The following table shows the actual
and forecast use of smart cards by the industry.

Table 8 Telecommunication Industry Smart Cards.
Year

Pay phone cards

Mobile phono cards

1996

lOOm

15m

1997

220m

70m

1998

Not known

lOOm

1999

250m

2000 (est)

430m

2004 (est)

970m

(Facts and forecasts, 1999; ICMA Quick card facts, 2000).
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The increase in the use of mobile phone cards and the potential for their usc in an
ex.tended role has led to the belief that they could form the core of a multi·application

card. Hitherto, the telccommunicationcompanies have been prepared to sell only prepai~

cards (both pay and mobile phone), or "credit" phone cards that record the service

and enable later billing. Apparentiy the industry did not wish to become involved in
providing cards that could be used by entities outside the industry: possibly, because of
the difficulties of the consequential furids clearing process. The financial institutions, for

their part, are believed to be wary of any financial

application using the

telecommunication payments protocols. Today, in addition to information services such
as news, weather and stock reports, there is discussion of providing interactive services
such as banking and e-commerce including payments. For these proposed services to be
implemented there will need to be co-operation between telecommunication companies
'

and banks. Card Technology Today, an online magazine dedicated to reporting news
about smart cards, writes that, in France, this proposal is already being acted upon
("France Telecom", 2000).
In Australia developments are slower. In l997,Telstra announced that it would issue six
million reusable (electronic purse) and eight million disposable (stored value) smart cards
before 1 July 1998, claiming that, by contrast, Australia's four major banks planned to
issue only 100,000 Mondex smart cards in the second half of 1998 ("Telstra winning",
1997). Telstra has the advantage that it is a nationwide "near monopoly" and has already
issued

som~

cards, but it remains to be seen whether it is able, or even wishes, to usurp

the traditional banks' function in this way. In a pilot scheme in Adelaide, Coca-Cola and
Smiths installed vending machines that would accept Telstra non-reloadable cards, but no
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results have been released. In

Melbo~1rne,

the City council considered adapting parking

meters to accept the Ci.lrds, but apparently did not proceed, because there have been no
further repOrts about the proposal ("Phone cards get smarter", 1998, January 13 ).

In

short, the cards have been used in payphoncs, but hardly anywhere else, since merchants
·(

--1'1

" reluctant to provide the necessary readers.
app-ear
In late 1999, the ANZ, Telstra and ERG announced that they had jointly formed a
transaction processing company with a centre to handle

purcha~es.

At present each of

these companies uses a different purse technology, but they intend to select one, probably
MULTOS, because a single standard would enable the offer of a variety of applications
on a single card (Big players get smart, 1999, September 14). It would seem that, despite
early optimism, telecommunication has not become the hoped for "killer application", but
the potential exists and one day could be exploited.

7.6.8 Purely access applications

The majority of smart card applications may be thought of as access applications but,
most of the majority, like the GSM SIM cards, involve some transfer of value. Purely
access applications, such as those restricting admission to secure physical areas, networks
and sources of infonnation have been successfully implemented for some time, but none
has been large scale. Such applications make no profit for the issuer, and any reduction in
administrative costs is usually small.
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7 .6.9 Welfare ben eli ts .

In several states in the USA, smart cards, in conjunction with biometrics, have been used
as the authentication device to enable beneficiaries to draw their benefits. Reports claim
substantial savings and, in particular, savings that result when applicants decline to
provide the biometric feature required. If beneficiaries were induced to use smart cards
as identification, it would be a logical extension to provide an electronic purse on the
cards, and even, perhaps, enable beneficiaries to download their benefits directly onto
them. Judging by the Australian public's reaction to the Australia Card proposal, in
Australia the situation is different, and the application of smart cards in welfare is likely
to face great difficulties. Public rejection of identification may be expected to continue
despite pressure upon the Government from industry, discussed in section 7.5.

7.6.10

Health

In Germany and France, smart cards have found a role as a store of information in health

schemes, but the cards do not include a fi "Uncial application and seem an unlikely core
for anything except their specific function. In W A, a health insurer (HBF) announced its
intention to issue 700,000 memory chip cards to its members by Christmas, presumably
1997 ("Smart card"", 1997).

Although it seems unlikely that a memory chip card
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application could be the core of a multi-application system, ERG, the card suppliers, say

'that whilst the current application requires only a memory chip, the chip to be US(;d is
capable of handling other applications. The intention, initially, is to usc the card as an
identification token, am.l eventually to extend it to become a

multi~application

system.

Neither HBF nor ERG has indicated how they propose to address the problems of
standardising operating systems or establishing a certification authority. These problems

are discussed shortly, but, by 1999, few vendors had installed card readers that would
accept payment using the cards.

7.6.11

Border control

Several pilot schemes have been introduced at airports with a view to determining
whether smart cards may be used as improved passport substitutes. The first was a Dutch
scheme launched in 1992, but apparently it was discontinued because a television
documentary proved that it could be defeated (Overview, 1997).

Other smart card

supported border control schemes are still operating, but their success, or otherwise, has
not been widely reported.

7.6.12

Th~

Multiple applications

potl!ntial applications discussed in the prcvtous paragraphs ~hould he considered

ag~tinst

the presumed desire of holders to have a multi-application card and the

assumption in chapter one that, for general acceptance,

~mart

cards would need to support

multiple applications. The technology to create and implement multi-application cards
probably already exists, as do most of the non-commercial criteria given in section 4.2 for
a successful system. The problems are commercial, and the crucial obstacle is the lack of
a satisfactol)' business case for each stakeholder.

To create a suitable commercial

environment requires co-operative answers to the following questions.

•

Who will own the card and applications?

•

Who will issue the card, own application keys and customer information and update
the information?

•

Who will perform application certification and authenticity?

•

Who will pay for the infrastructure development'

•

Who will control the advertising space on the card and its chip?

•

Who will be liable for lost, stolen or faulty cards?

•

Who will get the revenue .streams?

•

Who wiJ: own the card brand?

There are as yet no generally agreed answers to these questions and, until there are, it
seems unlikely that holder expectations will be met (Barr, Allen & Burke, 1997, p66·67).

jCJIJ

7.6.13

Holders versus issuers

Holders might desire increased functionality, fewer cards and the ability to make their
own sdcction from amongst the applications described above, hut they may then
encounter resistance from issuers who want no other brands on their issued cards. As
Peter Fogarty, CEO of ERG said, "It is unlikely you will have another Telco on a Tclstra
car•l" (Big players get smart, 1999). Further, if the card includes an electronic purse, the
holder would want to be able to usc it with a wide variety of merchants and reload it
anywhere at any time.

ATMs and EFTPOS tenninals would need modification and

further standardisation before this ideal could be achieved.

7.6.14

Operating system compatibility

Even if a killer application is discovered, it may not be possible to use it as the core of a
multi-application scheme due to the struggle between the supporters of the MULTOS
operating system and those of the Java API. If the financial institutions choose MULTOS
and the killer application usts the Java API or some other interface, then the applications
that can be built around the core might be restricted. It could be that the purse will first
emerge as a method of p'flying beneficiaries and, if so, the banks might insist on the use of
MUILTOS, since they control it and they perceive it as being more secure. On the other
hand the de,velopment of other uses of the card would be simplified for developers if the
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Java A~l was employed, since it is easier to install nr~w applic<Jtions on the Java interface.
In addition, non-bank participants might not trust a card with an operating system that
was the property of a banking consortium, especially as the banks might reserve the right
to install all applications. Although, ideally, a card should be capable of supporting Java
with MULTOS as shown in Figure 16, two incompatible systems could emerge.
MAOSCO, the international consortium that licenses the MULTOS specification, ha'i
committed the next generation of MULTOS to support a Java run-time engine (Cannon &
Wooderson, 1999), but only time will tell to what extent the commitment is met.

7.6.15

Public key certification

A different problem relates to public key certification. In testimony before a committee
on banking and financial services of the United States House of Representatives on 11
June 1996, Denis A. Calvert Vice President and General Manager United States Financial
Retail Division, Verifone, said,
" ... one of the cornerstones that will shape the future of money is the strength of a
private sector national and international Public Key Certification infrastructure (PKD.
The foundation for Electronic Commerce in the broadest sense depends on this crucial
infrastructure, including many Internet payment schemes. If these certification
systems are susceptible to compromise, if they are not supported in law, if they do not
provide a solution to the business liability issues related to a Certiticate Authority,
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then business

trans<~ctions

and the trunsiCr

or money over puhlic.: networks may never

rcuch their full potential"'. (Calvert, 1996, p. 2).

7 .6.16

Holder certification

However, the need for a certification authority goes beyond financial applications. Before
any multi-application card is accepted by the public there will need to be a procedure and
authority agreed by the issuers of the applications, for determining, at the time card users
are enrolled, that they are indeed who they say they are.

Similarly, each reader or

terminal will need to be certified iu some way as being what it purports to be. The
certification authority model would need to be agreed nationally or, preferably,
internationally ("Curly questions", 1997). An international standard for certificates of
this kind has existed for several years, documented within the CCITI standard X509, and
services of this nature are being offered in the US, but not yet globally. As mentioned in
section 4.3.4, in Australia, SecureNet offers this certification service.

7.6.17

Summary

After taking these difficulties into consideration, one may conclude only that a critical
mass in any application, or combination of applications, cannot be expected soon.
Incompatibility between smart cards has the potential to delay their widespread
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introduction for scvcml years. The ongoing struggle for compt.:titivc edge and the gaps in
standardismion, until resolved, will prohibit the multi·application card that is essential for
acceptam:c.

At present there is no compelling pressure that would cause the leading

stakeholders to sink their differences and move to a worldwide smart card system. As an
editorial in the Au.'>tmlian Computer News put it "Only the foolhardy would expect
companies involved in this brand-new technology to work together." ("Scourge", 1997).
Having said that, it should be added that amongst the competitors some arc more likely to
win than others.

In the USA. a card system using the Microsoft sponsored PC/SC

specification in conjunction with Windows for Smart Cards and finding a market in
e-commerce is probably the favourite. In Europe, an application using a mobile phone as
a payment terminal with the aid of a smart card might be more likely. Close behind could
be ticketing applications using a dual interface card and a modified MIFARE
specification, or other protocol accl!ptable to the financial institutions. Finally, less
likely, is the possibility that governments will sponsor a benefit smart card incorporating
an electronic purse and with identification established using a biometric feature.

7. 7 Industry forecasts

An alternative approach to forecasting the future use of smart cards is to extrapolate from
past growth, rather than to evaluate expectations. From reading predictions in journal
articles and Internet pages one might cas!!y gain the impression that we will all be

-----------------

2ffi

familiar with ~mart cards within a decade. Table 9 follows with estimates or forecasts
made by various organisations and authors, some of which approach, and in one case
equals. the world population. The most recent short-term forecasts, for 2000, seem to
group around two billion cards.

However, the "track rccorJ" of earlier long-term

forecasts suggests that the spectacular increases indicated after 2002 should be regarded
with caution. Despite caution, and accepting the doubtful nature of available information,
in view of the rapid growth in e-commerce and consumer applications such as PAY-TV,
health cards and mobile phones, and bearing in mind the expiry of patents taken out up to

25 years ago, the two billion card forecast does seem plausible. With a world population
of six to seven billion, of which less than one billion is in Europe, the forecast implies
that almost every breadwinner in the developed world, outside of the US, will carry a
smart card. Some caveats would be prudent.
•

The probability that affluent sophisticated people may choose to carry more than one
smart card must be acknowledged.

•

Some

authorities~

for example, Schlumberger, may disagree with the more optimistic

forecasts. In a review published on the Internet in April 97, it estimated that 1.35
b;llion chip cards would have been issued by the year 2000, but that only 450 million
of them would be "smart". ("Schlumberger", 1997). In a later forecast for the year
2005, Schlumberger seemed more optimistic, but it should be noted that the
infonnation for the longer term forecast is second hand, being a BitCom statement of
Schlumberger's opinion.

I
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•

There arc donbts about the validity of statements even hy sources considered more

reputable.

For example, the Financial Times Business Research Archives issued a

WWW page about WHSmith, the bookseller, and usc of smart cards, that made the
sli.ttemcnt. "In 1994. 99% of the 420 million smart cards were .... " ("Financial Times",
!997). Since this figure is outside the range of numbers reported for 1996, it can
hardly have been true in 1994.
•

The fact that two billion cards have been issued does not necessarily mean that they
have been activated and in use. As

de~cribed

in sections 7.4.5 and 7.6.9, the actions

of HBF and Telstra in Australia have already shown that cards may be issued, but

then either not activated, or else only partially exploited.
Generally, it seems that forecasts are illMdefined, and occasionally conflicting, and
provide insuffici!!nt grounds for disregarding the conclusion in the previous section that
there is as yet no existing or imminent compelling pressure to establish smart card
systems worldwide.
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Tahlc 9A: Schedule of Estimate and Forecast References ( 1992-1 CJ9X ).

No

r.I
2
3
4

5

6
7
8
9
10
II

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Source

Year
cslimatc
or rorccasl
made

Baker, T

1992

"CASCADE"

1994
1995

"Or)!a"
Cordonnier, V.
"Gemplus'"
Choi &
Whinston
Goldfinger, C.

Baker, T
"Orga"
Cordonnier, V.
"Philips"
'·Solaic"
Amdur, D.
Goldfinger, C.

1995
1997
1998
1998

1992

1995
1995
1995
1997
1997

1996
1996
1997
1998

20

Myers, W.
Fancher. C.
Benhammou,T
Choi&
Whinston
Frost &
Sullivan
Dataquest

21

Gemplus

1999

22

DataQuest

1998

23

Ovum

1998

24

Philips

1999

25

Andersen

1999

19

1999
1997

Rcrcrcnce

Year ror
which
t.;i[~-,atc

See

n:li.:n:nt:L'.~

..

or rorecast
made
1992

Estimate
or
Forecast
(billions)

0.26

JY92
IYlJ4

0.25

1994

0.3

..

1994
1994

0.11

Quoting Orga , Gemplus & Philips in Economi~:s of
Finandul Applications of smart cards p. 9
Ohtaincd from: httn://www.isno.sec.be/fiwgffasc.htm
Sec references

1994

0.132

1995

.

1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995

1.0
0.235
0.4
0.052
0.04
0.084
0.178

.
.
.

1996
1996
1996
1996

0.156
0.151
0.205

Facts & Forecasts Obtained from:
hup://www .card l(Jui x.com/fm:l! lids. ht ml
GartnerGroup's Dataquest Hot News Obtained from
http://www.infopower.eom.tw/trcnd/dataqucst/chipcard.htm
Smart Success. Riding high on mulr.iplc applications,
smart cards arc here to stay in the Indian market
March 15 1h, 1999. Obtained from:
http:/!www .dqindia.com/mar 1599/ds I .htm
Gemplus edges Schlumbcrgcr. Obtained from:
htt 1://www .card tech. fau Iknergra v.com/more. htm
Mlilti·application smart card prospects. Ovum claims.
Obtained from:
h!!n/fwww.canltcch.faulkncr)!ray.com/morc.htm
BitCom quotes Philips. Obtained from:
hun/fww w. hit. inc.com!h tm 1fi lcs/ovcrvi c w. htm
Smart cards account for IH% of world curd
production. Card tech quoting Arthur Andersen Co.
Obtained frm: httn://www.c:mltcch.faulkncrgray.com/

1996

0.102

1997

0.311

1997

0.9

1998

0.3

1998

0.645

1998

1.362

1998

1.2

.
..
.

..

..

.
.
Quoting Orga , Gcmplus & Philips in Economics of
Finundul Applications of smart cards p. 9
Obtained from: htto://www.isoo.scc.be/fiwg/fasc.htm
Sec references

0.134

0.11

0.35

Table YB: Schedule of Estimate <md Forecast References ( 1999~2005).
No

26
27

28
29
30
31

-32
33

34
35
36
37

Source

"Or.c:a"
"Philips"
Daniels, G.
Cordonnicr, V.
Fancher, C.
n"'nhammou, J
Amdur, D.
"Soliac"
Schlumber.c:cr
Cordonnicr, V.
Goldfinger, C.

Year
estimate
or forecast
made

Reference

1995
1995

Sec rcfcrcm:cs

1995
1995
1996

..

1997

1997
1997
\997

1997
1998

1998

38

Choi &
Whinston
"Soliac"

39

"Philips"

1999

40

"Mentis"

1999

41

"CardTech"

1999

42

"Gemplus"

1999

43

"Siemens''

1999

44

"Dataqucst"

1999

45

Ovum

1998

46

"Gemplus"

1999

47

"Ovum"

1999

48

Schlumberger

1999

1999

..

.

.
..
.
Excludes Japan and China"
.
..

Quoting Orga, Gemplus & Philips in Economics of
Financial Applications of smart cards p. 9
Obtained from: http://www.ispo.scc.be/fiwg/f<~sc.htm
Sec references
BitCom quotes Soli<~c. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm
BitCom quotes Philips. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm
BitCom quotes Mentis. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfilcs/overview.htm
BitCom quotes Card Technology. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm
BitCom quotes Gemplus. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overvicw.htm
BitCom quotes Siemens. Obtained from:
hllp://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfilcs/ovcrview.htm
SitCom quotes Dataquest. Obtained from:
hno://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm
Obtained from:
http://europe.cnnfn.com/digitaljam/newsbytcs/111910
.html
BitCom quotes Gem~] us. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc.corn!htmll1lcs/overview.htm
Card Technology quotes Ovum. Obtained from:
http://www .cardtech. fau] knergra v.com/more. htm
SitCom quotes Schlumhergcr. Obtained from:
http://www.bit-inc .• :om/htrnlfilcs/overvicw.htm

Year for
which
estimate
or forecast
made
1999

2000
2000
2000

Estimate

"'

J'orecast
(billions)
1.212
0.513
0.75
I

2000
2000
2000
2!KJO
2000
2000
2000

0.99
1.34

2000

2.4

2000

1.25

2000

2

2000

2

2000

2.8

2000

2to 3.8

2001

2.8

2001

3.4

2003

2.7

2003

6.3

2004

3

2005

3.75

1.1

0.4
0.45

4
1.088
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Before disl:ussing this Table attention is drawn to tlu: following points.
•

The published forecasts often do not specifically distinguish between memory cards
and true smart cards. The schedule attempts to show only true smart cards and, for
cxo.unplc, if the application is known, the following have been assumed to be memory
cards not smart cards.
•

Payphone cards

•

Games cards

•

Meter cards

•

Access control cards

•

Vending machine cards

This may be an invalid assumption in some ways because, for example, some payphone
cards are true smart cards that are being used in memory card mode.
•

The same assumption appears to have been made by the Gemplus forecast published

by Cardshow in December, 1995.
o

Published information is usually either well dated or second-hand. This is probably
because, when up-to-date, it is valuable.

For example, Killen & Associates asked

US$4,000 for a copy of their 1997 report, "Non-banks' smart card strategies". Other
market researchers, DataQuest and DataMonitor, charge similar amounts, and figures
attributed to these and similar organisations have been taken from the published
material of authors who. it has been assumed, did have access to the original material.

I
ZOK

ln an attempt to portray the situation more vividly, Figure

n~

shows the information

graphically. The circles in each row represent either a forecast or an estimated total of

smart cards in use in the year given at the left of the row. The years in the bottom row
show the years in which the forecasts or estimates were made. The size of the circles

approximate to the relative size of the corresponding estimate or forcca:;t, whilst the
number within or near each circle refers to the source in Table 9. The circles in Figure 18

are not to scale and attempt merely to give an impression of the relative sizes of the
corresponding estimates or forecasts. As may be seen, forecasts, represented by circles
above and to the left of the dotted line, have tended to be optimistic and it would be
prudent, therefore, to presume that this is still the case.

There are sometimes wide

variations between estimates: for example, Dataquest (in 1998) estimated there to be 0.3
billion smart cards and Ovum more than twice that number. However, to some extent
confidence in the figures is restored by the two most recent confirmable estimates (for
1998) with Phillips reporting 1.36 billion and Arthur Andersen, 1.2 billion.
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Figure 18: Graphical portrayal of smart card estimates and forecasts.
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7.8

Perceived need for better vehicle management

In chapter three it is concluded that a smart card vehicle management system has the
potential to improve each of the vehicle management components: namely, traffic
management, usage control, maintenance, and security. However, in chapter one it is
argued that perceptions rather than reality will be crucial in determining whether a better
or more personal system will be adopted. It is the authorities, rather than owners or
drivers, that are concerned with traffic management and, as would be expected in
democracies, the authorities' ambivalent attitude reflects that of the public. Most people
would like better regulation of driving behaviour, and reductions in congestion and
pollution, but only if it is others who must modify their behaviour. On balance, despite
occasional calls for improvement, there seems to be no strong public perception of a need
for change. To have determined objectively how individuals view the need for usage and
maintenance control would have required a description of the perceived meaning of the
term and a second questionnaire. Instead discussions with friends, and with a contact in
the RAC, led to the tentative and unsubstantiated conclusion that most people see the
existing arrangements as adequate. For the individual, usage control is subordinate to
personal convenience, and maintenance control by windscreen stickers, supported by
reminders from service stations, is familiar and satisfactory. Fleet managers view things
differently, regarding these components as more important, and their main objection to
the available automatic logging systems was cost. The managers that responded to the
questionnaire at Appendix 6, would have welcomed a system obtainable at what they
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regarded as a n:asonabic figun.:, but expressed misgivings about the pos!-.ihle reaction of
employee drivers. In conversation, for a total system, including both usage control and
security, one percent of vchidc cost was mentioned and, <b stated in chapter six, this
would be about A$200 per vehicle. This modest figure suggests that there is no strong

pet'ct:ption of any need for change.
Unlike fleet owners, the main concern for

owner~drivcrs

is security. If a smart card

security system could be provided at close to the same cost as an immobiliser, then it
would probably be chosen because of the extra facilities it would provide. The resull of
the questionnaire distributed in the University car park suggests that owner-drivers would
like better security but would be prepared to pay only from A$1 00 to A$500 for it.
It seems there is no great pressure for change. If the cost of a smart card system could be
brought to within a range acceptable to owners, individual owners might install it to
improve security. By contrast fleet owners might be motivated more by a wish to acquire,
and have control of, the additional information that could be extracted and would be
happy to improve their negotiating position with the oil companies.

A possible

development that could encourage adoption of in-vehicle smart card systems is robot

refuelling ("Robot", 1997),
If all the modifications listed in chapter six were required, the system would be expensive
and would have aspects that not all owners would want. No one group of users perceives
a need for all aspects, and a general conclusion, therefore, is that an acceptable vehicle
smart card management system, should be flexible enough to enable owners to choose
only the aspects that they perceive as necessary, and for which they arc prepared to pay.
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7.9

Conclusion.

The point has been made repeatedly that a probable precondition for sman cards to be
used in vehicle management is their widespread usc. One day, smart cards may be w;
ubiquitous as wristwatches and be not just a convenience but a necessity, cnabiing us to

organise our immediate surroundings in at least two ways. First, we may be able to
configure the smart card to suit our individual need, thm making each card as unique as

its holder, and second. we may be able to personalise the devices around us. A wide
range of devices (telephones, vehicles, TVs, dwellings, PCs and others) may be able to
accept and read the smart card, and then operate according to our personal preference.
Nevertheless, at present there is no clear business case for moving to smart card systems
worldwide, because biometric identification cannot meet the more exacting financial
institution requirements; and, the ongoing stmggle for competitive edge and the gaps in
standardisation, until resolved, will prohibit acceptance of the multi-application card.
Even outside the commercial world, no killer application has emerged, and forecasts of
growth are conflicting and unconvincing.

For the motoring world the technology is

probably already adequate, but without either widespread use, which depends on the
factors already mentioned, or pressure from the public or authorities, the development of
smart card systems and their installation in vehicles 'Yould cost more than the benefits
would justify. The obstacles may eventually be overcome, but the process is likely to be
incremental, and a realistic conclusion is that smart cards will not be used to personalise
vehicles within the postulated ten-year time frame. With regard to the opening fantasy
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about summoning and dismissing a

{;<If

like a magic carpet, it should be noted th:tt the

technology already exists. GM has ccmductcd a driverless test on a stretch of highway
1-15 in San Diego. California and the French IN RIA has conducted a realistic experiment
at Saint Quentin en Yvelines using driverless electric cars which the public arc able· to
access using smart cards (Lc systeme Praxitelc, 1999). Notwithstanding the above, a felt
need for the techr.ology does not exist.

Future work should include further investigation of vehicle owner and/or operator
attitudes to

~mart

card assisted vehicle management and the investigation of the opinions

of both fleet operators and

r.~gulatory

authorities using a larger, more representative

sample. Researchers in a different study discipline could probably better address any
follow-up study. Although pertinent, an investigation of possible shifts in commercial
intentions might be fruitless, because of the commercial sensitivity of the information, but
an investigation of the feasibility of developing a smart card supported vehicle tracking
and locating system might be of interest and is planned. The problems of introducing an
improved system are not new and it may be appropriate to give Machiavelli the last word.

"There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, ... than to
initiate a new order of things. The refonner has enemies in all those lvho profit by the old
order and only lukewarm defenders in those who would profit by the new order. "
(Machiavelli, 1513, Cit 6, paragraph 4/8).
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Appendix I

ESTIMATE OF THE PROPORTION OF
CARS AND LIGHT COMMERCIAL
VEHICLES IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA
THAT ARE FLEET OWNED
This proved to br: a surprisingly difficult figure to estimate. Enquiries were made of the
following organisations:
Australian Bureau of Statistics
Motor Trade Association of WA
RAC

but they were unable to help.

There are about one million

car~

and light commercial vehicles now registered in W A.

New vehicle registrations of these vehicles are now about 50,000 each year. Since the
total number of registrations for the last five years has increased by only 25,000 each year

it seems that about 25,000 are taken out of use annually.
Senior salesmen in various large dealerships had kept no figures but gave estimates of the
proportion sold for fleet use as from 50 to 70 percent. If 60% of new registrations each
year are for fleet owners this is 30,000 vehicles. If fleet vehicles are used for an average
of three years only before being sold to private owners some 90,000 of WA's light
vehicles are fleet vehicles. This amounts to about nine percent. A call to the Federal
Chamber of Automotive Industries, Canberra, elicited the verbal opinion that of
Australia's eight million vehicles, one million were fleet owned.
therefore been adopted as a reasonable "ball park" figure.

Ten percent has
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Appendix 2

THE CRIME ENVIRONMENT
Efforts to improve vehicle security arc a small (perhaps, relatively unimportant) part
of society's efforts to reduce crime generally. Crime statistics are capable of different
interpretations and these interpretations depend on the weight given to various factors
such as policing strategy, media attitudes and public perceptions. Trends in crime
differ by categories.
•

In W A, total crime seems to be decreasing but crimes against the person are on the
increase. (WA Yearbook. 1997, p. 108). For example, for the years 1992-96, total

reported crime, excluding vehicle theft, fell: although, violent crimes such as
robbery and assault rose (WA Yearbooks, 1995-7). While vehicle theft decreased
from I 995 to 1996 over the longer tenn it has increased. (W A Yearbook, I 996, p.

I 10).

•

Police strategy may distort the figures, although there appears to be little evidence

to support that possibility. In the latest yearbook it is shown that for offences
against the person the percentage of offences cleared is 82%, whereas for crimes
against property it is 21%, but this outcome could be merely a consequence of the
fact that there is nearly always a witness to a violent act. Even if suspicions about
the statistics are well founded, the number of reported thefts of insured items
would probably not be affected because the owner can only claim the insurance if
the alleged offence is reported to the police.

•

However, it may be that the police, perhaps rightly, devote more resources to the
prosecution of violent criminals and that a rise in such crimes, without a
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compensating increase in police resources, may necessarily result m a rclativc
neglect of crimes against property and a distortion of the statistics.

•

Those who support any such strategy argue that crimes against property (of which
vehicle theft and theft from vehicles is a component) do not merit the same level
of deterrent effort as crimes against the person.

•

The counter perception is that if minor cnmes rarely result in apprehension,
criminals become bolder and commit more serious offences. Civic authorities in
New York, where a vigorous campaign has been waged against minor offenders
such as drunks, marijuana smokers and vandals, apparently take this view.
According to a Time magazine report the campaign has led to a significant fall in
all crime including major offences (Law and order, I 996, p. 50). In July 97 there
were television news reports of the adoption in W A of a "zero tolerance" policy
that appears to bear some resemblance to the New York campaign - although,
equally, it could be merely lip service.

•

Press reports often point out that crime generally is decreasing but also usually
emphasise the increase in crime against the person. Perhaps because of these
reports, there is a public perception that overall crime is increasing although the
greatest outrage is expressed about crimes against the person.

At the least it can be argued that motorists should not be tolerant of vehicle theft
merely because their insurance covers them against major loss.

I
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Appendix 3

VEHICLE THEFT
Larger vchiclt.:s arc olicn pillagcd hut .sl!ldom stokn. Over tht: three year period 19931996, in Western Au:;tralia. about 1.6% of registered whklr.:s or an avcragt.: of nearly
19,000 vehicles each year were stolen at an estimated cost of over $100 million (WA
Police Annual Crime Statistics Report 1995/96). In most years WA has the highest
rate of vehicle theft in Australia. but figures published recently on the Australian
Bureau of Statistics web site show a reduction in the rate. During 1999, the number of
motor vehicle thefts in Australia declined by 1.3%, from 131,587 in 1998 to129,865

in 1999. The largest percentage decrease was recorded in Western Australia, where
the number of motor vehicle thefts decreased by 21%, from 16,115 in 1998 to 12,752
in 1999 (Motor vehicle theft, 2000). Presumably the community would still welcome
any measures to reduce the loss.

Other points obtained from an earlier study by Devery follow (Devery, 1993). Any

figures related to car thieves must be regarded with caution since most thefts do not
result in the thief being apprehended. In 1988, in NSW, the clearing-up rate (thief
apprehended) was 2.74% (Geason & Wilson, 1990). Devery states that only about 5%
of car thieves are apprehended (Devcry, 1993). In WA, in 1994 - 1995 the rate was
15.9% and in 1995- 1996, 17.5%. A statistical report from the Comprehensive Autotheft Research Scheme (CARS) of South Australia, implies a 10% apprehension rate
(about 10,000 cars stolen each year and about 1,000 persons apprehended) (Motor
vehicle theft in SA, 1995). Finally, a recently published report from the Australian

Bureau of Statistics has a table for motor vehicle theft 'Outcome of investigation'
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which shows the proportion of offcmh.:rs procc~:dcd against. The figurcs range from
Tasmania 2.6% to Queensland 15.2%. Figures were not available fOr WA (Recorded
crime in Australia. 1996, ABS Catalogue Number 451 0.0). Mindful that figures arc
drawn from the small ··selected" sample of appn:hcndcd offenders, there is still some
evidence that car thieves fall into two broad categories:
•

young (under 21)

60%

•

older

40%

The profile of a typical car thief is that of a male, aged 14 to 25 and with the mode at
age 16. It may be that older thieves have become more cunning and are apprehended

less frequently. The situation seems to be long standing, since as far back as 1984
only 15% of car thefts were cleared (Biles & Willing, 1987, p. t,2).
In SA about 80% to 90% of stolen cars are recovered within a week (Motor vehicle
theft in SA, 1995). This, according to local industry opinion is similar to the situation
in W A. Recovery rates in the eastern states are less, varying from 65% to 76% (Car
theft, 1997). Probably, therefore, in WA, no more than 20% of those stolen are stolen
for resale, either as complete vehicles or as parts. A few ( 18.7% in SA in 1995) of the
proportion quickly recovered will have been stolen to use in the commission of
another crime; for example, as a getaway car or for "ram-raid" use. Of the remainder,
most are likely to have been taken for joy-riding or for instant temporary transport.
One may speculate that for some young people, car theft is a crime much as apple
stealing used to be some years ago. Mostly, it is not for profit but is exciting and not
particularly risky. It may be a training ground and recruitment area for more serious
criminals, but there is no hard evidence to support this. The joy-riding may be on the
increase because, in 1993, Devcry estimated:
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•

Short-term usc. (e.g. joy-ritling, a dH.:ap taxi or to filcilitatc a more scriou:-i
crime)

50-60%

•

Pro lit (t.:.g. !'or n:~alc or salt: as parts}

•

Fraud (e.g. to collect the insurance)

30-40%

4-12%

Similar figures arc givt.:n by Genson (Gcason & Wilson, 1990, p. 6).

Older vehicles are more commonly stolen. Devcry gives figures that put the average
age of stolen cars as between 5 and 15 years with the peak at about ten years (Devery,
1993 ). The CARS study, however, gives the highest rates of theft for vehicles in the

15 to 18 years age group (Motor vehicle theft in SA, 1995). Popular makes appear to
be the most commonly stolen, the five with the highest theft rate per ten thousand
vehicles being, in descending order, Holden, Chrysler, Ford, Mazda

and Toyota.

There is a bias towards bigger. more powerful models. Although statistics show that
older vehicles are more often stolen, there have been recent thefts of newer cars that
use fairly sophisticated, transponder-supported locking.

About 300 such vehicles

were stolen in Victoria in latel995, which may have been a transitory anomaly
(Thieves beat car giants, 1996).

Nevertheless, It would seem highly desirable to

develop devices that can be fitted as a kit to an older vehicle. The average age of
registered vehicles is also about ten years (Yearbook Australia, 1997, p. 526).
Both Devery and Geason estimate that from I 0 to 15% of stolen vehicles were left
unlocked. Gcason reports that about 5% had the keys left in them. Actual figures
quoted by different investigators vary, but it seems that in up to 30% of car thefts the
vehicle was either left unlocked or the thief had access to the key or a duplicate
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(Motor vehicle, 1995, p.75). In Australia, in about 5% of thclls the keys were left in
the car (Oeason & Wilson, 1990). In SA in 1995, in 15.4% of vehicle thefts the thief'

had access to a key and in 14.3% the vehicle was unlocked. Clearly a device that
compensates for human carelessness would be useful. According to the CARS study,
when thieves forced access, in 43.8% of known cases the lock was manipulated
(presumably by driving a sharp instrument through the door panel) and in 19.3% of
cases a window was broken (Motor vehicle, 1995, p.75). The most recent study, the
NRMA report on Car Theft in Eastern Australia, 1996, does not record the means of
entry (Car Theft, 1997). The matter is summarised by Livermore of the UK Police

Science Development Branch who writes, "Cars are stolen not because thieves posses
fine engineering skills but because they exploit weaknesses in the system.

Their

approach is ... based on familiarity and brute force methods. (They) ... rely on the fact
that when they lay hands on a car it is known to them, they know exactly where the
weaknesses are: success is certain because they have done it before." (Livennore,
1993).
Statistics are available showing the places from which cars are most commonly stolen
but, unfortunately, there are no comparative statistics to show where vehicles are
commonly parked.

About 30 cars each year are stolen from the Mount Lawley

campus car park. With 1500 parking spaces, this is in line with the State average.
One gains the impression that unattended, parked cars are stolen impartially from
places to which the public have access, including carMparks, kerbMsides and driveways.

I
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Appendix 4

ESTIMATING
GLOBAL MONETARY FLOWS

Cash payments. Within finance there arc at least two areas in which smart cards
might have a major impact. of which one is the small change, or cash transaction
market. already de tined. There are varying estimates of its size.

•

Choice magazine estimates that, worldwide, the small change market of private
expenditure, the market for the electronic purse, (that is, transactions below
US$15 in value) is worth an estimated US$1.8t each year (Smartcards, 1996).

•

Allied, an organisation conducting market surveys, estimate the total as US$8.1 t
(Prusa & Reed, 1996).

•

Jean McKenna, vice president of Visa International, cited research that, "in the top
29 countries in 1995, more than US$8.1 t was spent in cash. 22% for transactions
of ten dollars or less" (Myers. 1996).

Since 22% of US$8.1 t is US$1.782t,

McKenna appears to confirm the Choice Magazine estimate.
•

An article in the Australian Personal Computer stated that Mastercard believed
that money stored on smart cards could one day be worth US$2t (Yiacoumi,
1997).
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•

A web page quotes a paper by Jack M. Kaplan that, "cash transactions under

US$20 arc valued at US$2t each year ami represent 80 percent of cash
transactions." (Kaplan, 1996 ).
•

A recent report to Congress from the US Federal Reserve board on the subject of
stored-value cards, stated that transactions of Jess than US$20, for things like fast
food and Siurpecs, amount to more than US$500b annually.

Credit card

companies have already largely exhausted Americans' ability to buy US$75 items

on credit cards, but issuing stored-value cards would allow the companies to
become involved in the high volume, low price transaction business ("Changing",
1997).
•

According to the Bank for International Settlement, the number of consumer cash
transactions in the U.S. alone exceeds 300 billion per year. By contrast, bankfacilitated consumer transactions, such as credit and debit cards, cheques, and wire
transfers, total only 60 billion per year. The worldwide market for automating
cash transactions remains virtually untapped.

Clearly, although there is room for dispute about market size, the figure is substantial.
This is an area in which electronic money, possibly facilitated by smart cards, might
gain some acceptance. In New Zealand it is estimated that 70% by volume of all
transactions are by cash, although cash accounts for only 30% of their value, because
the average value of cash payments is less than NZ$10 (NZ Bankers Association
Annual Report, 1996; Butler, 1996). By contrast, in Australia, 90% by volume of
transactions arc still by cash (Mair, 1996). The forgoing figures give an indication of
the potential market in which the purse, or other form of electronic money, might be
sold. After allowing for growth, the current total might be US$! Ot.

I
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E-commcrcc. Stcintidd, writing in the Lansing State Journal, 26 Dcccmhcr, 19CJ5
claims that in 1994, a consulting firm, Euromonitor, noted that the "global shopping"

market was approximately US$166b, and contrasted this with "electronic shopping"
that was a mere US$300m (Stcinficld, 1996). The terms were not defined. In 1997,
an Australian Internet services company, Camtcch. asserted that c-commcrcc was

currently A$2b annually, but would grow to A$50b annually by the year 2000
("Camtech", 1997).

In 1998, researchers at the University of Texas, estimated

Internet commerce to be US$102b (Barua. Pinnell, Shutter & Whinston, 1998). The

figure probably includes Internet shopping. In the same year, Tom Benemann, of
Forbes ASAP, estimated the market, exclusive of Internet shopping, to be US$43b
(Benemann, 1998).

In 1999, Ernst & Young, in a presentation to an OECD

conference in April, quoted estimates of e-commL:rce from various market surveyors
that varied from US$9.9b to US$97.2b (Simcoe, 1999). Finally, in a White Paper
dated 7 December, 1999, the UK InterForum quoted the !DC, a leading international

research organisation, as predicting that e-commerce would rise to US$600b in 2001
and to US$1. It the foliowing year (Electronic signatures, 1999).

These figures.

although not always so defined, are assumed to be annual and are summarised in the
following table.

I
Table I: E.-commerce markt.:t :-;ize

Source

Forecast-~
Estimated Actual
-- -------Year Amount
Year
Amount
----~---

Forbes ASAP
Gold linger
Ernst & Young

1994
1997
1998
1999
1998
1998
1999

InterForum

1999

Euromonitor

Cam tech

University of Texas

US$ 300m
A$2b
US$102b
US$170b
US$43b

-

2000

A$5~Jb

2002

US$300b

2001
2002

L'S$600b
US$ I. It

US$9.9 to
97.2b

The estimates of its size are increasing, and a reasonable guess at its present size
might be US$210b.

E-shopping. In the liS, in 1994, the 3.5 million people connected to the Internet
sp~nt

an average of under 60 cents each via their PCs, compared to US$94 through

traditional mail ordering (Steinfield, 1996), but, surprisingly, in 1999 this may have

risen. According to Gaw and Utting, writing in the West Australian and quoting the
Boston Consulting Group, the per capita global e-tail expenditure in that year was

US$60 (Gaw & Utting, 2000). Brislen, writing in Unlimited Magazine in May, 2000,
also quoting the Boston Group, gives the figure for the US alone as US$134.20
(Brislen, 2000). The Boston Group cannot be quoted directly because they release
their findings only to subscribers.

In 1994, according to Steinfield, electronic

shopping, including CD-ROMS, accounted for just US$300m in sales, or less than

0.02% of total shopping. Verifone estimated e-shopping in !994 as a mere US$ 100m
(Hansen, 1996).

Gaw and Utting, in the article already quoted, gave the total as
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US$40b. 1-lmvcvt.:r, even discounting the ligurc from Gaw and Utting, there arc hopes
for the future. For example. Mondcx, in its Decem her, 1996 magazine, stated that
pnymt.!nts over the lntcnu:t amounted to US$500m, but cstimak:d that by the year

2000 the figure would be in billions. According to the Smart card Forum, Killen and
Associates

sa~.'

there were 250 million transactions in I 996 and that this will grow to

25 billion by 2005 (Smart Card Fuctoids, 1996).

A Forrester Research study on

Internet commerce, claimed worldwide revenues from interactive, online sales
increased from US$240m in 1994 to US$350m in 1996, and could reach US$6.9b by

2000 (Rupley, 1996). In an article in the Economist, Christopher Anderson wrote,
" ... analysts reckoned that consumer Internet transaction in 1996 were worth
... US$500 - 600m" (Anderson, 1997). He did not identify the analysts, but quoted
International Data as forecasting that by the year 2000 consumer online shopping
would amount to US$16.1 b. These disjointed estimates of the shopping market are
summarised in the following table.

Table 2: E-shopping market size

Source

Source date

Sales Estimates
Year· Amount

Steinfie1d
Verifone
Mondex
Forrester

1996
1996
1996
1996

Anderson

1997

1994
1994
1995
1994
1996
1996

Internatio
na1 Data
Gaw&
Utting

1997

1-·

2000

1999

Forecasts
Year Amount

US$300m
US$ 100m
US$500m 2000
US$240m
US$350m 2000
US$500600m
2000
US$3040b

Billions
US$6.9b

US$16.1b

242

Fon:casting is not an exact science! The larger ligures arc hardly believable since, if

true, they indicate that individual purchases could be equal to one third of businessto-business commerce, and not all forccustcrs arc completely optimistic.

For

example, Brislcn quotes Forrester Research as predicting that "many c-tailing
ventures will fail and most will disappear by 2001" (Brislcn, 2000). A plausible guess
at the total in the year 2000 might be US$! Ob.

I
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Appcnrlix 5

SYSTEM REPOSITORY
External entities

EXTERNAL AUTHORtTIES
VEHICLE OWNER
VEHICLE
MERCHANT OR SERVICE PROVIDER
DRIVERS/USERS
Data stores
Name
ArmingCode
DriverAuthSupplied

DriverDetail
DriverRecord
ExtAuthDetail
LicenseDetails

OwnerDetails
PersonalisationData
Purse

SensorReadings
ValetCodes

ValetOpConditions
VehicleDetails
ESTIMATED TOTAL

bytes
2

8-25(,
68-316
400
200
60
58-306
200
200
300
20
10
100
2400

Estimated

Processes

non~volatile

memory required to
store code

StoreStaticData

(no storage requiredprocess carried out using
a terminal emulator)
Get ValetCodes
Get ArmiugCode

Get PersonalisationData
Get VehicleDetails
Encrypt ValetCode + ArmingCode
Store ValetCodes
Store ArmingCode
Store PersonalisationData
Store VehicleDetaiis
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2.1

Enro!Ownt:r
Get OwncrDctails
Store OwncrDetails

"

2.2

EnroiDrivcr
Grt Liccnst:Dctails
Get DrivcrDctails
G~.:t EnrolAuthData

"

Get Owner /\uthSup

Get OwncrEnrolAuthData
If OwncrAuthSup in OwncrEnrolAuthData then
Store Li~.·cnseDctails + DrivcrDetails +OwneriD
Encrypt DrivcrEnrolAuthData
Store DriverEnroiAuthData

Enro IExternal Au tho ri ties
Get ExtAuthDctai1s
Get OwnerAuthSup /*(BioiP1NIPassword]*/
Get OwnerEnrolAuthData /*[BioiPINIPassword]*/
If Ov·merAuthSup in OwnerEnroiAuthData then
Store ExtAuthDetails /*a matrix that assigns queries to authorities*/
Note: Above processes would be carried out at an enrolment workstation.
3.1

ldentifyQueryingAuthority
Get ExtemalAuthCode + Extcrna1AuthQuery
{from transceiver}
If Externa1AuthCode in ExternalAuthDctail then
Get ResponseDefinition
If ExtemalAuthQuery in ResponseDefinition then
RespondToExterna\Authority (ResponseDefinition )

200 bytes

3.2

RespondTa External Authority ( ResponscDefinition)
If LicenseDetails in ResponseDefinition then
Get LicenseDetai!s
Send LicenscDetails to transceiver
If Sensor Readings in ResponscDefinition then
Get SensorReadings
Send SensorReadings to transceiver
If Payment in ResponseDefinition then
PurseBalance := PurseBalance - TransactionAmount
Send TransactionAmount to transceiver
Note: Above two processes initiated by transceiver signal

600 bytes

3.3

Pay Forltems
400 bytes
Get payment from reader
Purse Balance := Purse Balance- Payment
Note: Above process triggered by smart card insertion into a purse wallet or
cash receiver.

I
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3.4

400 bytes

AddCashToPursc
Get Cashlnput /* from ATM dispenser*/
PurscBalancc := PurscBalancc ·I· Cashlnput

Note: Abovc process triggcrr.!d by insertion into ATM cash dispenser.

4.1

PollY chick:Scnsors
Get ScnsorRcadings
StorcScnsorRcadings

400 bytes
Queue structure required

Note: This process pl!rformcd at each pulse

4.2

StoreSensorRcadings

/* Process not claL.loratcd. Some items would be overwritten at each pulse.
Some would be stored at specified event. For example, time of start, at
start, in a queue of, say, ten. Speed and deceleration might be stored in a
queue of. say. 60 items at one second intervals */

2000 bytes
Comparison required for
each item

5.1

ValidatcDriver
Get DriverAuthSupplied /*[BioiPINIPassword]*/
Get UsageCode
Store DriverAuthSupplied /* record last attempt*/
Store UsageCode in DriverRecord
Get DriverAccess
Decrypt DriverEnro\AuthData
If DriverAuthSupplied in DriverEnro!AuthData then
Ann VehicleSystems(Driver!D)

600 bytes

5.2

Ann Vehic\eSystems(Driver!D)
Get AnningCode (*from ArmingCose store*)
Decrypt ArmingCode
Send ArmingCode to vehicle microcontrollers
Get Time (*internally generated*)
LastS tartTime :=Time
Store DriveriD + LastStartTime in DriverRecord

400 bytes

5.3

Set ValetMode
400 bytes
Get ValetSetSupplied (*as chosen by owner from ValetCodes- can be
ValetSet or ValetReset*)
Get OwnerEnro\AuthData /* [BioiPINIPassword]*/
If OwnerEnrolAuthData = DriverAuthSupplied and then
Store ValetOpConditions (*can be null when reset*)
ValetSet/ResetVehic\eSystems

5.4

ValetSet/ResetVehicleSystems
Get SensorReadings
Get ValetOpConditions

600 bytes

I
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I r ValctOpConditions incluJe Rc:;ct or ValctOpConditions less than
ScnsorReadings then
Get ValctDisarmingCodc
Issue ValctDisarmingCodc to microcontrollcrs
Else.: Get ValctAnningCodc
Issue ValetArmingCodc to microcontrollcrs
6.1

ValidatcQuerycr
Get OwncrQucry
Get Ov..·ncrAuthSupplied
If OwncrAuthSupplied in OwncrEnrolAuthData then
Get DataRequircd
ExtractData (DataRcquircd, RequiredData)

6.1

ExtractData (DataRcquired, RequiredData)

600 bytes

Search and comparison
required for each item
2000 bytes

If Sensor Readings in RequiredData then
Get SensorReadings
Display SensorReadings

7.1

ManageEngine
Get EngineManagementCriteria
Get SensorReadings I* Power and rpm *I
If SensorReadings <> EngineManagementCriteria then
AdjustThrottleSetting /* Process not elaborated*/

400 bytes

7.2

PersonaliseSeating&Mirrors
Get Persona! Settings I* Required seat and mirror setting *I
Get Sensor Readings I* Actual seat and mirror setting *i
If SensorReadings <> PersonalSettings then
AdjustSeat&Mirror I* Process not elaborated *I

600 bytes

Total storage required for code

9600 bytes

Data flows
Components

Data structure

Est

Storage
Acceleration/deceleration
ActualEngineReadings

ActuaiPersonalSettings
AppropriateSensorReadings
Appropriate Vehicle Details
Arming Code
Authenticationfrom Driver
AuthorisedData
BloodGroup

-

~~

-

*sensor report*
*Sensor reports ofEngineRevs, Temperature,
Oi!Prcssure, IntakcManifoldPressure,
ThrottleSetting*
*alias Pcrsona!Settings*
*readings S(;]ectcd for report to external authorfly*
*details selected for report to external authority*
*Code to activate designated microcontrollers*
*alias DrivcrAuthSupplied*
*data that may be supplied in response to a query*
*driver's blood group
(sec DriverPublicHealthDetail) *

(bytes)
2

50

2
256

3
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..

Cashin put

~cc

Category

r--

Conditions
Datu InA ccun.lancc With Appropr
iatcDcl1nitiun

..

DataRcquircd

'"

I-· Date {Valet ~ct)
Displa ycd Dircct ions
Distance (Valet set)

*sum added !0 purse baluncc*

-

---

l,iccnscDctails)*

--------

*{sec LiccnscDctails)*
- '[!JrivcrData I LiccnscJJittal*

*(alias QucryDtli'U/{C{jUirclllcnt or Owncrf)ucry-

--~----~----

2
10

·---------

-----256

Data as specified fly the owner)*

-

*(scl' ValctOpCorlJitions)*

.

6

*May not involve srnartcard*
*(sec ValctOpConditions)*

2

DOB

-

~(sec

6

DriverAccess

-

Drivcr!D + DrivcrEnrolAuthData
[PIN I TranspondcrSignal I BioTcmplatcJ

Driver AuthSupplied
DriverDatalnAccordancc

-

Engine No
EngineRevs
EngineSettings

-

Expiry Date
ExtAuthDetail

-

ExtemaiAuthCode
ExtemalAuthorityQuery
ExtemalAuthQuery

FrameNo
lntakeManifoldPressure
lssueAuthority
LastStartTime
LicenseDatalnAccordanceWith
AppropriateDefinition
LicenseDetails
LicenseNo
Make
MedicaiWaming
MirrorSetting
Model
Oi!Pressure
Owner Access
Owner AuthSupplied
OwnerDetails
OwnerEnroiAuthData
OwnerlD

LiccnscDctails)*

---

'

8-256

*Data that owner has authorised for release to

WithAppropriateDefinition
DriverDctail
DriverEnrolAuthData
DriverlD
DrivcrJoumey
DrivcrName
DriverPublicHealthDetail
DriverRecord
EngineManagementCriteria

-

2
----·-256

-

-

-

-

external authorities*
DriverAccess+ DriverName +
DriverPublicHealthDctails + LicenseNo
[PIN I TranspondcrSignall BioTemplatc]
*(sec DriverDctail)*
DriverlD + UsageCode + LastStartTime
*(see DriverDctail)*
BloodGroup + 4'Medica1Wamings
DriveriD + LastStartTime + UsageCodc
MaxRevsAtThrottleSetting +
MaxThrottlcSettingAtRevs
*(see VehicleDetails)*
*(see EngineSettings)*
Engine Revs+ Temperature+ Oil Pressure
+lntakeManifoldPressure + ThrottleSetting
*(see LicenseDetails)*
•a matrix 8 X I0 each 2 bytes (ExtcmalAuthCode by
Response Definition)*
*identities external authority•
ExtemaiAuthCode + ExtemalAuthQuery
*Some vehicle details (FrameNo, Engine No), some
owner details, some driver detai!s, some license
details and some sensor readings*
*(see VehicleDetails)*
*(see EngineSettings)*
*(see LicenseDetails)*
*(see SensorReadings)*
License data that owner has authorised for release to
external authorities
LicenseNo + 008 + Expiry Date+ Category+
Condition + JssueAuthority
*(see LiccnseDetails)*
*(see VehicleDctails)*
•a code to identify allergies etc •
*(see PersonalSettings)*
*(see VehiclcDetails)*
*(see ScnsorReadings)*
OwnerlD + OwnerEnrotAuthData
[PIN 1 TranspondcrSignall BioTemplate]
Owner Access+ OwnerNamc
[PIN I TransponderSignall BioTemplate]
*(sec OwnerDetails)*

I
8 - 256
2
30

20
20
2

6

2

20
10
10
10

10
20
2
50
20
2
8 ~ 256
8 ~ 256

2

I
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OwnerName
OwncrQucry
Payment

-

Pcrsonu lis11t ion Data
Personal Sctti ng,s
PrcviousMaxmia
Previous Readings
Previous Read Time
Prcvi0usSartTimc
Pulse
Purse Balance
Readings
Registration

"(sec

---

ValetCodes
ValetOpConditions
ValetReset
ValetSet
ValetSetSupplied
VehicleDetail
YearOtManufacture

--·~-----

30

-----·-·

1-

------

MirrorSctting

--

•Jato items potentially updatcablc•
•data items potentially_updatcablc•

---

•data items potentially updatcablc•

-

*datn items potentially updatcablc*
•an event initiated by the engine•
•cash available to the driver•
•updated previous readings•
*(see VehicleDctails)*

ResponseToExtAuth
ResponseToOwner

Speed (Valet set)
StorableReadings
Temperature
ThrottleSetting
TransactionAmount
Transaction Date
TransactionDetail
UsageCode
UseCode
ValetAnning/DisanningCode

----

Owncrcr!D + OwncrAuthSupplicd -1· Data~~.:_quir~---2
•sum deduCted rrorn purse balance•
--EngincManagcmcntCritcria +· Pcrsona]Scttings
ScatSctting

Response Definition

Road Use Directions
SeatSetting
SemsorReadingsAsAppropriate
SensorReadings

O~vncrDctails)~

~

~

-

~

--

-

-

-

•defines what response may be made to an external
enquiry*
*Authorised data as specified*
* Data as specified by the owner( Alias
RequircdData)*
*provided by external authority*
*(sec PersonalSettings)*
*alias Readings*
Ace/deceleration +Engine Revs+
IntakeManifoldPrcssure +LastStartTime +
LastJOPeriodicReadingsSpeed +
LastJOPeriodicReadingsDeceleration +
MaxDecelerationSinceLastRead +
MaxOilPressureSinceLastRead +
MaxPowerSinceLastRead +
MaxRevolutionsSinceLastRead +
MaxSpeedSinceLastRead + OdometerReading +
SpeedKPH +Temperature+ ThrottleSetting +
TimeLastRead +Time (Date-time group)
Actua\PersonalSettings
*(see ValetOpConditions)*
*alias Readings*
*(see EngineSettings)*
*(sre EngineSettings)*
*(sec TransactionDetail)*
*(see Transaction Detail)*
Transaction Date + TransactionAmount
*indicates purpose of journey*
*alias UsagcCode*
*activates microcontrollcrs ifValetOpConditions are
met*
*codes potentially selectable by the owner*
Date + Speed + Distance
*removes constraint imposed by ValetSet*
*causes the microcontrollers to enforce confommncc
to the ValetOpConditions*
[ValetReset 1(ValetSet + ValetOpConditions)]
Make+ Model+ Registration + EngineNo +
Frame No+ YearOtManufacture
*(see VehicleDctails)*

IU

7

50

2

2
\0
\0

6

2

2

·-
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Appendix 6

QUESTIONNAIRE
Fleet Operator:
A fleet manager needs data upon which to base his decisions.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your advice as to what data your organisatiuon
collects, how it is collected. stored and retrieved, and whether, in your opinion, the process
could be improved using modern technology.

1. What data is recorded:
Usage: driver details?
journey purpose?
kms covered?
defects observed?
fuel etc. supplied?
other?
Maintenance
routine checks?
repairs?
other?

There are several ways of collecting data:
A. By the driver, or other person, keeping a diary or fog sheet manually with a
pen/pencil
B. By a fuel station automatically reading the driver's fuel card and the pump
dispensing meter. This is supplemented by the keyboard entry of the odometer
reading as advised by the driver. These data are periodically passed to the fleet
owner, either electronically or by a paper report.

C. By a repair or service workshop providing documents such as quotes and
invoices whose details are entered into the fleet owner's database, either by filing the
documents or by keyboard.
D. Other.

2. How is the data collected?
Usage: driver details?
journey purpose?
kms covered?
defects observed?
fuel etc. supplied?
other?
Maintenance
routine checks?
repairs?
other?

I
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Data can also be stored in different ways.
A. In paper files?
B. Digitally? (e.g. in a database)
C. Other.
3. How is the data stored:
Usage: driver details?
journey purpose?
kms covered?
defects observed?
fuel etc. supplied?
other?
Maintenance
routine checks?
repairs?
other?
4. Do you feel your current system is satisfactory
or do you have eventual changes in mind?
5. Do you feel users and others co-operate
satisfactorily?
6. Assuming the price was right , would you
consider a system that automated most
data collection?
7. If not, what would be your objection?
8. If so, what do you think would be an
acceptable price for the in-vehicle unit
of an automatic system?
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Appendix 7

PASCAL CODE TO MANIPULATE SMARTCARD READER
(* This program accesses seas based on the Intel 8051 chip in the
smartca.rd reader, reads a codeword from a smartcard via ComPort2, and
passes it to ComPortl for reception by the HCll microcontroller. In
doing so it .!:limulates a more sophisticated reader*)

Program PassCode;
uses
CRT,

{Standard Turbo Pascal unit}

Mise,

{standard Turbo Pascal unit}

IO,

{Unit obtained from Chris Barrett}
{Unit obtained from Chris Barrett}
{unit obtained from Chris Barrett}
{Unit obtained from Rising Edge Technology}

seas,
CtrlCmds,
ASYNC;

canst
ComPortl

= l;

ComPort2 = 2;

{The port used to communicate with the HCll}

{The port used to communicate with the reader}

var
SaveExit : pointer;
Status : integer;
StatusStr : String;
BufStr
String;
Buffer
BufType; {Type defined in unit IO}
I
Byte;

{-------------------------------------------------------------------)
procedure CloseDown; Far;
begin
WriteLn (···Now in Closedown ') ;
ExitProc := SaveExit;
{ Attempt to close down the Communications Port (IO. PAS 4)}

lf CloseCommPort(ComPort2) then
Writeln ('COM', ComPort2, ' closed successfully!')
else
begin
Wri teln ( 'Unable to close COM' , ComPort2) ;
Halt;
end;
If CloseCommPort(ComPortl) then
Writeln ('COM' ,ComPortl,' closed successfully!'}
else
begin
Writeln( 'Unable to close COM' ,ComPortl};
Exit;
end;
end;
{ CloseDown}

{----------------------------------------------------------------)

I
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procedure SendArmingCode;
begin

{SendArmingCode}

{Inst:all exit procedure to close down the communication port}
SaveExit := ExitProc;
ExitProc := ®Closedown;

{ Att:empt to open the Communications Port (IO.PAS JJ}
If OpenCommPort(ComPortl) then
Writeln ('COM', ComPortl, ' opened successfully! ')
else
begin
Writeln('Unable to open COM' ,ComPort!);
Halt;
end;
writeln ('Ready to Write CODEWORD to ComPort 1') ;
{ASYNC19 writes BufStr to
ComWrite (ComPortl, BufStr);
Cornportl}
writeln ('Codeword sent');
readln;
end;

{SendArmingCode}

{-----------------------------------------------------------------}
begin {PassCode main program}
ClrScr;
if not Initialise_SCAM{ComPort2) then { Uses unit CtrlCmds }
begin
WriteLn{'SCAM Initialisation Error');
halt;
end,·
readln;
if not Initialise_scos then
{ uses unit Scos }
begin
WriteLn('SCOS Initialisation Error');
halt;
end;
readln;
Write('Select Directory #4 - ');

(* Selects card directory
containing codeword *)

Status := sel_Dir(4);
SCOS_Error(Status,StatusStr);
WriteLn(StatusStrl;
readln;
Write ('Open File #1 - •);

(* Opens the card file

containing codeword *)

Status := Open_File(l);
SCOS_Error(Status,StatusStr);
WriteLn(StatusStr);
readln;
if Status = File_Not_Found then
Writeln('File not found. Must create File

,,

\

~- _: _', :.,
.....

.-.-,
•'

');
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Write('Read File ltl (RecNum = 1, Let."" 8) - ');
(* Reads the codeword
from the card ')

Status:= Read_File(l,B,Buffer);
SCOS_Error(Status,StatusStr):
WriteLn(StatusStr);
readln;

Move(Buffer,BufStr[l] ,8);
BufStr[O)

:= #8;

WriteLn ( 'BufStr

=

',

BufStr) ;

Send.ArmingCode;
writeln('SendArmingCode
readln;

end.

~xited');
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Appendix 8

MICROCONTROLLER CODE FOR HCll
0001
0000
0002
0000
0000
0003
0004
0000
0005
0000
;*****************************************************************
A program to pass a codeword to the HCll
0006
0000
microcontroller, compare it
0000
0007
to the codeword already stored in RAM in
the microcontroller and,
0008
0000
if the two are the same, output a small
current and voltage to
0000
switch on a thyristor,
0009
0010
by
0000
0000
H<. .· ry Jones
0011
File: ARMCARV.ASM version for RAM
0012
0000
0000
19th JULY I 1998
0013
assemble with tasm using tasml1s.bat
0014
0000
0000
0015
·*********************************************************************
'
0016
0000
0000
0017
·**********************T~*********************************************

'

0018
0019
0020
0021
0022
0023

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

ADDRESS

.EQU

$0000

0024

0000

CODESPOT .EQU

$B700

0025
0026
0027
0028
0029
0030
0031

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

REGBASE

$1000

0032
0033
0034
0035
0036
0037
0038

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

0039

EQUATE TABLE
addresses

.EQU

; parameters
BAUDDAT
CONF1
CONF2

. EQU
.EQU
.EQU

$30
$00
$0C

SELPIN

.EQU

$20

BAUD
DATA
DDRD

.EQU
.EQU
.EQU

$28
$2F
$09

0000

NUMCHAH.

. EQU

$08

0040

0000

NUMFLASH . EQU

$20

0041
0042
0043

0000
0000
0000
0000

PORTO
SCCRl
SCCR2
STATUS

$08
$2C
$2D
$2E

00~4

;Supplied code stored
;here
;On-board code stored
;here
;Register base address

; Sets baud rate
;Configures frame
;Enables transmit
; &receive
;Select Port pin

; offsets

.EQU
.EQU
.EQU
.EQU

;Baud register offset
;Data register offset
;Port D data direction
;reg
;Number of chars in
;CODEWORD
;Twice number of
; flashes
; Port D offset
;SCI con reg 1 offset
; SCI con reg 2 offset
;SCI status register
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;offset
0045
0046
0047
0048

0000
0000
0000
0000

0049
0050
0051
0052
0053
0054
0055
0056
0057
0058
0059

0000
0000
'
0000
; For EEPROM use 8600
8600
.org
~8600
8600
;*************PREPARE TO RECEIVE CODEWORD************
B600
Set up the parameters for serial Communication
8600
8600
; Interface reception.
...... ~t************************************************
8600
'
8600
#REGBASE ; Sets index to regstr
8600 CE 10 00 START: ldx
;base.
8603 lC 08 20
bset PORTD,x,SELPIN ;Ensures pin
; DS set on start.
8606
;Inverter acts on it.
8606 86 30
ldaa #BJl.UDDAT ; (sets baud to 5600 by
setting bits SCPl SCPO)
8608 A7 28
staa BAUD, x
860A
(bits 4 & 5 in baud register)
ldaa #CONFl
; (1 start bit, 8 data
860A 86 00
860C A7 2C
staa SCCR1,X ; bits & 1 stop bit)
860E 86 OC
ldaa #CONF2
; (transmit & receive
; enables TE = RE = 1 in
8610 A7 2D
staa SCCR2,x ; SCCR2)
8612
; (bits 2 & 3 are set by $0C)
8612 86 20
ldaa #SELPIN ;(Sets data direction
for Port DS to become
8614 A7 09
staa DDRD,x
; output for LED &
8616
; thyristor)
ldy
#ADDRESS ;Store received data here
8616 18 CE DO 00
B61A
861A
; * ** * *********RECEIVE CODEWORD CHARACTERS***************
; The program will cycle at this point until a character
861A
B61A
; is received,
861A
;*****************************************************
B61A A6 2E
RECVCHAR: ldaa STATUS,x
(Proceed if RDRF = 1
B61C 84 20
anda #SEI,PIN
(Anding with $20
; results in $00
861E
if RDRF bit is not
;set. It will be set
861E
; when data arrives & show
861E
;receive data reg full.
B61E 27 FA
RECVCHAR
If so, loop)
beq
8620 A6 2E
ldaa STATUS,x
(Read SCSR & data char
8622 A6 2F
ldaa DATA, x
and so clear RDRF)
8624
Para 5-9 of HC11 manual
8624 18 A7 00
staa O,y
Store char at ADDRESS.
8627 18 08
(Inc index until all
iny
86:.>.9 18 ac DO 08
chars (8) received)
cpy
#$d008
862D 26 EB
bne
RECVCHAR
Get next char
B62F
B62F
;**********COMPARE STORED TO SUPPLIED CODEWORD********
862F
NOTE: BUFFAT~O Memory Modify HAS BEEN used to put the
B62F
stored code at CODES POT IN E2PROM. If the supplied
862F
code matches the stored code an LED flashes
862F
as a visual signal and SV is supplied to pin PDS.

0060
0061
0062
0063
0064
0065
0066
0067
0068
0069
0070
0071
0072
0073
0074
0075
0076
0077
0078
0079
0080
0081
0082
0083
0084
0085
0086
0087
0088
0089
0090
0091
0092
0093
0094
0095
0096
0097

;**********H*RECEIVE SUPPLIED CODEI'IORD '*****
; This program will receive characters from
;the PC i f it is installed in RAt-1 on the hell
;microcontroller and the command GO cOOO in
:; issued
. * * ***** * ** **. * ** * * ** * * * * * * ** ** * * * * ~· * ** * * * * * * * * * * * "'* *
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0098
0099
0100
0101
0102
0103
0104
0105
0106
0107
0108
0109
0110
0111
0112
0113
0114
0115
0116
0117
0118
0119
0120
0121
0122
0123
0124
0125
0126

862F
862F
862F
8632
8636
8638
8638
8638
8630
8630
863F
B63F
863F
B63F
8640
8642
8643
8645
8645
864S
8645
8645
864S
8645
8645
8648
B64A
864A
864C

0127
0128
0129
0130
0131
0132
0133
0134
0135
0136
0137

B64E
86SO
8652
8653
8655
8655
8655
8655
8655
8655
8655

0138
0139
0140
0141
0142
0143
0144
0145
0146
0147
0148
0149

8658
8658
865C
B65C
B65E
8661
8663
8667
8669
B66C
B66C
B66C

0150
0151
0152
01S3
01S4
015S

8670 20
8672
8672
;****************DELAY*******************~************
8672
; a delay routine to enable flashes to be seen
8672
;****************************~*****w******************
8672 18 3C
DELAY:
pshy

'
CE
18
C6
18

87 00
CE DO 00
08
1\.6 00
LOOP!:

ldx
ldy
ldab
ldaa

Al 00

cmpa

26 16

bne

08
18 08
SA
26 F3

inx
iny
decb
bne

jjCODBS PO'!'
HADDRESS
#NUMCIIAR
$00, y

; Stored CODEWORD here
; Reset y to addr
; CODE\o'IOf{D is 8 chars
; Ace loaded with
suppld char from ADDRESS
$OO,x
Compares to stored
char from CODESPOT
RESTORE
If no match then
error RESTORE resets all
values and then returns to
; the waiting loop RECVCHAR.

LOOP!

; Set-up for next char
; Loop for 8 chars

;*************OPEN GATE & FLASH LED ******************
Routine puts eight pulses on Port DS. This activates
; the thyrister gate and causes the LED to flash on
; sixteen times .
·*****************************************************

'

ldx
ldab

CE 10 00
C6 20
86 20
88 20
A7 08
80 20
SA
26 F7

CE

18
86
18
18
18
26
1C

18

LOOP3:

ldaa
eora
staa
bsr

decb

bne

#REG8ASE ; restored from CODESPOT
#NUMFLASH ; Number of LED changes.
;Flashes half the number of changes.
#SELPIN
Selects bit 5
#SELPIN
Self XOR toggles bit 5
;on/off
POR'I'D,x
Activates/Deactivates 05
DELAY
enables LED to be seen
after 16 flashes = 0
repeat until count is 0
LOOP3
return to loop waiting
for CODEWORD

;*********PREPARE TO RETURN TO WAIT LOOP**************
; routine to restore loop waiting for supplied code
·*****************************************************
'
10 00 RESTORE:
ldx #REGBASE
; Only needed in
;restoring from ERROR
(Restored from CODESPOT)
CE DO 00
ldy #ADDRESS
; location of supplied code
(Restored after DELAY routine)
FF
NEXT: ldaa #$ff
Overwrites a supplied code
A7 00
staa O,y
: character with ff
08
iny
; Then next code character
8C DO 08
cpy #$d008
; until 8 chars.
F3
bne NEXT
; Overwrite next char
08 20
bset PORTD,x,SELPIN ;Ensures pin D5 set ON
; at each RESTORE. Inverter acts to
; make it OFF until ON in LOOP 3,
CE DO 00
ldy #ADDRESS
After 8 chars reset the
; index &
AB
bra RECVCHAR
return to wait loop
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0156
8674 18 CE FF FF
0157
8678 18 09
LOOP2:
0158
B67A 26 FC
0159
B67C 18 38
0160
B67E 39
0161
B67F
0162
867F
0163
B67F
tasm: Number of errors = 0

ldy

II$FFFF

dey
bne

LOOP2

puly
r::s
.end

Contaminates Y
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Appendix 9

VEHICLE SECURITY SURVEY
No pen needed. Just prick six holes and drop it.

QUESTIONS
FURTHER INFOR.~IATION FOR THOSE I:"'TERESTED
The following five qul!stions arc intended
In Western Australia almosl 20.000 vehicles are stolen every year and the number is
to get your opinion as to what a motorist
rising.
You can help 10 change that. For most people a car is their second most
might pay for security. Some reasons
v~luable
asset and it is the easiest to steal. Your answer. by indicating just five choices,
why you might respond------+
Will help a study of the options for making vehicle theft harder. Security is often
defined as the preservation of one's assets. Therefore. the cost of security must be
b~lanced against the possibility of loss. The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your
Cltimate sccuri£y that would defeat
v1ews on what kind of balance motorists might choose.
almost any thief can be installed t\n
almost :my vt=hicle. For details

--+

Ql What would you be prepared to

•

pny for ultimate security?

moreiS5001SlOOISSOI$25ISlOIIess
{Pril.:k your choice with the toothpick)

Pretty good security that would defeat
most joyriders and impulse thieves is
installed on some modem vehicles.
For details------------.

Q2 What would you be prepared to
pay for pretty good security?

The ultimate vehicle 5ecurity system is one that requires the presentation by the
legitimate driver of a personal feature such as a fingerprint. eye retina or back-of-hand
for scanning. Only when the presented feature matches its de:;cription stored in the
vehicle will the doors. bonnet and boot open, ignit1on and fuel systems work and
steering, brakes and gearbox be released. Also, if the engine is switched off and no one
is in the vehicle, then after a short period the doors will be locked and the other systems
deactivated

A pretty good vehicle security system is one that requires the pres'!ntation of a device
that responds to a radio challenge from the vehicle with J code that causes the vehicle
doors to open 3nd, on entry of a PIN using a keypad within the veh1cle, enables the
ignition and bonnet catch to work and unlocks the steering. The device presented is no
bigger than a key tag.

moreiS500ISlOOIS50IS251SlOiless
(Prick your choice with the toothpick)

Standard security is fitted to most older

vehicles.

-----------+

Q3 Do you think this is enough?

yes I no

A standard security system is one that requires a key to unlock the doors. bonnet and

steering and activate the ignition.
Do you have any suggestions or comments?

(Prick your choice with the toothpick)

······························· ··································································
Q4 Do you think alarms or

immobilisers are worth fitting?

yes I no
(Prick your choice with the toothpick)

QS If YES. haw much would you be
prepared to pay for one?

more!S500I$100!S501$251SI011ess
{Prick ~our choice with the toothpick)

································ ············································································
... ······················ ........................................... ············ ...........
.............................................................................................................
WHAT TO DO WITH COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE
Drop it on the ground for facer collection. (the weight will prevent
it blowing awa..v) or
put it in any of the boxes at the exits from rhe car park. or
drop it in the Building 13. Computer Science assignment box. or
give it to the Secretary. Computer Sciem.:e Department
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Appendix to

LIST OF ACRONYMS
IN RIA
ISO

IVHS
i

ti

I
I

I

K
LWB
MCU

il
i I
11
1
I kilo :r
Long Nheel Base
i

h in
s(

1$3e~;~~~

ti
i i
/SYStem

MiiZ

""
MTL
Mill

NEC
NRI

contactless card
I
i ;·;vstem
Mount Lawley
li i
I
'Svstem
Nippon I I
i
I
nc
Ani

[NZ
i

OBD

[Qjj[)
OMI

I

Open

I i

[fET

i

I PC
PC/SC

computer

a

I
I PIN

[PKI
I PVC
RAC

i
i
I Public Key
I
i
I i
The Royal Automobile Club of WA or

UK

~

n access
n Set
a curves
read only
Rivest Shamir.

i

1

I SA
I SAM

~
Mobile

I I

Association
I

~
rsss
3A

~
IVP

II

~

. South

I

·an
v method

t

J access
I
J chip for limited payment
Secure<

i
I Francais

:orotocol
r Identity Module
i

I ""

Smart Silicon
ltd
United
United States
United states of
i
itvofWA
I Vehicle i ft System
I Vice
li
I World i

'"""

